Corley v. Cobb County

• Decision Date: 02 November 1917
• Docket Number: (No. 8922.)
• Citation: 93 S.E. 1015,21 Ga.App. 219
• Parties: CORLEY. v. COBB COUNTY.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

21 Ga.App. 219

93 S.E. 1015

CORLEY.

v.COBB COUNTY.

(No. 8922.)

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1.

Nov. 2, 1917.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from Superior Court, Cobb County; W. E. H. Searcy, Jr., Judge.

Suit by J. T. Corley against Cobb County. Judgment of nonsuit, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

J. Glenn Giles and J. Z. Poster, both of Marietta, for plaintiff in error.

E. H. Clay and D. W. Blair, both of Marietta, for defendant in error.

WADE, C. J. J. T. Corley brought suit against Cobb county, seeking damages for personal injuries to his wife, and alleged, in brief: That on May 26, 1914, while his wife was driving a horse attached to a buggy, from her home on the "Powder Springs road, " a public highway, to Marietta, Ga., and while descending a long hill commonly known as "Goodman hill, " at a point about midway thereof and about 150 yards south of the public bridge which spans the "2-mile branch, " the horse, from a cause unknown to the driver, suddenly became frightened, ran down the hill, and continued his flight on to the bridge; that when the horse had nearly reached the main span of the bridge and was upon the south abutment thereof, running at great speed and beyond the control of the plaintiff's wife, T. W. Robertson, a mail carrier, who was standing on the west end of the abutment on the south side of the bridge, vehemently and violently gesticulated at and towards the horse, whereupon it suddenly swerved to the right, causing the horse, buggy, and driver to be thrown off the abut ment, a distance of 9 feet, to the water below. The plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of the county in not having the bridge or abutment properly protected by guard rails, banisters, railing, or other means of protection, and insisted that this negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries received by his wife. At the conclusion of the evidence introduced in behalf of the plaintiff, the court granted a nonsuit, and to this ruling, as well as to several rulings of the court in rejecting certain proffered testimony, the plaintiff excepts.

It will be observed that the plaintiff's cause of action is grounded solely upon the proposition that the defendant was negligent in not having its bridge properly protected by guard rails or other means of protection, and that this negligence was the direct, proximate cause of the injuries sustained by his wife. Without entering into any lengthy dissertation on the subject of proximate cause, it is enough to say that whether the negligence of the county (if it was guilty of any negligence at all) was the proximate cause of the injuries would generally be a question for the jury; but where all the evidence in behalf of the plaintiff clearly shows that the injuries complained of were not the natural or proximate result of the defendant's conduct, negligence, or breach of duty, but resulted through an independent agency or agencies, not invoked or brought into play by the defendant, no recovery would be authorized on this ground.

As we view this case, the alleged negligence on the part of the defendant in failing to properly protect the bridge with guard rails or banisters was not the proximate cause of the injuries sustained; but, to the contrary, said injuries were the natural and proximate result of two independent causes, not in any way related to the alleged negligence of the defendant. The two causes which brought about the injuries complained of were: (1) The wild, ungovernable conduct of the horse in its mad flight down the hill, and (2) the acts of one Robertson in trying to stop the runaway animal, which caused it to swerve or wheel sharply to one side and off the bridge; the former being, in our opinion, the primary cause, and the latter the secondary contributing cause, and the two causes, considered together, being the direct, proximate cause of the injuries for which damages are now sought. Without either of these causes the catastrophe would not have occurred. Had the horse been under the control of its driver, they would have passed over the small stream in entire safety—either by way of the ford or over the bridge. So, too, notwithstanding that the horse was running away and entirely beyond the control of its driver, they would nevertheless have passed over the bridge in safety but for the acts of Robertson in vehemently and violently gesticulat-ing at and towards the then wild and unmanageable animal. As to the nature and conduct of the horse (the primary cause) just prior to and at the time of the injury, the uncontradicted evidence of the driver thereof is:

"I was going down that long hill the other side of the branch, and all of a sudden the horse became frightened at something; I don't know what. I wasn't noticing him particularly, and did not see anything for him to get frightened at. I was just driving along singing. When he [the horse] became frightened he began to run, and continued to run, and got faster and faster. He started pretty fast. He began to run half way up that long hill. * * * If I could have controlled my horse when I got down there I had two ways of crossing the branch, either drive through the branch below the bridge, or drive over the bridge. I could not control my horse; he was entirely beyond my control. I could not control him at all, although I did make the effort to control him and turn him. I put all my strength against him, and it made no impression on him at...