Corley v. State, A98A2018.
Decision Date | 08 February 1999 |
Docket Number | No. A98A2018.,A98A2018. |
Citation | 236 Ga. App. 302,512 S.E.2d 41 |
Parties | CORLEY v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Larsen & Larsen, W.W. Larsen, Jr., Dublin, for appellant.
Richard A. Malone, District Attorney, Jennifer E. Hildebrand, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Lester Leshon Corley was indicted on one count of trafficking in cocaine, OCGA § 16-13-31(a). After his motion to suppress was denied, he stipulated to the remainder of the evidence, and the trial court convicted him of possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Corley appeals the judgment of conviction and sentence, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Because we find that the warrantless search of Corley's pocket was made without his consent and cannot be justified under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), we reverse.
In reviewing a motion to suppress, (Citations omitted.) Morgan v. State, 195 Ga.App. 732, 735, 394 S.E.2d 639 (1990).
The evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress showed that Georgia State Patrol Officer William Hitchens stopped Corley at a roadblock set up to check drivers for documentation such as licenses and proof of insurance. Hitchens noticed that Corley was not wearing his seatbelt and asked him for his driver's license. When Corley responded that he did not have his driver's license with him, Hitchens asked him to park his car on the shoulder of the road while he verified whether Corley had a valid driver's license. After determining that Corley had a valid license, Hitchens asked him to step out of his car while Hitchens wrote citations for failure to wear a seatbelt and have a license on his person. Hitchens asked Corley to step out of the car because it was safer for both of them to move away from the road area. Hitchens testified that he planned to release Corley after writing these citations.1
Hitchens was writing the citations in the presence of Corley and another officer, Ben Forehand, when Officer Mercer joined them. Mercer recognized Corley and told the other officers that Corley had been "associated with" or "messed with" controlled substances in the past. Mercer talked with Corley about his past and asked for permission to search his car. When Corley refused, Mercer left to obtain a search warrant after talking with Corley for an additional 15-30 seconds.
Hitchens then started a pat-down search of Corley to ensure that Corley did not have any weapons in his pockets. Hitchens also wanted to make sure he would not have to react in a manner that would harm Corley should Corley reach into his pockets. During this pat-down, Hitchens felt money in Corley's pocket and asked him to remove it because weapons are sometimes hidden behind money.
Officer Forehand testified he saw a "small lump" or "bulge" in Corley's right front watch pocket while Hitchens was counting the money in front of Corley. Forehand pointed it out to Hitchens and asked Corley to remove the object from his pants so "[h]e could see what it was." Corley placed his index finger in the pocket and pushed the object down further into the pocket. Forehand then stated, Corley then "raked out" a small bag of green leafy material that appeared to be marijuana and "took off running." After providing this testimony, Forehand agreed with the prosecutor's statement that Corley removed the marijuana voluntarily at Forehand's request. Forehand testified that after Corley "took off running," the officers chased him and caught him a short distance away. Corley fought with the officers, who used pepper spray to subdue and handcuff him. After Corley was arrested and transported to jail, the officers searched his car and found a black bag containing cocaine in the glove compartment.
Corley gave a different version of his encounter with the officers. He testified that he was not asked to step out of his car until after Officer Mercer recognized him and that Officer Mercer, not Officer Hitchens, asked him to step out of his car. At Hitchens's request, Corley walked back toward Hitchens's patrol car. Corley further testified that Hitchens said:
Corley testified that after he was directed to turn around, he stated again that he had already been searched and asked "what's going on?" Corley testified that Officer Lanier, who was also present, told him to turn around, stop asking questions and do what he was told to do. After being instructed to pull out the contents of his pocket, Corley complied. Corley denied running away, and he claimed the officers hit him, hog-tied him, and used pepper spray after telling him he was under arrest. After providing this testimony, Corley agreed during cross-examination that he had consented to a pat-down search by the police officers.
After hearing this evidence, the trial court entered a written order denying the motion to suppress. The order recites: "Trooper Hitchens conducted a pat down of the defendant and removed a small lump from the defendant's watch pocket which appeared to be marijuana." The trial court did not determine whether Corley voluntarily consented to the search of his right front watch pocket.
1. On appeal, Corley contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because the searches of his person and his automobile were without probable cause. The State asserts that the search of Corley's person was warranted based upon officer safety and Corley's consent.
(a) The officers were authorized to conduct a pat-down search of Corley's person to ensure that he was unarmed. Hayes v. State, 202 Ga.App. 204, 205, 414 S.E.2d 321 (1991). But even if Corley's compliance with the officer's direction to empty his pocket is characterized as a search of Corley's watch pocket, it cannot be justified as a frisk for weapons under Terry v. Ohio, supra. (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Clark v. State, 208 Ga.App. 896, 900-901(2), 432 S.E.2d 220 (1993).
The record in this case contains no testimony or facts showing that any of the officers felt a bulge in Corley's watch pocket that they believed to be a weapon. It shows only that the officers saw the bulge after completing their frisk of Corley. No evidence was presented that the appearance of the bulge led the officers to believe it was a weapon. And the record does not show that Corley acted in a manner that led the officers to believe he was hiding a weapon in this pocket before he was asked to show the officers the contents of his watch pocket. Compare Pace v. State, 219 Ga.App. 583, 466 S.E.2d 254 (1995) ( ).
As a result, the officers were not authorized under Terry v. Ohio, supra, to intrude into Corley's watch pocket by directing him to remove its contents. State v. Williams, 220 Ga.App. 100, 101-102(1), 469 S.E.2d 261 (1996); Barrett v. State, 212 Ga.App. 745, 748-749, 443 S.E.2d 285 (1994).2
(b) Our analysis does not end here, however, because the State contends the search was consensual. ...
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