Cordova v. Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac

• Decision Date: 29 March 2013
• Docket Number: No. 3:12–CV–153.,3:12–CV–153.
• Citation: 936 F.Supp.2d 1003
• Parties: Amber Marie Letts CORDOVA, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME DU LAC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

936 F.Supp.2d 1003

Amber Marie Letts CORDOVA, Plaintiff,

v.UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME DU LAC, Defendant.

No. 3:12–CV–153.

United States District Court,

N.D. Indiana,

South Bend Division.

March 29, 2013.

Michael S. Dalrymple, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff.

Jeanine M. Gozdecki, Barnes & Thornburg LLP, South Bend, IN, for Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

RUDY LOZANO, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, filed by Defendant, University of Notre Dame Du Lac, on June 1, 2012. (DE # 6.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED. The plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED with prejudice, and the clerk is ORDERED to close this case.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Amber Marie Letts Cordova (“Cordova”), originally filed a complaint on July 13, 2011, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, cause number 3:11–CV–210, against Defendant, the University of Notre Dame Du Lac (“Notre Dame”). On December 13, 2011, the Honorable Robert L. Miller, issued an opinion and order for that case which, as related to Notre Dame, provided that several of Cordova's claims were dismissed with prejudice and several were dismissed without prejudice. Cordova filed a new complaint with this Court for those claims dismissed without prejudice against Notre Dame on March 30, 2012.

In this most recent complaint, Cordova states that she has a cognitive learning disability which “alters the manner in which she processes written materials and her ability to write” and a mental or psychological disability which results in “periods of severe depression and anxiety.” (DE # 1, p. 1, 3.) She further states that these disabilities cause her to be “substantially limited in the major life activities of learning, thinking, concentrating, reading, and sleeping” and require “reasonable accommodations in order for to [sic] access educational materials and content.” ( Id. at 3.) Cordova alleges that Notre Dame:

violated Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), as amended 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181–12189 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 794, by failing to provide [her] with appropriate accommodations in order to fully participate as a master-level student in Defendant's Masters Degree in Fine Arts program (“Program”); expelling her from the Program, and retaliating against her for complaining about the lack of appropriate accommodations.

( Id. at 1–2.) She also alleges that she suffered “severe emotional distress” as a result of Notre Dame's conduct. ( Id. at 17.) In her complaint, Cordova describes numerous occasions on which she allegedly requested but was denied accommodations by Notre Dame faculty members, and she sets out the steps she took to file related grievances and appeals. ( Id. at 4–11.) Cordova states that she was “effectively expelled from the Program” on August 10, 2009, but that she was “not aware of this fact at this time.” ( Id. at 11.) Several days later she registered for courses, began her course work, and resubmitted her appeal; however, Graduate School Associate Dean Turpin “instructed the registrar to remove Cordova from all registered fall semester courses and discontinued her student status” on August 25, 2000. ( Id.) That same day, she was informed via an email from Student Housing that she had twenty-four hours to vacate her residence, and Cordova states that this was the communicationto inform her that she was “no longer a student.” ( Id.) Cordova subsequently testified at an appeal board hearing, and on September 24, 2009, her appeal was denied. ( Id.) She “appealed this decision to the Provost,” but her complaint was “summarily denied” on April 1, 2010. ( Id. at 11–12.)

Notre Dame filed the instant motion in lieu of an answer. Cordova filed her response on June 25, 2012, to which Notre Dame filed a reply on July 3, 2012. The motion is ripe for adjudication.

DISCUSSION

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a complaint to be dismissed if it fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Allegations other than fraud and mistake are governed by the pleading standard outlined in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement” showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). All well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true, and all reasonable inferences from those facts must be resolved in the plaintiff's favor. Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 692 (7th Cir.2008). However, a plaintiff may plead himself out of court if the complaint includes allegations that show he cannot possibly be entitled to the relief sought. McCready v. eBay, Inc., 453 F.3d 882, 888 (7th Cir.2006).

The Seventh Circuit has cautioned against granting Rule 12(b)(6) motions based on affirmative defenses because “[t]he mere presence of a potential affirmative defense does not render the claim for relief invalid.” Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners, 682 F.3d 687, 690 (7th Cir.2012). However, while affirmative defenses “typically turn on facts not before the court at that stage in the proceedings,” cases may be properly dismissed prior to discovery “when all relevant facts are presented.” Id. See Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 579 (7th Cir.2009) (statute of limitations argument was properly addressed at the motion to dismiss stage “because the relevant dates [were] set forth unambiguously in the complaint.”) ¹

In its motion to dismiss, Notre Dame argues that the complaint affirmatively shows all of Cordova's claims are time-barred. Cordova disagrees.

Cordova's Claims Under Title III of the ADA

Cordova brings several claims pursuant to Title III of the ADA, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181–12189, which provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation ....” 42 U.S.C. § 12182. The ADA is a “broad mandate” of “comprehensive character” and “sweeping purpose” intended “to eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals, and to integrate them into the economic and social mainstream of American life.” PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675, 121 S.Ct. 1879, 149 L.Ed.2d 904 (2001) (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1), (2) (providing that the ADA is intended “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate” for eliminating disability discrimination as well as “clear, strong, consistent,enforceable standards” addressing such discrimination). In terms of the ADA, “disability” with respect to an individual is defined as (A) “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual”; (B) “a record of such an impairment”; or (C) “being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).

Because the ADA does not contain its own limitation period, courts have been directed to apply the statute of limitations of the state cause of action “most analogous” to the plaintiff's claims. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985); Scherr v. Marriott Intern., Inc., 703 F.3d 1069, 1075 (7th Cir.2013). ADA claims brought in a federal court sitting in Indiana are generally governed by Indiana's two year statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Ind.Code § 34–11–2–4; Soignier v. Am. Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 92 F.3d 547, 551 n. 3 (7th Cir.1996).

However, in 2004 the Supreme Court held that if a plaintiff's claim is “made possible by a post–1990 enactment,” the action is governed by the four year statute of limitations period set forth in 28 U.S.C. section 1658. Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 380, 124 S.Ct. 1836, 158 L.Ed.2d 645 (2004). The Court noted that section 1658 also applies to those claims that are created by amending existing statutes, and “[a]ltering statutory definitions, or adding new definitions of terms previously undefined, is a common way of amending statutes.” Id. at 381, 124 S.Ct. 1836 (quoting Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 308, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994)); see also Middleton v. City of Chicago, 578 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir.2009). The Jones Court stated that “[w]hat matters is the substantive effect of an enactment—the creation of new rights of action and corresponding liabilities—not the format in which it appears in the Code.” Jones, 541 U.S. at 381, 124 S.Ct. 1836. In a footnote, the Court acknowledged the potential difficulty in determining the viability of certain actions when authority is split regarding the scope of the original statute but noted that courts “will have to determine whether the amendment clarified existing law or created new rights and liabilities.” Id. at 385, n. 18, 124 S.Ct. 1836.

Effective January 1, 2009, the ADA was amended to “carry out the ADA's objectives” by “reinstating a broad scope of protection.” See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”), Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008). The ADAAA itself is described as “[a]n Act to restore the intent and protections of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,” and in its findings Congress specifically noted that the original intent of the ADA was to provide “broad coverage” and a “clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” Id. (emphasis added). Specifically, Congress found that the United States Supreme Court had improperly narrowed the protection intended to be afforded...