Corley v. Goll

• Decision Date: 12 September 1894
• Citation: Corley v. Goll, 27 S.W. 819, 8 Tex. Civ. App. 184 (Tex. App. 1894)
• Parties: CORLEY v. GOLL et al.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

27 S.W. 819

CORLEY v. GOLL et al.¹

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

September 12, 1894.

Appeal from district court, Bexar county; W. W. King, Judge.

Trespass to try title by Daniel S. Corley against Frank Goll and others. Judgment was rendered for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

James B. Goff, for appellant. Geo. C. Altgeld, for appellees.

Conclusions of Law.

JAMES, C. J.

It is not questioned that the administration originally granted to Luckie was valid, but it is contended that the letters to Stribling de bonis non were void, because there was no petition showing legal cause for his appointment, and because the order appointing him discloses no legal ground therefor. From an examination of the record before us, we do not find the petition included in the papers introduced, but the order of appointment of Stribling states that the appointment was sought because Luckie had died two or three years previous, "without closing the business of the estate; and that it was necessary, to protect and secure the property of the estate, that a new administrator be appointed." It also appears that the administrator, Stribling, sold other property during his administration, though for what purpose does not appear, and the inference would be that it was for the payment of debts, and some other debt than the one for which the land here in question was sold. We cannot regard the administration granted to Stribling as unauthorized, on any of the grounds suggested. The order granting letters would presume a valid petition therefor in its absence from the files, and the order indicates that it was granted because the administrator had died without closing the estate, and not solely because it was necessary to protect and secure the property of the estate. That the business of the estate was not closed is an expression broad enough to imply the existence of debts. This must be taken as sufficient in this collateral form of action, for the court entering the order would be presumed to have found facts justifying its entry, in the absence of proof that there were no debts. All the presumptions are in favor of the legality of the proceedings in this form of attack. Nor will the presumption be indulged, for the purpose of disproving the jurisdiction of the court granting letters de bonis non, that from the duration of an administration all debts of the estate have been settled or barred by limitation. Debts established are not subject to the statute pending the administration. These remarks dispose of the questions raised by appellant touching the jurisdiction of the court to grant letters to Stribling.

Another question, and one involved in greater difficulty, is presented in the contention that the descriptions of the land in the order of sale and in the order of confirmation are not the same. The order of sale, after reciting that application had been made for an order to sell a portion of the one-fourth of the headright of Loui Kneipp which was set apart in a partition to said estate, directs the sale of 400 acres off the southwest corner of the tract known as "Survey No. 11 on the Salado creek, in Bexar county, patented to Loui Kneipp." The portion that had been set apart to the estate was that fourth of the league taken off its north-east side, and consequently a description of land off the southwest corner of the league would not embrace any part of it. The report and the confirmation of sale were of "400 acres of land out of the N. W. corner of the league patented to Loui Kneipp, * * * the said 400 acres to be taken off the west or upper end of the portion of said league set apart to the estate by decree," etc. The deed from the executor to the purchaser, I. A. Paschal, described the land as it was described in the latter order, and this is the land now involved. Appellant contends that there was no order of sale of this property, and that the administrator's deed conferred no title; in other words, that for this the sale was void. It is not really necessary, as we view the case on another point, to decide the question of whether the order of sale is an essential part of a title derived through an administrator, or whether the purchaser is bound to look beyond an order of confirmation which in itself shows the proceedings to have been regular. We are strongly inclined to the opinion that where such a sale is brought into question in a collateral manner the decree of confirmation should protect the purchaser, and be preclusive of all questions, save that of the jurisdiction of the court over the estate, which, as we have seen, the court had in this instance. It is possible for a sale to be reported and confirmed without any previous order having been made, and the interested parties be content with the transaction; and it would seem a vicious principle that would admit of their allowing the sale to be perfected when, by an appeal, they could have it avoided, and afterwards avail themselves of the defect in a collateral suit for the property against, as in this case, remote purchasers. The court, however, found that the order of sale was intended to apply to the same land that was mentioned in the decree of confirmation, and that the difference in description was a clerical mistake, and we think the conclusion an admissible one under the evidence. If the order of sale had designated the tract as in the northwest portion of the league instead of the southwest portion, the descriptions would not have been...