Corkum v. Clark

Decision Date23 May 1928
Citation263 Mass. 378
PartiesMARY E. CORKUM v. ANNA P. CLARK.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

January 4, 1928.

Present: RUGG, C.

J., PIERCE CARROLL, WAIT, & SANDERSON, JJ.

Equity Pleading and Practice, Answer, Equity Rule 6 (1926). Rules of Court. Marriage and Divorce, Foreign divorce. Jurisdiction. Pension. Equity Jurisdiction, Federal pension, To establish marriage status. Constitutional Law, Full faith and credit. Conflict of Laws.

It was stated, that an answer in a suit in equity, stating as to each of several separate paragraphs of the bill, merely that the defendant neither admitted nor denied their allegations but required the plaintiff to prove the same, is not in conformity with Equity Rule 6 (1926).

A wife, whose matrimonial domicil always has been in this Commonwealth, who always has lived here and at all times has been a nonresident of the

State of Washington, may attack collaterally, in judicial proceedings in this Commonwealth, a judgment of a court of the State of Washington purporting to divorce her and her husband, where it appears that the judgment was issued in proceedings in which no personal service was made upon her in that State and she did not appear.

The courts of this Commonwealth are not required by art. 4, Section 1, of the Federal Constitution to give any faith or credit to a judgment of a court of the State of Washington rendered in divorce proceedings against a woman who was a nonresident of that State and never had a matrimonial domicil there, who had not appeared in the proceedings, and upon whom no service of process had been made in that State, where it appeared that by a false affidavit and a fraud perpetrated upon the court the husband falsely had represented that he had complied with a statute of that

State as to service upon the wife by mailing to an alleged last known address.

In a suit in equity by one alleging herself to be the widow of a man against another woman, who also asserted herself to be his widow, it appeared that the plaintiff always had had a matrimonial domicil in this

Commonwealth and had been deserted here by her husband, who had brought divorce proceedings in the State of Washington, in which, by a false affidavit and a fraud upon the court, he had represented that he had complied with a statute of that State as to service upon the wife by mailing, and through that fraud had procured a divorce. Thereafter, in the State of Washington, he went through the form of marriage with the defendant, had children by her, and died. His standing as a veteran of the Spanish and the World Wars entitled his widow to pensions. The alleged second wife claimed the pensions and Federal authorities had awarded them to her, had made some payments in accordance with the award and had suspended further payments pending a decision by the courts of this Commonwealth as to who was widow of the veteran. The prayers of the bill were that the divorce and alleged second marriage in the State of Washington be declared void, for an injunction restraining the defendant from representing herself as widow and from claiming as widow any money or property as aid, pension or compensation, for an accounting as to money already received, and for general relief. Held, that

(1) The judgment of the court of the State of Washington was open to attack collaterally in this suit;

(2) Such declaration as the courts of this Commonwealth may make as to the validity of the judgment of the Washington court cannot affect the status of the parties in that State;

(3) In the circumstances, the judgment of the court of the State of Washington cannot be recognized by the courts of this Commonwealth, but must be treated as void here;

(4) The first prayer of the bill must be denied; (5) The provisions of the acts of Congress with respect to the pensions and adjusted compensations in question preclude the courts of this Commonwealth from attempting either directly or indirectly through injunction upon the defendant to impose their view as to the plaintiff's status as widow upon the Federal authorities therein described, who are given exclusive jurisdiction for the administration of those laws; and also preclude the relief by accounting sought by the plaintiff, the defendant herself not having been guilty of any fraud;

(6) Whether the plaintiff was the widow and entitled to represent herself as such, or whether that status belonged to the defendant, was a question having important aspects of a pecuniary nature, the decision of which related to a civil right which was the basis of a pecuniary claim and which had an immediate evidentiary value in the pressing of that claim; and the court of equity in the circumstances had jurisdiction to determine that question;

(7) It was ordered that a decree be entered with appropriate recitals as to the domicil of the plaintiff, the matrimonial domicil of the plaintiff and the husband, and the domicil of the husband at the time of his death, declaring that the plaintiff was the widow of the veteran according to the law of this Commonwealth.

BILL IN EQUITY, begun by writ of summons and attachment in the Superior Court dated April 7, 1926, and described in the opinion.

There were eleven paragraphs in the bill. The defendant admitted the allegations of the second paragraph. As to each of the other paragraphs, she alleged that she "neither admits nor denies the allegation contained" therein "but requires" the plaintiff "to prove the same."

The suit was heard by Lummus, J. Material facts found by the judge are stated in the opinion. By his order a final decree was entered dismissing the bill. The plaintiff appealed.

The case was submitted on briefs.

C.T. Flynn, for the plaintiff. J.F. McGrath, for the defendant.

RUGG, C.J. The plaintiff in this suit in equity seeks to have both the divorce decree from her obtained by her late husband, Aubrey D. Corkum, in the State of Washington, and his subsequent marriage to the defendant declared null and void and to have herself declared the widow of said Aubrey. There is a prayer for an injunction to restrain the defendant from representing herself to be the widow of Corkum and from claiming, as his widow, any money or property as aid, pension, or compensation. There is also a prayer for an accounting and for general relief.

By her answer the defendant admitted the allegations of one paragraph of the plaintiff's bill and as to the ten other paragraphs neither admitted nor denied the allegations, but required the plaintiff to prove the same. This was not a proper answer. The defendant in a suit in equity is required to answer fully, directly and specifically each allegation in the bill and to avoid any general denial of its averments. The essentials of a proper answer are specified in Equity Rule 6 (1926). They have been explained fully in recent decisions. Burke v. McLaughlin, 246 Mass. 533 , 537, 538. Volpe v. Sensatini, 249 Mass. 132 . Piper v C.L. Hayden Co. 254 Mass. 317 , 319. The case, however, has been argued without regard to this defect and is therefore considered as if there had been a proper joinder of issues.

Findings of fact were made by the trial judge. Thus it appears that on January 24, 1916, Aubrey D. Corkum, a widower, having seven children, married the plaintiff, both being domiciled at Fitchburg in this Commonwealth. They lived together as husband and wife in that place until he went to war in April, 1917. He went to France and returned from the war in 1918, lived for several days with the plaintiff on two occasions in the fall of 1918, and was then transferred to Camp Dodge, near Des Moines, Iowa, remaining there until September, 1920, except for a short visit to his wife in Fitchburg in September, 1919. Two children had been born of this marriage and these with a majority of the seven children of Corkum by his first wife continued to live with the plaintiff in Fitchburg. In the fall of 1919 Corkum commenced divorce proceedings against the plaintiff in the District Court for Polk County, Iowa, which in August, 1920, were dismissed after notice and hearing. In September, 1920, Corkum was ordered to Camp Lewis, Tacoma, Washington, by his military superiors. Before September 14, 1920, he became domiciled in Tacoma. He had no justifiable cause for living apart from the plaintiff and she has been guilty of no matrimonial fault. He intentionally deserted her without cause in or before September, 1920.

The statutes of Washington then in force required that the complainant should have been a resident in that State for at least one year prior to bringing a proceeding for divorce. On September 14 1921, Corkum filed a complaint against the plaintiff in the Superior Court in Pierce County, Washington, falsely alleging cruelty and other matrimonial misconduct on the part of the plaintiff, and praying for a divorce. It has been found that, by the law of Washington then in force, when a defendant in a divorce case could not be found within the State, the plaintiff or his attorney was required, as a prerequisite to service by publication in a newspaper, to make an affidavit that he believed that the defendant was not a resident of the State and that he had deposited a copy of the summons and complaint in the post office, directed to the defendant at his place of residence, unless it was stated in the affidavit that such residence was not known to the affiant. Said Corkum filed such affidavit sworn to by him, in which he declared that the present plaintiff "is not a resident of the State of Washington," but that her "last known place of residence" was "at Des Moines, Iowa"; and his attorney made an affidavit that he had deposited a copy of the summons and complaint in the post office,...

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  • Corkum v. Clark
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • May 28, 1928

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