Cordova v. Imperial Cnty. Narcotics Task Force

Decision Date07 January 2022
Docket Number3:21-cv-00445-BEN-DEB
PartiesJOSE MANUEL CORDOVA, an individual, Plaintiffs, v. IMPERIAL COUNTY NARCOTICS TASK FORCE, a California governmental entity; COUNTY OF IMPERIAL, a California governmental entity; MELANIE MAGUE, individually and in her official capacity; ALBERT VALENZUELA, individually and in his official capacity; IMPERIAL COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY, a California governmental entity; GILBERT G. OTERO, individually and in his official capacity; IMPERIAL COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, a California governmental entity; RAYMOND LOERA, individually and in his official capacity; FONTANA POLICE DEPARTMENT, a California governmental entity; CHRISTOPHER MACIAS, individually and in his official capacity; CARL GUTHRIE, individually and in his official capacity; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of California

ORDER: (1) GRANTING THE FONTANA POLICE DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE (2) DENYING AS MOOT DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAR TELEPHONICALLY AT HEARING [ECF NOS. 12, 14 15, 16, AND 17]

HON ROGER T. BENITEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Jose Manuel Cordova, an individual (Plaintiff or “Mr. Cordova”) brings this civil rights action against Defendants Imperial County Narcotics Task Force, a California governmental entity (the ICNTF); the County of Imperial, a California governmental entity (Imperial County); Melanie Mague (Ms. Mague), individually and in her official capacity as a law enforcement officer working for the United States Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”)[1]; Albert Valenzuela (Mr. Valenzuela), individually and in his official capacity as a law enforcement officer; the Imperial County District Attorney, a California governmental entity (the ICDA); Gilbert G. Otero, individually and in his official capacity as the District Attorney; the Imperial County Sheriff's Office, a California governmental entity (the ICSO); Raymond Loera, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff; the City of Fontana, erroneously sued as the Fontana Police Department, a California governmental entity (the “FPD”); Christopher Macias, individually and in his official capacity as a law enforcement officer for FPD (Mr. Macias); Carl Guthrie, individually and in his official capacity as a law enforcement officer for FPD (Mr. Guthrie) (collectively, Defendants[2]); and Does 1 through 10[3], inclusive. Complaint, ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) at 2-6, ¶¶ 3-14.

Before the Court are the Motions of Police Defendants (1) to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for Failure to State a Claim, ECF No. 12 (the “Motion”), and (2) for Leave to Appear Telephonically or by Videoconference During the COVID-19 Public Emergency, ECF No. 15. The Motions were submitted on the papers without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1) and Rule 78(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), thereby mooting Defendants' Motion for Leave to Telephonically Appear at the Hearing on the Motion. ECF No. 17; see also Tur v. YouTube, Inc., 562 F.3d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 2009) ([A]n issue is moot when deciding it would have no effect within the confines of the case itself.”). After considering the papers submitted, supporting documentation, and applicable law, the Court (1) GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint without leave to amend and (2) DENIES Defendants' Motion for Leave to Telephonically Appear at the Hearing on the Motion.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Statement of Facts[4] Plaintiff alleges that between September 20, 2013 and October 3, 2013, the Investigative Defendants conducted a wiretap on the telephones of two individuals, Raphael Martinez and Jonathan Vizcaino, pursuant to an order issued pursuant to Search Warrant 2013-185 (“SW-2013-185”) allowing them to wiretap for the purpose of listening for drug-related activity. Compl. at 7, ¶ 19; see also Defendants' Motion, ECF No. 12-1 (Mot.) at 6 10-11. During calls on September 20, 24, 26, 30, 2013 and October 1, 2, 3, 2013, the Investigative Defendants intercepted statements using the wiretap that led them to believe that a kidnapping was going to take place in the City of Fontana. Id. at 7, ¶ 20; see also Mot. at 6:15-16. Moving Parties state that Imperial County asked for the FPD's help in preventing the kidnapping. Mot. at 6:16-17.

On October 3, 2013, both the Investigative Defendants and Police Defendants, relying on the intercepted communications obtained via the wiretap performed pursuant to Search Warrant 2013-185, obtained a separate search warrant[5]; stopped Plaintiff and two other men; searched their vehicles, property, and hotel rooms; and arrested them. Id. at 7, ¶ 21; Mot. at 6:17-20.

Approximately one year and a half later, on April 14, 2015, a first amended information was filed in the Imperial County Superior Court, Count I of which alleged that Plaintiff conspired to commit the crime of kidnapping for ransom in violation of California Penal Code, §§ 182(a)(1), 209(a). Compl. at 8, ¶ 26(a); see also California v. Jose Manuel Cordova, Imperial County Superior Court Case No. JCF31827 (the “Criminal Case”). This charge arose out of the wiretap investigation that included wiretap interception order SW-2013-185, issued on or about September 20, 2013. Id.

On May 12, 2015, after using the wiretap communications as “the sole evidence” used to establish Plaintiff's alleged involvement with the kidnapping, a jury found Plaintiff guilty on Count I. Compl. at 7, ¶ 22, 8, ¶ 26(b); but see Cal. Penal Code § 1054.1 (requiring a prosecuting attorney to disclose to a defendant or his counsel any exculpatory evidence in the prosecutor's possession, or that the prosecutor knows to be in the possession of any investigating agencies). At the time of his conviction, Plaintiff alleges that he was unaware that the ICDA had failed to obtain an order from the court stating that the intercepted communications that went beyond the scope of the wiretap order could be admitted in Court, as is required by California Penal Code, § 629.50 et seq.[6] Id. at 7, ¶ 25.

On June 17, 2016, Plaintiff was sentenced to 1, 136 days in jail (which he had already served) and probation. Compl. at 7, ¶ 23, 8, ¶ 26(c).

On or about June 17, 2019, Plaintiff's probation was terminated. Compl. at 7, ¶ 24.

During post-trial proceedings in the case involving Plaintiff's co-defendant, Raphael Martinez (Case No. EHC000180), the government discovered that judicial authorization had not been obtained pursuant to California Penal Code, section 629.82(a) to allow use of evidence of crimes not specified in SW-2013-185. Id. at 8, ¶ 26(d). Penal Code sections 182(a)(1) and 209(a), the statutes under which Plaintiff was convicted, were not specified in wiretap interception order SW-2013-185. Id. On December 23, 2019, Plaintiff filed a letter to the court in his criminal action … in which he references the outcome of the habeas corpus petition filed by his co-defendant Rafael Martinez wherein it was discovered that there were authorization issues with SW-2013-185.” Answer, ECF No. 11 (“Ans.”) at 6, ¶ 27.

On or about June 3, 2020, based on a stipulation submitted to the Superior Court for the County of Imperial, the court entered a Stipulation and Order to Vacate Conviction as to Count 1 in Plaintiff's Criminal Case. Compl. at 8, ¶ 26(e). Defendants “admit that judicial authorization was not obtained pursuant to Penal Code section 629.82(a) to allow use of evidence of crimes not specified in SW-2013-185.” Ans. at 6, ¶ 25. Plaintiff alleges he did not learn that the scope of the wiretap warrant had been exceeded until he was served with a copy of the June 3, 2020 Stipulation and Order.[7] He further pleads that his “delay in learning about the invalidity of the wiretap order and the use of the intercepted communications was reasonable as the matter required years of litigation to determine, with the District Attorney refusing to produce the wiretap orders and affidavits.” Compl. at ¶ 28.

At this time the Court vacated his conviction, Plaintiff had already served his time in jail, and his probation had terminated. Thus, the Court's decision vacating the conviction only had the effect of removing the conviction from his record.

B. Procedural History

On March 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against Defendants, alleging a single cause of action for violation of his civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against all Defendants. See Compl. at 9-10.

By March 18, 2021, Plaintiff had served the ICDA, Imperial County, the FPD, the ICSO, and ICNTF. ECF Nos. 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10. However, to date, no proof of service has been filed for Ms. Mague, Mr. Valenzuela, Mr. Otero, Mr. Loera, Mr. Macias, and Mr. Guthrie.[8]

On April 7, 2021, Defendants Imperial County, ICDA, ICSO, Mr. Otero, and Mr. Loera filed an Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint. ECF No. 11. That same day, Police Defendants filed the instant Motion. See Motion, ECF No. 12-1 (Mot.). On May 24, 2021, Plaintiff opposed. Opposition, ECF No. 14 (“Oppo.”). On May 28, 2021, Moving Parties replied. Reply, ECF No. 16 (“Reply”).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 12(b)(6)), a complaint must be dismissed when a plaintiff's allegations fail to set forth a set of facts which, if true, would entitle the complainant to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 555 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (holding that a claim must be facially plausible to survive a motion to dismiss). The pleadings must raise the right to relief beyond the speculative level; a plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the...

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