Corines v. Am. Physicians Ins. Trust
Decision Date | 26 April 2011 |
Docket Number | No. 09 Civ. 10348 (NRB).,09 Civ. 10348 (NRB). |
Parties | Peter J. CORINES, Plaintiff,v.AMERICAN PHYSICIANS INSURANCE TRUST, USI Administrators, Inc., Hartford Life Insurance Co., Continental Casualty d/b/a C.N.A. Insurance Company, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Peter J. Corines, Eastchester, NY, pro se.Randi F. Knepper, Esq., McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants.
Plaintiff Peter J. Corines, appearing pro se, brings an action against his insurers seeking a declaratory judgment that he is entitled to disability insurance income benefits dating back to February 4, 1999 and a refund of premiums paid since that date. Defendants American Physicians Insurance Trust (“APIT”), National Employee Benefit Companies, Inc. (“NEBCO”), as successor to USI Administrators, Inc., Hartford Life Insurance Company (“Hartford”), and Continental Casualty Co. (“Continental”), incorrectly captioned as “Continental Casualty Company d/b/a C.N.A. Insurance Company”, move to dismiss the action on the grounds that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims which have already been fully litigated in the New York state courts, or alternatively, that this action is barred by claim preclusion. In response, the plaintiff moves pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f) to strike certain statements in the Defendants' Declaration in Support of the Motion as redundant, immaterial, irrelevant, or scandalous. For the reasons discussed below, the plaintiff's motion is denied and the defendants' motion is granted.
From 1976 until 1999, Peter J. Corines was licensed to practice medicine in the State of New York. He operated a medical practice as a surgeon with offices in Manhattan and Queens. On November 25 1997, he purchased a disability income insurance policy from APIT, which was underwritten at the time by Continental. It provided benefits of $10,000 per month in the event of disability. In June 1998, Corines injured his back while doing sit-ups. He was subsequently diagnosed with a spondylolisthesis, more colloquially known as a slipped vertebra. On October 20 1998, he submitted a claim to Continental asserting that his injury constituted a total disability which prevented him from working.
Six days prior to Corines's submission of this claim, on October 14 1998, the New York State Board for Professional Medical Conduct had revoked Corines's medical license for negligence, incompetence, fraud, and failure to maintain accurate and complete patient records. The revocation became effective on February 4, 1999, and Corines pursued an Article 78 challenge 1 before the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court, Third Judicial Department. On December 23, 1999, the Appellate Division ruled against Corines, confirming the Board's determination revoking his license. Corines v. State Bd. for Prof'l Med. Conduct, 267 A.D.2d 796, 700 N.Y.S.2d 303 (App.Div. 3d Dep't 1999), leave to app. denied, 95 N.Y.2d 756, 712 N.Y.S.2d 448, 734 N.E.2d 760 (2000).
In June 2000, a jury in the Queens County Supreme Court convicted Corines of aiding and abetting another person in the unlicensed practice of medicine, in violation of New York Education Law § 6512(1).2 During the trial, Corines admitted performing medical procedures in July and December of 1998, during the period he had claimed to be totally disabled by his back injury. On December 13, 2000, after concluding a lengthy investigation, Continental denied Corines's claim for disability benefits on the basis of these admissions.
On March 28, 2001, Corines brought a declaratory judgment action against Continental and two other insurers in New York County Supreme Court seeking to establish his entitlement to disability income benefits. In January 2002, Corines's state court action was stayed because he was indicted by the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York on charges of conspiracy and mail fraud. On December 1, 2003, Corines pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to defraud and one count of mail fraud.3 As part of his plea allocution, he again admitted performing numerous medical procedures between June 1998 and January 1999. He was sentenced to 18 months in prison with three years of supervised release and ordered to pay $70,000 in restitution.
On May 31, 2005, New York Country Supreme Court Justice Shafer granted summary judgment dismissing Corines's action against Continental. She concluded that “Corines' own stipulation and testimony provide sufficient evidence that he continued his medical/surgical practice after he claimed to be totally disabled, and until his medical license was finally revoked in February 1999.” (Def.'s Decl. Ex. F, 10.) Corines appealed to the Appellate Division, First Department, which unanimously affirmed the lower court's decision. See Corines v. Sentry Life Ins. Co., 33 A.D.3d 443, 821 N.Y.S.2d 885 (App.Div. 1st Dep't 2006). He then sought leave to appeal from the Court of Appeals, which was denied. See Corines v. Sentry Life Ins. Co., 9 N.Y.3d 914, 844 N.Y.S.2d 167, 875 N.E.2d 886 (2007).
On November 12, 2008, Corines sent a letter to Hartford again claiming disability income benefits under his APIT policy, which had been transferred from Continental to Hartford in 2000. In that letter, Corines states that he “became legally disabled from the practice of medicine on February 4, 1999” and quotes the following provision from his policy:
“Total Disability” means any loss of time, duties, and income as a result of any regulation, restrictions or modifications of policy set by:
1. A licensing board ...
2. Any State or Federal Agency ...
(Am. Compl. Ex. 5.) On November 20, 2008, Hartford sent Corines a letter in reply, suggesting that his notice of claim was not timely and requesting that Corines provide further information within the next twenty-one days.
On January 1, 2009, Corines sent Hartford the requested information and an accompanying letter, in which he stated, On March 13, 2009, Hartford sent Corines a letter stating that his file remained under review. He alleges that he received no further communication from Hartford prior to the commencement of this action.
On August 4, 2009, Corines filed a complaint against the defendants with the Pro Se Office of this Court. On December 21, 2009, Judge Preska issued an order granting Corines leave to submit an amended complaint correcting certain deficiencies in his pleadings. On January 6, 2010, Corines filed his Amended Complaint and the case was subsequently assigned to Judge Robinson. On August 11, 2010, the defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss. The case was reassigned to this Court on November 15, 2010. Corines filed his brief in opposition and a motion to strike certain parts of the defendants' declaration on December 2, 2010.
Defendants move for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. Alternatively, they seek dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and the principle of res judicata. For the purposes of this motion, we accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegation in the Amended Complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Ziemba v. Wezner, 366 F.3d 161, 163 (2d Cir.2004); Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 56 (2d Cir.1999). Because the plaintiff is appearing pro se, we must read his pleadings liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. See Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir.1996).
The Rooker–Feldman doctrine developed out of the Supreme Court's decisions in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923) and Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482–86, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983) holding that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review state court final judgments, other than in the context of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. As recently as 1996, Rooker–Feldman was understood to be “at least coextensive with” principles of preclusion, possibly even superseding them. See Moccio v. New York State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 199–200 (2d Cir.1996). That broad understanding of the doctrine was corrected by the Supreme Court in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 (2005), which limited the application of Rooker–Feldman to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” The Second Circuit interprets Exxon as specifying the following four requirements that must be met for Rooker–Feldman to apply: (1) the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state court judgment, (3) the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of that judgment, and (4) the state court judgment must have been rendered before the district court proceedings commenced. Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. Of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir.2005).
The present plaintiff does not dispute that the first and fourth requirements are met. Instead plaintiff argues that the state court judgment only eliminated one basis for his claim to disability benefits, namely his back injury,...
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