Corley v. Long-Lewis, Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 July 2020
• Docket Number: No. 18-10474,18-10474
• Parties: Myra CORLEY, Charles Corley, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LONG-LEWIS, INC., individually and as successor to Burrell Corp., f.k.a. Lewis Hardware Co.; Birmingham Rubber and Gasket Co., et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

965 F.3d 1222

Myra CORLEY, Charles Corley, Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.LONG-LEWIS, INC., individually and as successor to Burrell Corp., f.k.a. Lewis Hardware Co.; Birmingham Rubber and Gasket Co., et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-10474

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

July 16, 2020

Grover Patterson Keahey, Jr., Law Office G. Patterson Kehey, Birmingham, AL, James Arthur Butts, John D. Saxon, PC, Birmingham, AL, Nathan David Finch, Motley Rice, LLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Robert W. Heath, Porterfield Harper Mills Motlow & Ireland, PA, Birmingham, AL, Laurie J. Hepler, Greines Martin Stein & Richland, LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant-Appellee Warren Pumps, LLC.

Nicole Mapp Hardee, James Addison Harris, II, Harris & Harris, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant-Appellee CBS Corporation.

Edward B. McDonough, Jr., Law Offices of Edward B. McDonough Jr., PC, Mobile, AL, for Defendant-Appellee Air & Liquid Systems Corporation Successor-by-merger to Buffalo Pumps, Inc.

Donald Crawford Partridge, Maron Marvel Bradley Anderson & Tardy, LLC, Jackson, MS, for Defendant-Appellee Gardner Denver.

Sarah Elizabeth Jones, Gay Jones & Kuhn, PLLC, Jackson, MS, for Defendant-Appellee General Electric.

James Ford Little, Woolf McClane Bright Allen & Carpenter, PLLC, Knoxville, TN, for Defendant-Appellee Owens-Illinois, Inc.

Frederick G. Helmsing, Jr., McDowell Knight Roedder & Sledge, LLC, Mobile, AL for Defendant-Appellee IMO Industries, Inc.

Charles Paul Cavender, Allan R. Wheeler, Burr & Forman, LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant-Appellee FMC Corporation.

Nicholas P. Vari, Michael James Ross, K&L Gates, LLP, Pittsburgh, PA, Timothy A. Clarke, Vickers Riis Murray & Curran, LLC, Mobile, AL, for Defendant-Appellee Crane Co.

Timothy A. Clarke, Vickers Riis Murray & Curran, LLC, Mobile, AL, for Defendant-Appellee Foster Wheeler Corporation.

Walter T. Gilmer, Jr., McDowell Knight Roedder & Sledge, LLC, Mobile, AL, for Defendant-Appellee Crown Cork & Seal Co., Inc.

Michael A. Vercher, Christian & Small, LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant-Appellee Metropolitan Life Insurance Company.

Schuyler Allen Baker, Jr., Jenelle R. Evans, Julian H. Smith, III, Balch & Bingham, LLP, Birmingham, AL, Richard M. Crump, Maron Marvel Bradley Anderson & Tardy, LLC, Jackson, MS, Suzanne Alldredge Fleming, Brooke G. Malcom, William Larkin Radney, Lightfoot Franklin & White, LLC, Birmingham, AL, Edwin S. Gault, Jr., James Gordon House, III, Forman Watkins & Krutz, LLP, Jackson, MS, Allan R. Wheeler, Burr & Forman, LLP, Birmingham, AL, Anthony C. Harlow, Burr & Forman, LLP, Birmingham, AL, Erik E. Harris, Allstate Insurance Company, Birmingham, AL, Anne Laurie McClurkin, The Kullman Firm, PLC, MOBILE, AL, William Thomas Mills, II, Porterfield Harper Mills Motlow & Ireland, PA, Birmingham, AL, Edwin Bryan Nichols, Walding, LLC, Birmingham, AL, Frank Grey Redditt, Jr., Maynard Cooper & Gale, PC, Mobile, AL, James A. Wyatt, III, Parsons Lee & Juliano, PC, Birmingham, AL, for Service.

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, JILL PRYOR and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge:

This appeal requires us to resolve three difficult questions of appellate jurisdiction before deciding a single issue on the merits. The jurisdictional issues are (1) whether an order granting a voluntary dismissal without prejudice, Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), is a "final decision[ ]," 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ; (2) whether we have territorial jurisdiction, id. § 1294, to review an interlocutory decision by an out-of-circuit district court that merged into the final judgment of a district court in this Circuit; and (3) whether an appellant has standing to appeal from a final judgment accompanying an order granting his motion for a voluntary dismissal. Charles Corley and his wife, Myra Corley, filed this lawsuit against dozens of companies that allegedly supplied products containing asbestos that caused Charles's malignant mesothelioma

. Although the Corleys commenced their suit in an Alabama court, the companies removed it to the Northern District of Alabama. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation then transferred the suit to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, which eventually returned it to the Northern District of Alabama. After the Northern District of Alabama granted the Corleys’ motion to voluntarily dismiss the last two companies in the suit, the Corleys sought our review of an order entered by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania that denied their motion to reconsider a partial summary judgment in favor of several companies. In that motion, the Corleys had argued for the first time that the district court should apply maritime law, not state law, to determine the merits of their claims. We conclude that the order granting a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is a final order, that we have territorial jurisdiction to hear this appeal, and that the Corleys have standing to appeal. We also affirm the judgment against the Corleys.

I. BACKGROUND

Charles and Myra Corley sued dozens of companies that allegedly supplied asbestos-laden products that Charles used when he served in the United States Navy and later when he was a self-employed mechanic and repairman. The Corleys alleged that these products caused Charles's malignant mesothelioma

and sought damages under state law. After Charles's death, his son, Oscar Corley, joined the suit as the executor of Charles's estate. Oscar and Myra amended their complaint to add a claim under the Alabama Wrongful Death Act. The Corleys originally filed their complaint in an Alabama court, and the companies removed the suit to the Northern District of Alabama.

The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred this action to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, where several of the companies filed motions for summary judgment. As relevant to this appeal, the Pennsylvania district court granted summary judgment in favor of 17 companies that supplied products that Charles used when he was in the Navy—a group we will call the "Navy suppliers." The district court determined that the statute of limitations had expired on the claims against these companies. The Corleys filed a motion to reconsider, which asked for "leave to elect the application of maritime law and, in so doing, the [extended] statute of limitations recognized under maritime law." After explaining that the Corleys had not previously argued that maritime law applied, the district court denied the motion on the ground that a motion for reconsideration was far too late in the litigation for the Corleys to change their theory of liability.

Over the next year, the Pennsylvania district court whittled the suit down to what it thought were the final two companies in the suit—Honeywell International, Inc., and Ford Motor Company. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation then remanded the suit to the Northern District of Alabama. The Alabama district court later dismissed Honeywell and Ford from the suit with prejudice.

The Corleys filed an appeal to this Court that challenged the Pennsylvania order denying their motion to reconsider the summary judgment in favor of the Navy suppliers. Two defendants, Fairbanks Morse Pump Corporation and Garlock Sealing Technologies, LLC, filed suggestions of bankruptcy in this Court. After investigation, we discovered that the Corley's claims against Fairbanks and Garlock were still pending in the district court and dismissed the Corleys’ appeal.

On remand to the district court, the Corleys reported that Fairbanks and Garlock had filed petitions for relief in a bankruptcy court in 2010, which had stayed proceedings against them in this suit. Three months later, the bankruptcy court confirmed a reorganization plan that prevented the Corleys from litigating their claims against Fairbanks and Garlock in this suit. Because their claims against the two companies had "already been eliminated as a matter of law" in the bankruptcy court, the Corleys asked the district court to voluntarily dismiss those claims without prejudice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) (permitting the dismissal of "an action ... at the plaintiff's request ... by court order, on terms that the court considers proper"); see also Plains Growers, Inc. ex rel. Florists’ Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ickes-Braun Glasshouses, Inc. , 474 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that plaintiffs can voluntarily dismiss individual parties from a suit). The district court granted their motion and entered what it called a "final judgment with respect to all claims asserted in this action." The Corleys then filed this appeal, which again challenges the denial of their motion to reconsider the summary judgment in favor of the Navy suppliers.

II. JURISDICTION

We have a threshold obligation to ensure that we have jurisdiction to hear an appeal, for "[w]ithout jurisdiction [we] cannot proceed at all in any cause." Ex parte McCardle , 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1869) ; accord Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co. , 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999). Because we are a court of limited jurisdiction, adjudicating an appeal without jurisdiction would "offend[ ] fundamental principles of separation of powers." Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't , 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). In practical terms, our jurisdiction "must be both (1) authorized by statute and (2) within constitutional limits." OFS Fitel, LLC v. Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C. , 549 F.3d 1344, 1355 (11th Cir. 2008).

To say that the odd procedural history of this appeal tests the boundaries of our jurisdiction would be an understatement. The Corleys challenge an interlocutory order from a district court in another circuit, and they do so by appealing from an order granting their motion for a voluntary dismissal without prejudice. But even so, we conclude that we have jurisdiction to address the merits.

We divide our discussion of the jurisdictional issues into three parts. First, we address...