Cordova v. Univ. of Notre Dame Du Lac

• Decision Date: 13 December 2011
• Docket Number: CAUSE NO. 3:11-CV-210 RM
• Parties: AMBER MARIE LETTS CORDOVA, Plaintiff v. UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME DU LAC and CHARLES E. BARBER, Defendants
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

AMBER MARIE LETTS CORDOVA, Plaintiff v. UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME DU LAC and CHARLES E. BARBER, Defendants

CAUSE NO. 3:11-CV-210 RM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

ENTERED: December 13, 2011

OPINION and ORDER

Following the June 23, 2011 dismissal of Amber Cordova's complaint, she filed a timely amended complaint alleging that the University of Notre Dame and Dr. Charles Barber violated her rights under Titles I and III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5, the due process and equal protection clauses of the United States and Indiana Constitutions, and Indiana tort law by engaging in discriminatory practices based on her disabilities. Ms. Cordova claims that after being admitted to Notre Dame's Graphic Design Masters Program and hired as a graduate assistant at the University in 2008, she was subjected to harassing and discriminatory conduct and, in 2009, was "effectively expelled from the Program" and terminated from her employment based on her disabilities. Ms. Cordova seeks an order enjoining the "defendants from engaging in further violations of Federaland State discrimination laws, including but not limited to the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and HIPAA;" requiring the "defendant" to rehire and reinstate her with commensurate compensation, benefits, and seniority, or, alternatively, to pay her all lost compensation; directing the "defendants" to pay her liquidated damages; and directing the "defendant" to pay her actual, compensatory, and punitive damages, pre- and post-judgment interest, attorney fees, and costs.

The University of Notre Dame and Dr. Barber have moved to dismiss Ms. Cordova's claims against them pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Ms. Cordova filed her response to the motion, and the defendants filed their reply. For the reasons that follow, the court grants the motion as to Dr. Barber in its entirety and as to the University in part.

Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a defendant to seek dismissal of a complaint that states no claim upon which relief can be granted. When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept as true the factual allegations of the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff without engaging in fact-finding. Reger Dev., LLC v. National City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2010); Stakowski v. Town of Cicero, 425 F.3d 1075, 1078 (7th Cir. 2005). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleadsfactual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, _. __, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Under the pleading standard of Rule 8(a), a complaint needn't contain "detailed factual allegations," but the complaint's allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and give the defendant fair notice of the claims being asserted and the grounds upon which they rest. Bell Atl. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) ("First, a plaintiff must provide notice to defendants of her claims. Second, courts must accept a plaintiff's factual allegations as true, but some factual allegations will be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice to defendants of the plaintiff's claim. Third, in considering the plaintiff's factual allegations, courts should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.").

ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims: Counts I - VIII

A. Claims against Dr. Barber

Dr. Barber argues that he can't be individually liable to Ms. Cordova under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112, because that statutory section doesn't provide for individual liability, or under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12182, because he doesn't operate a place of public accommodation, or under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation, 29U.S.C. § 794, because, like Title I and Title III, courts have uniformly held that individual liability isn't appropriate. Ms. Cordova responds that she doesn't contest Dr. Barber's motion to dismiss her claims against him in Counts I - VII of the amended complaint, so the court dismisses Ms. Cordova's ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims as to Dr. Barber. See EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1276, 1279-1282 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting individual liability under ADA); Dent v. City of Chicago, No. 02 C 6604, 2003 WL 21801163, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2003) ("[T]he law is well-settled that there is no individual liability under Title VII, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the ADEA."); Vollmert v. Wisconsin Dep't of Transp., No. 97-C-547-C, 2000 WL 34235982, at *3 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 14, 2000) ("[I]ndividuals do not seem to fit within the Rehabilitation Act's provision for suits against 'any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,' 29 U.S.C. § 794.").

B. Claims against the University

The University maintains that Ms. Cordova hasn't alleged a disability with sufficient particularity to state a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act. In reliance on decisions from various courts that have granted motions to dismiss where the plaintiff didn't specify his or her disability and limiting major life activity, the University says Ms. Cordova hasn't specified a disability or alleged that she is limited in any major life activity so her claims in Counts I - VIII should be dismissed. In response, Ms. Cordova summarilyconcludes that the facts she alleged in the amended complaint are sufficient to support her claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and to inform the defendants of the claims being alleged. The court can't agree.

The only allegation of a disability in the 144-paragraph amended complaint is Ms. Cordova's conclusory statement that she "has disabilities covered by the ADA and Rehabilitation Act." Amd. Compl., ¶ 8.¹ She hasn't identified what her disability is (or disabilities are), see Paine v. Johnson, No. 06 C 3173, 2008 WL 4890269, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2008) ("To state a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must first allege a disability."), nor has she alleged that she is substantially limited in a recognized major life activity. See Cassimy v. Board of Educ. of Rockford Public Schools, 461 F.3d 932, 936 (7th Cir. 2006) ("The critical question in every case is what was the effect of the impairment on the life of the individual."); Foley v. City of Lafayette, Ind., 359 F.3d 925, 928 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Rehabilitation Act claims are analyzed under the same standards as those used for ADA claims.").

Recognizing that disagreement exists as to the amount of detail necessary to allege a disability claim, the court concludes that the allegations of Ms. Cordova's complaint are insufficient to put the defendants on notice of her disability claims. Compare Jackson v. Northwestern Univ. School of Law, No. 10-C-1986, 2010 WL 5174389, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2010) (dismissing complaint because "[plaintiff] does not plead what her disability is or how it substantially limits one or more major life activities. She simply makes the conclusory statement that it does."); Walton v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 2:10-CV-188, 2010 WL 3526263, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 3, 2010) (dismissing ADA claim where plaintiff didn't identify his injury or alleged disability or allege facts demonstrating that he was covered by the ADA); Knox v. Rhodes, No. 08-cv-277, 2010 WL 1418568, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 6, 2010) ("Knox's broad assertions that he is a qualified individual are too generic to meet the pleading requirements of Twombly. In fact, these allegations represent the generic legal labels and conclusions explicitly condemned by Twombly."); Paine v. Johnson, No. 06 C 3173, 2008 WL 4890269, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2008) (dismissing ADA claim that didn't "allege the nature and severity of [plaintiff's] condition, its duration or expected duration, or its permanent or long term impact or its expected impact on her ability to conduct her major life activities"), with Mattice v. Memorial Hosp. of South Bend, Inc., 249 F.3d 682, 684 (7th Cir. 2001) (Plaintiff "alleged that he 'has a history of a significant impairment of major life activities of sleeping, eating, thinking, and caring for himself in addition to other life activities significantly impaired by the existence of and care and treatment for panic disorder, severe depression and suicidal ideation.' These allegations are sufficient to state a claim under the ADA."); Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assocs., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, (7th Cir. 1996) (allegations that chronic severe allergic rhinitis and sinusitis substantially impaired plaintiff's ability to breath andwork found sufficient to plead an ADA claim); Hughes v. Colorado Dep't of Corrections, 594 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1240 (D.Colo. 2009) ("Hughes identifies an impairment of which the State defendants were allegedly aware and alleges that such impairment constitutes a disability under the ADA. . . . At the pleading stage, . . . Hughes' allegation regarding disability is sufficient.").

Ms. Cordova's allegations in Counts I - VIII of the amended complaint are insufficient to state a claim against the University of Notre Dame under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act, and the court will grant the University's motion to dismiss those claims.

HIPAA Claim: Count IX

The...