Cordell v. Scott
Decision Date | 13 November 1961 |
Docket Number | No. 9913-,9913- |
Citation | 111 N.W.2d 594,79 S.D. 316 |
Parties | Katherine CORDELL, Plaintiff and Appellant. v. Richard SCOTT, by Mildred L. Scott, his Guardian ad litem, Defendant and Respondent. a. |
Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Loucks, Oviatt & Bradshaw, Watertown, for plaintiff and appellant.
Gribbin & Burns, Watertown, Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith, Sioux Falls, for defendant and respondent.
The trial of this personal injury action resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of defendant from which plaintiff appeals alleging error in an instruction to the jury.
In summarizing the material facts we do so in the light most favorable to the verdict. Accordingly, it appears the collision of automobiles in which the plaintiff, Katherine Cordell, was injured occurred at an intersection in the city of Watertown about 5 o'clock in the afternoon on February 5, 1959. Plaintiff was riding in the right front seat of a 1951 Oldsmobile owned and operated by her son-in-law, Raymond DeVille. The DeVille car had been traveling south on North Broadway. It stopped at the intersection of Fourth Avenue to make a left turn. The car was standing on ice which extended over the entire intersection. It was daylight, the weather was clear, and visibility good. While waiting for oncoming cars to pass before turning left the DeVille car was struck in the rear by an automobile driven by the defendant, Richard Scott.
Defendant Scott was driving his mother's 1958 Oldsmobile. He was a high school student and had driven the car to school on the day of the accident, Sometime after school closed and just prior to the accident Scott stopped his car on North Broadway to let a girl friend out at her home. She lived about six blocks north of the Fourth Avenue intersection. Afterwards defendant proceeded south on North Broadway. That street was approximately 45 feet wide. Snow had been pushed off the roadway unto the curbs on each side of the street. The streets in Watertown were generally icy, but the southbound lane on North Broadway was clear. When defendant was about a half block north of the Fourth Avenue intersection he first observed the DeVille car. It was headed south in his lane of travel. Defendant thought it was moving. When he was about three car lengths away he noticed the DeVille car was standing still. Defendant was then traveling about 15 miles per hour. When he discovered the DeVille car was stopped defendant applied his brakes and without success attempted to turn right. The application of brakes caused defendant's car to skid and the collision followed.
Instruction No. 3 advised the jury, in substance, that the claims in this action were founded upon negligence; the mere fact an incident resulting in damage occurred was not alone sufficient to justify a verdict against the other party; and the claiming party had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was negligent and that such negligence, if shown, was a proximate cause of the injury. The instruction also contained the following reference to unavoidable accident:
To which portion of the instruction plaintiff objected and excepted upon the grounds it was misleading, prejudicial, and not warranted by the evidence and facts. Plaintiff's objections were overruled and the sole question for consideration here is whether the giving of this instruction constituted reversible error.
This court has never been called upon to determine when, or under what circumstances, an instruction upon unavoidable accident would be appropriate. Elsewhere the problem has been productive of many cases and many different conclusions. Reference is made to an exhaustive annotation on the subject in 65 A.L.R.2d 12 which points out that the most difficult question in nearly all of the cases is what constitutes the essential evidentiary foundation for an accident instruction and that great difficulty has been experienced in formulating a clear, workable, general rule for determining the same. As a possible solution the annotator suggests that 65 A.L.R.2d 23. Also see LaDuke v. Lord, 97 N.H. 122, 83 A.2d 138, where this policy is followed.
In support of his contentions plaintiff cites the case of Butigan v. Yellow Cab Company, 49 Cal.2d 652, 320 P.2d 500, 65 A.L.R.2d 1. The position of the California court on this subject is unique. In a long line of cases culminating in Parker v. Womack, 37 Cal.2d 116, 230 P.2d 823, that court approved of accident instructions in general and evolved the rule that such an instruction was proper in any case except where the evidence established the negligence of the defendant as a matter of law. In the Butigan case the court reconsidered and reversed Parker v. Womack, supra, and generally disapproved of unavoidable accident instruction in all cases. The reasons for this 'about face' were stated by the court as follows:
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