Corkings v. State
Citation | 99 N.Y. 491,2 N.E. 454 |
Parties | CORKINGS v. STATE. |
Decision Date | 06 October 1885 |
Court | New York Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Martin A. Knapp, for appellant, Philip Corkings.
D. O'Brien, for the State.
On the nineteenth day of August, 1873, the plaintiff entered into two contracts with the state for work upon the Erie canal, and deposited two sums of money, amounting to $1,800, as security for the performance of the contracts, under chapter 766, Laws 1873. That chapter (page 1170) provided that, ‘upon the entering into said contract, the bonds or stocks or money required by the commissioners as security for the entering into said contract, together with such additional securities as they may require, may be held as security for the completion of the work, and shall be deposited with the treasurer as a special trust, to be returned by him to the contractor with such further sums as he may have realized for the use thereof, when the commissioner in charge and the state engineer shall certify that the contractor has fully completed his contract, and that the state has no further claim upon such funds.’
The board of claims found that prior to August 1, 1874, the plaintiff duly performed and completed both contracts in full compliance with their terms and provisions; that his work was in all things duly accepted and approved by the officers and agents of the state; that a final accounting thereof was made on or about August 10, 1874; that by the laws of the state it was the duty of the officers and agents of the state, upon such final completion and settlement of the contracts, to repay to the plaintiff the two sums of money deposited, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent. from August 10, 1874; that no part of the principal or interest has ever been paid to him; that the $1,800 became due and payable August 10th; that plaintiff's claim was filed with the state board of audit, May 13, 1882; and that there was no proof that he ever made any claims for the payment of his deposits prior to that date. And the board found that more than six years had elapsed between the time when the money was due and payable by the state to the plaintiff and the time when the claim was so filed with the state board of audit, and therefore decided that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations, and on that ground alone defeated the plaintiff.
The sole question for our determination is whether plaintiff's claim was barred by lapse of time; and whether it was or not depends upon the effect to be given in this case to section 14 of article 7 of the constitution, which was adopted at the election in the fall of 1874, after the claim became due, and which reads as follows: The object of this section was to prevent the allowance against the state of stale claims which had long lain dormant. But, as the state could not be sued, it was not intended to bar claims which had been duly presented for payment or allowance. To avoid the bar of time it was not necessary that the presentation should be made to the board of audit, or to its successor, the board of claims. All either of these boards could do was to audit or allow claims. They could not pay them, but the legislature would still have to appropriate money for their payment, and thus approve them. The presentment of a claim may be made to the legislature, which has jurisdiction in some form over all claims against the state; or it may be made to any officer or body of officers having jurisdiction to pay, allow, or act upon the claim, and the claim may not be presented and then permitted to lie dormant, but must be prosecuted with reasonable diligence. It must be a live claim which the claimant has, by reasonable and suitable efforts, diligently sought to have allowed and paid, else time interposes a bar which will defeat it, as it could be defeated if presented against an individual.
This money was payable upon demand on the tenth day of August, 1874. The plaintiff had the right to make the demand on that day, and hence, if this were an action between individuals, the limitation of time would have to be computed from that day. These moneys were not deposited to be repaid only upon a special demand, within the meaning of the second subdivision of section 410 of the Code; but we think this claim was duly presented, within the meaning of the constitutional provision referred to, and was prosecuted with due diligence. Some time before August 10, 1874, the state treasurer deposited this money with the Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank of Rochester, together with other similar funds, and subsequently the bank became insolvent, and the money was lost. This loss did not absolve the state from its liability to repay the money to the plaintiff. He deposited the money with it when the money was paid into the hands of its treasurer, who was not his agent, but a state agent acting for and on its behalf. It cannot allege the loss by the misconduct or default of its treasurer as a defense to the payment of the money according to its contract.
But the money having been lost, and not being in the state treasury, nor under the control nor at the disposal of the treasurer, it could not be refunded, according to the provisions of the act of 1873, upon the certificate of the state engineer and canal commissioner, but only after some legislative action making new provision for its repayment. So the plaintiff could be charged with no default or omission in not procuring the certificate of the two officers named, or placed at a disadvantage on that account.
On the first day of May, 1876, the legislature, in the supply bill of that year, (chapter 193,) enacted as follows: ...
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