Corinthian Int'l Wage & Hour Cases Adrian Turner v. Corinthian Int'l Parking Servs., G060405

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: ZELON, J.
• Decision Date: 29 September 2021
• Parties: CORINTHIAN INTERNATIONAL WAGE AND HOUR CASES ADRIAN TURNER, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CORINTHIAN INTERNATIONAL PARKING SERVICES INC. et al., Defendants and Appellants.
• Docket Number: G060405

CORINTHIAN INTERNATIONAL WAGE AND HOUR CASES ADRIAN TURNER, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
CORINTHIAN INTERNATIONAL PARKING SERVICES INC. et al., Defendants and Appellants.

G060405

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, Third Division

September 29, 2021

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Santa Clara County JCCP No. 4886, Thomas E. Kuhnle, Judge. Affirmed.

Berliner Cohen, Susan E. Bishop, and Thomas P. Murphy for Defendant and Appellant.

Schneider Wallace Cottrell Konecky, Carolyn H. Cottrell, David C. Leimbach, Sean L. Litteral; Lawyers for Justice and Edwin Aiwazian for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

ZELON, J. ^[1]

Defendant Corinthian International Parking Services, Inc. appeals from denial of its motion to compel arbitration of coordinated wage-and-hour claims brought by its employees. The trial court denied defendant's motion because it found the arbitration agreement unconscionable and because defendant failed to identify the class members who were parties to arbitration agreements. We conclude the trial court erred in finding the agreements unconscionable. However, we affirm because defendant failed to establish the existence of an arbitration agreement as to any particular class member or identifiable group of class members.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Adrian Turner is a former employee of defendant. Plaintiff sued defendant as the named plaintiff in a putative class action alleging various Labor Code violations in 2015. In 2016, defendant offered its employees, on a voluntary basis, an arbitration agreement containing a class action waiver. Some of its employees evidently signed the agreement, while some did not. After 2016, defendant required all new employees to sign an arbitration agreement containing a class action waiver.

In 2019, after extensive litigation, including removal to federal court, remand back to state court, and various discovery motions, plaintiff moved for class certification. In opposing the motion, defendant asserted the existence of arbitration agreements with class action waivers. However, defendant offered no evidence of the arbitration agreements, and the trial court certified the class.

Shortly after the certification order was issued, defendant moved to compel arbitration and enforce the class action waivers. Defendant included with its motion the declaration of defendant's owner, authenticating unsigned examples of the arbitration agreements. The declaration also stated that “many” of defendant's employees had signed the agreements. Defendant's motion more specifically sought an order to “limit the Class Period for those employees who signed Arbitration Agreements... to claims that arose prior to the signing of binding Arbitration Agreements, ” and to require “all class members who have signed arbitration agreements [to] submit their claims as set forth in the Mediation and Arbitration Agreement and Class Action Waiver.” Defendant's motion did not identify either any class member who had signed an arbitration agreement, or the number of employees who had signed. It did not propose the terms on which a subclass of employees subject to the agreement could be defined.

The arbitration agreement offered to defendant's then-current employees in 2016 required submission of “any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to [the employee's] employment relationship with [defendant] or the termination of that relationship, ” to arbitration. The agreement also states it covered “i. Any dispute concerning the arbitrability of any controversy or claim arising between [the employee] and [defendant], or any of its management team; and [¶] ii. Any claim that could be asserted in any court, and for which [the employee] has an alleged cause of action, including without limitation, claims for breach of any contract or covenant (express or implied); tort claims; claims for harassment, discrimination (including, but not limited to, those based on sex, pregnancy, race, national or ethnic origin, age, religion, creed, marital status, sexual orientation, mental or physical disability or medical condition or any other characteristics protected by applicable statute); retaliation claims, claims for wrongful discharge; claims for failure to provide mandatory leaves of absence or reasonable accommodations, including but not limited to, violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA); unfair competition, wage and hour violations, violations of confidentiality or breaches of trade secrets; and/or claims for violation of any federal, state, local or other law, statute, regulation or ordinance, and whether based on statute or common law or in equity; and [¶] iii. All claims whether made against [defendant], any of its subsidiary or affiliated entities or its individual officers, directors, owners or managers (in an official or personal capacity).” The agreement also contained a class action waiver. The agreement required of defendant's new hires was substantively identical.

The trial court denied defendant's motion. The trial court concluded the motion was defective because it was directed at only part of the class and not at any identifiable subclass or class member: “The Court cannot grant a motion to compel arbitration where not all class members are parties to a purported arbitration agreement. As there is no subclass of employees who signed the Agreements to which the motion can be directed, the motion cannot be granted as filed.” The trial court also found the agreement unconscionable because it was a contract of adhesion, and was unilateral-only requiring arbitration of the employees' claims against defendant. Defendant timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues the arbitration agreements are not unconscionable because they have only a low degree of procedural unconscionability, and because the trial court's finding of substantive unconscionability was predicated on a misinterpretation of the agreements. Defendant also contends the trial court could and should have granted its motion to compel arbitration and...