Corder v. Corder
Decision Date | 26 September 2005 |
Docket Number | No. G033608.,G033608. |
Citation | 132 Cal.App.4th 1261,34 Cal.Rptr.3d 294 |
Court | California Court of Appeals |
Parties | Shaoping CORDER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Lisa R. CORDER, Defendant and Respondent. Lisa R. Corder, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Shaoping Corder, Defendant and Appellant. |
Law Office of Ronald E. Harrington and Ronald E. Harrington, Ventura, for Plaintiff, Defendant and Respondent Lisa R. Corder.
Shaoping Corder (Sherry) appeals a judgment that apportioned the proceeds of a settlement made with one of the defendants in a wrongful death action. The court apportioned the proceeds of the settlement 10 percent to Sherry, the decedent's surviving spouse, and 90 percent to Lisa R. Corder (Lisa), the decedent's adult daughter.1 Sherry asserts the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to apportion the proceeds, and argues the court committed other errors as well, which, although variously phrased, amount to a challenge to the adversary system of justice and to the sufficiency of the evidence. We reject all of Sherry's contentions and affirm the judgment.
Sherry met Raymond Corder (Raymond) in August 1999; he proposed marriage to her in December 1999; and they married in September 2000. Eight months later, in May 2001, Raymond was killed in a construction accident.
In a consolidated wrongful death action originally brought separately by Sherry and Lisa, one of the defendants settled with both plaintiffs for an unapportioned lump sum of $1.1 million. On the same day the stipulated settlement was signed, Sherry and Lisa entered into another stipulation regarding the apportionment of their recovery. Their apportionment stipulation provided:
Following the settlement, plaintiffs went to trial against two remaining defendants, but the jury found neither was negligent and judgment was entered in favor of those defendants. Shortly after the trial, the parties commenced discovery proceedings in preparation for a further trial to apportion the settlement proceeds. In the midst of these discovery proceedings, all conducted under caption of the Orange County wrongful death case, Sherry filed a separate lawsuit in the Los Angeles County Superior Court seeking to "quiet title" to the settlement proceeds. Lisa responded by moving to set a trial date in the Orange County case, contending the Orange County court had jurisdiction to apportion the proceeds, and, in any event, Sherry's filing of a separate suit in Los Angeles County violated their stipulation. The court ruled it had jurisdiction to apportion the proceeds and set the trial date.
At the apportionment trial, the court honored the parties' stipulation by hearing evidence not presented at the wrongful death trial. The court also made clear, however, it would consider all of the evidence, including the evidence it had heard in the earlier proceeding. Most of the additional evidence at the apportionment trial was about Lisa's contention that at the time of Raymond's death he was contemplating dissolving his marriage to Sherry because he suspected she was engaging in prostitution. Evidence was also presented to show the close relationship between Raymond and Lisa, his daughter. The court's written statement of decision sets forth a brief summary of the conflicting evidence and explains the court's resolution of those conflicts. We quote a portion of that statement as a succinct description of the basis for the court's decision.
Judgment was entered accordingly. Sherry's motions to vacate the judgment and enter a different judgment or for new trial were denied. She appeals the apportionment judgment and the denial of her posttrial motions. Lisa moves for sanctions. We affirm the judgment and denial of the motions to vacate or for new trial, and deny Lisa's request for sanctions.
Sherry contends the entry of judgment in favor of the nonsettling defendants following the jury trial deprived the Orange County Superior Court of its jurisdiction to apportion the settlement proceeds between the two plaintiffs. Sherry argues the "one judgment rule" precluded the court from entering a "second judgment," and Code of Civil Procedure section 377.612 only authorizes the court to apportion the award of a jury, not the proceeds of a settlement. Sherry is mistaken.
Sherry misapprehends the "one judgment rule." "The theory [of the one final judgment rule] is that piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals in a single action would be oppressive and costly, and that a review of intermediate rulings should await the final disposition of the case." (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Appeal, § 58, p. 113.) For that reason, "an appeal cannot be taken from a judgment that fails to complete the disposition of all the causes of action between the parties even if the causes of action disposed of by the judgment have been ordered to be tried separately, or may be characterized as `separate and independent' from those remaining." (Morehart v. County of Santa Barbara (1994) 7 Cal.4th 725, 743, 29 Cal.Rptr.2d 804, 872 P.2d 143.) But it is also settled that "`the rule requiring dismissal [of an appeal] does not apply when the case involves multiple parties and a judgment is entered which leaves no issue to be determined as to one party.'" (Nguyen v. Calhoun (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 437, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 436.) An appeal thus could have been taken from the judgment entered on the jury's verdict in favor of the nonsettling defendants. But that does not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to determine the issues remaining between other parties.
Here, the court had both the power and the duty to adjudicate all remaining issues in the wrongful death case including the allocation of settlement proceeds between adverse plaintiffs. (§ 377.61 []; Watkins v. Nutting (1941) 17 Cal.2d 490, 498, 110 P.2d 384 []; § 578 [].) Indeed, the court is required to "decide any proceeding in which he or she is not disqualified" (§ 170), and "[m]andamus will ... lie to compel the court to assume and exercise its jurisdiction, i.e., to hear and determine the case on its merits." (2 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1996) Jurisdiction, § 345, p. 934.) Accordingly, the court would have abdicated its clear duty had it failed to exercise its jurisdiction to apportion the settlement funds.
Sherry's other argument, that the court's jurisdiction to allocate a monetary recovery extends only to a jury award, and not to settlement proceeds, is unsupported by any apt authority. She relies on Changaris v. Marvel (1964) 231 Cal.App.2d 308, 41 Cal.Rptr. 774 (Changaris), a case that is easily distinguished. In Changaris, attorney Changaris represented all five heirs in a wrongful death case. A...
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