Corle v. Monkhouse

• Decision Date: 18 October 1892
• Citation: 25 A. 157,50 N.j.e. 637
• Parties: CORLE v. MONKHOUSE et al.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

25 A. 157

50 N.j.e. 637

CORLE

v. MONKHOUSE et al.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Oct. 18, 1892.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Suit by Calvin Corle, as executor of Peter W. Young, deceased, against Lydia Y. Monk house, for the purpose, among other things, of getting authority to settle his account as executor. Complainant, by permission of the court, filed an account, to which exceptions were taken. Three of the exceptions were overruled, and decision of the fourth deferred until additional facts could be learned.

Alvah A. Clark, for complainant.

William Y. Johnson and William S. Gummere, for Lydia Y. Monkhouse.

Charles A. Held, for legatees under the will of Penelope Young, deceased.

VAN FLEET, V. C. The questions which are to he decided in this case at this time arise "upon exceptions to an account filed in this court by the complainant as the executor of Peter W. Young, deceased. Originally the complainant's suit had two objects: First, to procure a construction of certain parts of his testator's will; and, second, to get authority to settle his accounts in this court. Such of the questions arising on the will as it was proper for the court to decide on the complainant's application have already been decided. Corle v. Monk house, 47 N. J. Eq. 73, 20 Atl. Rep. 367. The complainant has, with the permission of the court, filed an account here, to which many exceptions have been taken. All of them, except four, have, however, either been withdrawn or satisfactorily adjusted. Three will now be decided. The decision of the other must be deferred until additional facts are before the court.

The first of the three exceptions which will now be considered, relates to the credit side of the account. The complainant asks to be credited with the loss resulting from a loan made by him as executor on bond and mortgage to David Hill, after the testator's death, pursuant, however, to directions, both oral and written, given to him by the testator in his lifetime. The testator died on the 8th day of March, 1887, and the loan was made, and the bond and mortgage executed, on the 1st day of April following. The facts which induced the complainant to make the loan may be summarized as follows: Hill, the mortgagor, had married a niece of the testator. The niece had requested her uncle, who was childless, and a man of means, to help her husband buy a farm, and he had promised to do so. On the 16th day of December, 1886, the testator and Hill started together to look at a farm near Copper Hill, in the county of Hunterdon, with a view of buying it. On the way they were informed that a farm near Ringees, in the same county, which had been offered for sale the day before, at public sale, had not been sold. Thereupon the testator proposed that they should go and look at that farm first. Hill assented, and they went. After they had examined the buildings, and the vendor had stated his price and terms of sale, the testator advised Hill to buy, saying: "You had better buy this farm to-day. You will never be sorry for it." Hill answered that he thought they had better wait a day or two, or until the following week, and see further about it. The testator again said "You better buy to-day. You will never be sorry for it." Hill replied: "I don't feel that I can pay quite so much for a farm. I don't feel able to buy it. I can't raise over $1,000, as I see things now." To this the testator answered: "If you can't raise but $1,000, and Mr. Rue [the vendor] will take a mortgage for half the purchase money, I will see you through the rest." Hill, under the influence of this promise, consented to buy, and at once entered into a written contract, in the presence of the testator, for the purchase of the farm. He agreed to pay $7,600, one half of which was to be secured by a first mortgage on the farm, and the other half was to be paid in cash on the delivery of the deed. $1,520 was agreed upon as the sum which should be paid as liquidated damages in case either party failed to perform his part of the contract. Hill and the testator gave their promissory note to the vendor for $1,520, payable on the day the deed was to be delivered, with the understanding that the payment of the note should operate as a discharge of so much of the purchase money as it represented. In the early part of February, 1887, the testator was taken sick. He was then about 80 years of age. He had made his will in July, 1885, in which he appointed his wife and the complainant his executors. Soon after he was taken sick he told the complainant that he had been with Hill when Hill bought the farm, and that he had signed a paper by which he had bound himself for the purchase money, and that, if he did not live until the 1st day of April the complainant must, as his executor, lend Hill $2,800. The complainant was unwilling to promise that he would do so, saying he wouldn't like to do it; he was afraid it would give trouble. The testator then called a witness, and repeated his direction, and charged the witness to see that the complainant complied with his wishes. Subsequently, and on the 18th day of February, 1887, the testator signed a paper, addressed to his wife and the complainant as his executors, in these words, and delivered the paper to the complainant: "I hereby order and direct you, if 1 do not live to do it myself, to carry out the agreement I have made with David Hill to lend him twenty-eight hundred dollars April 1st, 1887, to be second mortgage on the farm lately purchased by him, at my request, of John Rue; he to take the first mortgage for one half of the purchase money." These facts show conclusively that Hill purchased the farm at the testator's request, relying implicitly upon the testator's promise that he would lend him $2,800 to pay for it; and that, if the testator had not so promised, Hill would not have entered into the contract by which he became liable for $7,600. They also make it certain that the testator made his promise in entire good faith, fully understanding what he was doing, and with an earnest desire to help Hill; and that, after he was taken sick, he became extremely desirous, under a fear that he might not live to perform his promise in person, that it should be put in such form that, in case of his death, his representatives should be legally bound to perform it. It is entirely clear, as I think, that if he did not put himself under a legal obligation to do as he had promised, it was not because he did not want to do so, but because he did not know how to do it effectually.

There can be no doubt that if the testator was under a legal duty to lend Hill $2,800, the complainant, as his representative, was bound to perform that duty, and is consequently entitled to the credit he asks. The books say very little concerning contracts to make loans of money, but I suppose such a contract, founded upon a sufficient consideration, and so expressed as to plainly show just what each party bound himself to do, is beyond question within the contracting capacity of the parties, and just as binding as a contract in respect to any other subject-matter. I entertain no doubt, if A. promises B., in writing, that if B. will purchase a certain tract of land for a price named he will lend B. either the whole or a part of such price for a certain period, and B. makes a binding contract of purchase in reliance on A.'s promise, that A. thereby becomes legally bound to perform his promise. In such a case B.'s compliance with A.'s request to purchase, B. thereby incurring an obligation that he would not have incurred but for A.'s promise, would constitute a sufficient consideration to support A.'s promise to lend the money. A consideration sufficient to support a promise may consist of either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee. Or, as defined by Mr. Justice Depue, in Conover v. Still well, 34 N. J. Law, 54, 56: "A consideration emanating from some injury or inconvenience to the one party, or from some benefit to the other party, is a valuable consideration." In my judgment, the evidence makes it clear that the testator was under a legal obligation to lend Hill $2,800, to assist him in paying for the farm. Hill bought the farm at his request. He bought a more expensive farm than he intended to buy, and thus charged against his future a greater debt than he thought a man of his means and capacity ought to incur, and he did this through the persuasion of the testator's promise that he would see him through the venture by lending him $2,800. The detriment or injury that Hill suffered in consequence of the testator's promise was that, in reliance on the testator's promise, he placed himself in a position where, if the testator did not keep his promise, he became liable to pay $],520 as liquidated damages. This, as well as the request to purchase, constituted a good consideration for the testator's promise, and either was, in my opinion, sufficient to make his promise binding. The testator, to protect Hill, in case he died before he made the loan himself, put his promise in writing. In his written direction to his executors he orders them, in case he does not live to do it himself, to carry out the agreement which he had made with Hill to lend him $2,800 on...