Cordeco Development Corp. v. Vazquez, Civ. No. 803-71.

Decision Date18 August 1972
Docket NumberCiv. No. 803-71.
PartiesCORDECO DEVELOPMENT CORP., Plaintiff, v. Antonio Santiago VAZQUEZ et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Charles A. Cordero, San Juan, P. R., for plaintiff.

José A. Anglada, Department of Justice, San Juan, P. R., and Inez Acevedo de Campos, Santurce, P. R., for defendants.

ORDER

TOLEDO, District Judge.

The controversy before this Court is between an alien corporation, Cordeco Development Corporation, plaintiff, and several named defendants all of whom are alleged to be citizens of and domiciled within the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Until the present date only defendant, Antonio Santiago Vazquez, Secretary of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico Public Works Department, has been served with process and is presently a party defendant in this case.

The jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked under the diversity statute, Title 28, United States Code, Section 1332, and also because of alleged violations of the Civil Rights Act, specifically, Title 42, United States Code, Sections 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986 and Title 28, United States Code, Section 1343. The plaintiff alleges violations of its due process and equal protection rights under the Federal Constitution.

As far as defendant Antonio Santiago Vazquez is concerned, the only defendant presently before this Court, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant acting under color of law has refused to grant plaintiff a permit for extraction of sand from plaintiff's land and to otherwise pass upon plaintiff's petition for said permit, all in violation of law and plaintiff's federal constitutional rights.

On November 29, 1971, codefendant Antonio Santiago Vazquez filed a motion to dismiss, alleging in essence, that the complaint is in reality an action against the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, who has not consented to be sued as sovereign. It is also alleged that the civil rights statutes under which the claim for remedies is brought was not designed to support a cause of action involving property rights and that state remedies have not been exhausted.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The action before this Court is clear in alleging that the defendant public officials engaged in specified concerted activity under color of law and title. The complaint is against these public officers in their individual capacity and no attempt is made to impose vicarious liability upon the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Therefore, the arguments to the effect that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has not consented to be sued, or that the Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico was not served, are not material to the jurisdictional issue before the Court. The doctrine of soverign immunity, applicable to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, does not extend its protective umbrella to individuals acting under the color of law and title of their office; Inmobiliaria Borinquen, Inc. v. García Santiago (D.C.P.R.1969), 295 F.Supp. 203. The guise of sovereign immunity cannot be used as a blanket protective cover by all state officials to avoid their personal liability and responsibility for their individual excesses committed under the shield of their office or title. To permit such an extension of the immunity doctrine, would be tantamount to demeaning the very essence of the Civil Rights Act and rendering useless the Federal protection offered by that statute and the Federal constitutional guarantees to persons aggrieved by such state officials.

PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

The defendant further argues that claims for the deprivation of property rights should be distinguished from constitutionally protected civil rights. The complaint in the case at bar seeks relief in the form of recovery of continuing money damages in excess of $100,000, plus punitive damages, the right by plaintiff to the free use and usufruct of his property, and the legal right to the permit as a consequence of the alleged concerted activity of the defendant public officials in refusing to comply with local law and in refusing to apply local law in an equal manner.

The defendant's identical assertion was raised before the Supreme Court and denied in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp. (1972), 405 U.S. 538, 92 S. Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424. There exists no dichotomy between personal liberty and property rights. It has long been recognized that rights in property are basic civil rights, Lynch, supra, p. 552, 92 S.Ct. 1113. See also: Harrison v. Brooks (1 Cir. 1971), 446 F.2d 404; Cobb v. City of Malden (1 Cir. 1953), 202 F.2d 701.

EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES

Defendant next argues that plaintiff should exhaust the state remedies available to him, namely the suggestion that a Writ of Mandamus be filed in the Commonwealth Court or that plaintiff seek a hearing before defendant. Where civil rights are asserted, exhaustion of state remedies has not been held to be a prerequisite to the maintenance of a Federal cause of action under Section 1983 of Title 42, United States Code and other provisions of the Civil Rights Act. In King v. Smith (1968), 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118, the Supreme Court established that an action under the Civil Rights Act is not subject to a requirement to exhaust state administrative remedies where the constitutional challenge is sufficiently substantial to require the convening of a three judge court. The plaintiff's claims of violations of his due process and equal protection rights are definitely substantial. See also Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L. Ed.2d 492; McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L. Ed.2d 622 (1963); Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416, 88 S.Ct. 526, 19 L.Ed.2d 647 (1967); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639, 88 S.Ct. 2119, 20 L.Ed.2d 1319 (1968); Wilwording v. Swenson, 404...

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4 cases
  • Comtronics, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • June 17, 1975
    ...Guild, 346 F.Supp. 106 (D.C.P.R.1972); Marin v. University of Puerto Rico, 346 F.Supp. 470 (D.C.P.R.1972); Cordeco Development Corp. v. Vazquez, 354 F.Supp. 1355 (D.C.P.R.1972); King v. Conservatorio de Musica de P.R., 378 F.Supp. 746 (D.C.P.R.1974). Despite defendants' urging, we do not pe......
  • Glenwal Development Corp. v. Schmidt
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • November 16, 1972
    ...83 S. Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 88 S.Ct. 2128, 20 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1968); Cordeco Development Corp. v. Vázquez, 354 F.Supp. 1355 (D.C.P.R.1972); Marín v. University of Puerto Rico, 346 F.Supp. 470 (D.C.P.R. As a corollary argument, defendant relies on Fornar......
  • Reynolds v. Logan Charter Service, Inc., GC 82-282-WK-O.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi
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    ...For support, defendants rely on Fox v. The Eaton Corporation, 615 F.2d 716 (6th Cir.1980) and Cordeco Development Corp. v. Vazques, 354 F.Supp. 1355 (D. Puerto Rico, 1972). Both cases stand for the proposition that, as a general principle, the filing of an action in a court that lacks juris......
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    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico
    • November 27, 1972
    ... ... CONTINENTAL CASUALTY COMPANY, Defendant ... Civ. No. 995-71 ... United States District Court, D ... ...

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