Cordrey v. Prisoner Review Bd.

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Justice THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
• Citation: Cordrey v. Prisoner Review Bd., 21 N.E.3d 423 (Ill. 2014)
• Decision Date: 20 November 2014
• Docket Number: No. 117155.,117155.
• Parties: Johnny CORDREY, Petitioner, v. The PRISONER REVIEW BOARD et al., Respondents.

21 N.E.3d 423

Johnny CORDREY, Petitioner

v.The PRISONER REVIEW BOARD et al., Respondents.

No. 117155.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 20, 2014.

E. King Poor and Michael S. Rhinehart, of Quarles & Brady LLP, of Chicago, for petitioner.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (Carolyn E. Shapiro, Solicitor General, and Brett E. Legner, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for respondents.

Alexa A. Van Brunt and Alan Mills, of Chicago, for amici curiae ACLU et al.

OPINION

Justice THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The petitioner, Johnny Cordrey, filed a motion for leave to file an original complaint for mandamus in this court pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 381 (Ill. S.Ct. R. 381 (eff. Mar. 1, 2001)). Cordrey asks this court to compel respondents, the Prisoner Review Board and Rick Harrington, Warden, to release Cordrey to serve his mandatory supervised release at a suitable host location outside of prison. Cordrey also requests that this court declare the practice of “violating at the door” to be unconstitutional as a violation of due process and equal protection.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In October 1993, Cordrey was sentenced to 36 years in prison for aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12–14 (West 1992) ), along with a concurrent term of 30 years for aggravated kidnapping (720 ILCS 5/10–2 (West 1992) ). Cordrey also was sentenced to a three-year term of mandatory supervised release (MSR) (730 ILCS 5/3–3–3(c) (West 1992)).

¶ 4 In November 2012, the Prisoner Review Board entered an order imposing certain conditions on Cordrey's MSR. Cordrey was required to attend anger management counseling, sex offender counseling, and outpatient mental health counseling. Cordrey was prohibited from having contact with his victim and was required to have biweekly visits with his parole officer for two years. Cordrey was required to register as a sex offender, with victim notification, and was subject to electronic monitoring for the duration of his MSR. The Prisoner Review Board also strongly recommended GPS monitoring.

¶ 5 Cordrey was scheduled to begin his MSR on April 12, 2013. On that day, the Department of Corrections issued a parole violation report stating that Cordrey violated his parole because he had no suitable host site where he could serve his MSR. Specifically, the report stated:

“Offender is in violation of the Rule # 16 in that he is mandated by the Prisoner Review Board to be supervised on electronic monitoring. This agency attempted to place the offender at (all) places with family and/or friends in the community and no suitable host site was found to supervise the offender on electronic monitoring. This agency attempted to place the offender at (all) places that the Illinois Department of Corrections would pay for and the paid placements for any number of reasons could not accept the offender. The offender is unable to fulfill the mandate by electronic monitoring place[d] by the Prisoner Review Board.”

Cordrey was then returned to the Menard Correctional Center to serve his term of MSR in prison.

¶ 6 Cordrey filed a grievance concerning the denial of his release. The Department of Corrections' Field Services unit responded that every effort was being made to find a place for Cordrey. Field Services stated that due to Cordrey's sex offender status, they had not been able to locate suitable placement.

¶ 7 Cordrey then filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus as well as an application to sue or defend as a poor person. Cordrey's application to sue or defend as a poor person was allowed. The Attorney General was directed to file a response to Cordrey's motion. After the Attorney General filed its response, counsel was appointed to represent Cordrey.

¶ 8 Counsel then filed a motion for leave to file a petition for mandamus or habeas corpus relief.¹ This court allowed that motion and directed the parties to brief the issue. Counsel from MacArthur Justice Center, Northwestern University School of Law, and the Uptown People's Law Center, were given leave to file an amicus curiae brief on behalf of 18 organizations in support of Cordrey's petition.²

¶ 9 The petition for mandamus challenges the practice sometimes referred to as “violating at the door.” As described by the federal district court in Armato v. Grounds, 944 F.Supp.2d 627, 631 n. 3 (C.D.Ill.2013) :

“Violating an offender at the door is a legal fiction wherein it is imagined that the offender is released from custody, placed on MSR, but when he leaves the institution he is in violation of his supervision terms and he is immediately placed back in custody. In reality, the offender simply remains incarcerated until a MSR prerequisite is satisfied. This can continue until either (1) the term of MSR expires, or (2) the prerequisite is satisfied.”

¶ 10 Cordrey's complaint alleges that more affluent offenders, who can afford suitable housing, can walk out the prison door, while the indigent offender is violated at the door and sent back to prison. The complaint charges that this unequal treatment—granting liberty to one offender and denying it to another based on the size of their bank accounts—violates the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection. Cordrey asks that this court declare the practice of “violating at the door” unconstitutional as a violation of due process and equal protection. Cordrey also asks this court to order him released to serve his MSR at a suitable host location outside of prison.

¶ 11 ANALYSIS

¶ 12 As a preliminary matter, we must address whether this case is now moot. In a joint status report filed by the parties on June 13, 2014, the parties noted that Cordrey was scheduled for release on October 14, 2014. It appears from our review of the Illinois Department of Corrections website (http://www2.illinois.gov/idoc/Offender/Pages/InmateSearch.aspx (last visited October 27, 2014)), that Cordrey is not currently an inmate.³ Because Cordrey has been released from MSR, we can no longer grant him the relief requested in his complaint.

¶ 13 Anticipating that his case might become moot, Cordrey asserted in the joint status report that, even if this court did not decide his case until after he was released from prison, this case would not become moot because it fits within the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine.

¶ 14 The public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applies where “(1) the question is of a substantial public nature; (2) there is a need for an authoritative decision to provide future guidance; and (3) the situation is likely to recur.” In re J.B., 204 Ill.2d 382, 387, 273 Ill.Dec. 827, 789 N.E.2d 1259 (2003).

¶ 15 As we observed in Holly v. Montes, 231 Ill.2d 153, 158, 324 Ill.Dec. 481, 896 N.E.2d 267 (2008), every convicted felon in Illinois, except those serving a natural life sentence, is required to serve a term of MSR. See 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(d) (West 2012). In Holly, the plaintiff filed an original claim for mandamus in this court seeking an order directing the Prisoner Review Board to eliminate the condition of electronic home confinement (EHC) during his MSR. Prior to oral argument, however, the plaintiff's EHC was terminated and his electronic monitoring device was removed. The court nonetheless elected to address the issue under the public interest exception. The court noted that:

“a large group of felons will be on MSR at least once, exposing each to the possibility that the Board will impose EHC. The vast number of felons potentially affected by the Board's allegedly improper imposition of EHC satisfies both the first and third prongs of the public interest exception test, requiring a question of a substantial public nature and a likeliness of recurrence.” Holly, 231 Ill.2d at 158, 324 Ill.Dec. 481, 896 N.E.2d 267.

¶ 16 With regard to the second prong of the test, Holly noted the substantial litigation addressing the imposition of EHC during MSR in both Illinois and federal courts. Id. Holly concluded that the ongoing litigation of EHC warranted an authoritative determination on the validity of the imposition of EHC as a condition of MSR. Id.

¶ 17 As Cordrey points out in his brief, challenges to the practice of “violating at the door” have been raised in numerous Illinois and federal cases. See Armato v. Grounds, 944 F.Supp.2d 627 (C.D.Ill.2013) ; Murdock v. Walker, No. 08 C 1142, 2014 WL 916992 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 10, 2014) ; Parker v. Roeckman, No. 3:13–CV–206–DRH–DGW, 2013 WL 6511486 (S.D.Ill. Oct. 8, 2013) ; Webb v. Robert, No. 13 –CV–00671–MJR, 2013 WL 6698081 (S.D.Ill. Aug. 16, 2013) ; Hughes v. Walker, No. 08–1317, 2009 WL 2877081 (C.D.Ill. Sept. 4, 2009) ; United States ex rel. Neville v. Ryker, No. 08 C 4458, 2009 WL 230524 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 30, 2009) ; Lucas v. Department of Corrections , 2012 IL App (4th) 110004, 359 Ill.Dec. 802, 967 N.E.2d 832. Consequently, we find that the number of offenders potentially affected by the Prison Review Board's allegedly unconstitutional practice of “violating at the door,” as well as the substantial litigation addressing the practice in both Illinois and federal courts, satisfies all three requirements of the public interest exception to mootness. The question is one of substantial public nature; there is a need for an authoritative decision to provide future guidance; and the situation is likely to recur. Because we find that Cordrey's case falls within the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine, we will address the merits of Cordrey's request for mandamus.

¶ 18 This court may exercise original jurisdiction in mandamus actions. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 4 (a). To obtain relief, a plaintiff must establish a clear right to mandamus. Holly, 231 Ill.2d at 159, 324 Ill.Dec. 481, 896 N.E.2d 267. “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to enforce, as a matter of right, ‘the performance of official duties by a public officer where no exercise of discretion on his part is involved.’ [Citation.]”...