Corley v. United States
| Docket Number | 3:02-CR-116 JD |
| Decision Date | 21 June 2023 |
| Parties | ODELL CORLEY a.k.a. NASIH RA'ID, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
On August 27, 2002, armed with a .45 caliber semiautomatic handgun, Odell Corley[1]entered a bank in the Town of Pines Indiana, intending to rob it. One cohort hesitated and stayed outside, and three others were nearby ready to assist with the escape. Within twenty-nine seconds, Mr. Corley had murdered two people and paralyzed another. He fled the bank without getting any money. A jury subsequently convicted and sentenced him to death on four counts of the superseding indictment stemming from the two murders. He seeks to vacate those convictions and sentences pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Court has previously found that of the ten grounds Mr. Corley advances, only Ground Seven-trial counsel's alleged failure to develop and present mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of the trial-requires an evidentiary hearing. However, all other grounds can be decided without a hearing and will be addressed in turn. But as explained below, none of them warrant granting habeas corpus relief.[2]
On November 21, 2002, a grand jury returned a ten-count superseding indictment against Mr. Corley and his co-defendants. (DE 69.) He was charged in eight of those counts as follows:
(Superseding Indict., DE 69.)
Mr. Corley and Edward Johnson were long-time friends who reconnected in August 2002. (Tr. Vol. 9 at 194.) Soon after, Mr. Corley asked Mr. Johnson to help him rob a bank. (Tr. Vol. 9 at 187.) They enlisted Andre McGregor as another accomplice. Jeanna Ramsay, a woman Mr. McGregor developed an amorous relationship with while in prison, also joined in as did Danyass Gay with whom Mr. McGregor was living at the time.
The five of them planned the robbery. Mr. Corley said he had been watching the bank for some time and was familiar with the area and the route to take. (Tr. Vol. 10 at 106.) They discussed their wardrobe and individual roles in the robbery. (Tr. Vol. 9 at 196-98.) Their disguises would consist of sunglasses, bandanas, oversized clothes, and makeup to lighten their complexions. (Tr. Vol. 9 at 140-41, 205-06; Tr. Vol. 10 at 104-05.) Mr. Johnson obtained the guns. (Tr. Vol. 9 at 202.) Three days before the robbery, Ms. Ramsey purchased ammunition.
On August 27, 2002, Mr. Johnson and Ms. Ramsey met Mr. Corley at Mr. McGregor's house. (Tr. Vol. 9 at 213.) Mr. Corley knew of a tan car he could take for the robbery, so he and Mr. Jonson went to retrieve it. (Tr. Vol. 10 at 118.) On the way to the bank, they stopped at a gas station, where Mr. Corley, in an effort to divert the police, used an Arabic accent to call in a bomb threat against an area school. (Tr. Vol. 9 at 218.) Mr. McGregor drove the tan car behind the bank (Tr. Vol. 9 at 221-22) while each of the women drove getaway cars (Tr. Vol. 9 at 218-20).
Mr. Corley entered the bank immediately but Mr. Johnson saw a security guard and stopped outside. United States v. Corley, 519 F.3d 716, 719 (7th Cir. 2008). A security camera captured what happened next. The guard, Keith Hill, went to the bank door as Mr. Corley entered. (Tr. Vol. 7 at 60-61, 82; Tr. Vol. 9 at 222-25.) Mr. Corley opened the door and fired his .45 caliber semiautomatic handgun at Hill at close range, wounding him twice and leaving him paralyzed. (Tr. Vol. 9 at 222-23.) While heading to the servicer counter, Mr. Corley shot teller Chandler Simpson in the head. (Tr. Vol. 7 at 63; Vol. 8, 172-80.) He vaulted the counter, leaving a palm print on its surface and then--just seven seconds after entering the bank--shot teller Kay Peckat who was crouching in the work area. (Tr. Vol. 8 at 183--205.)
At Mr. Corley's command, Mr. Johnson entered the bank and took Mr. Hill's gun. (Tr. Vol. 9 at 222-26.) They found that the vault was locked and fled without any money. During their getaway, Mr. Corley said, (Tr. Vol. 10 at 124-25.) In addition, while leaving the area he stated, “I think I killed somebody.” (Tr. Vol. 10 at 128.) When Ms. Gay asked him what had happened, he told her “not to worry about it, that [she would] see it on America's most wanted.” (Tr. Vol. 10 at 254.)
At trial, Messrs. Johnson and McGregor, and Ms. Gay testified against Mr. Corley. The government also introduced in evidence the bank's security videotape and the palm print from the counter. FBI latent fingerprint examiner Danielle Archambault testified about the palm print. (Tr. Vol. 8 at 250-305.) She testified that fingerprints were unique to each person. (Id. at 269.) Her experience included over 250,000 friction ridge comparisons, all of which were verified by another person. She had identified victims of war and terrorist attacks.
In this case, Agent Archambault examined the high quality palm prints from the bank counter and compared them to Mr. Corley's known exemplars. (Tr. Vol. 8 at 258.) To make an identification, she had to determine there were no unexplainable differences between the latent and the inked print. (Id. at 263.) She found no such differences between Mr. Corley's exemplar and palm prints from the crime scene. (Id. at 263, 267.) In conclusion, Agent Archambault opined that Mr. Corley left the latent print on the bank counter. (Id. at 267.)
After a month-long trial, the jury convicted Mr. Corley on all charges (DE 650) and, during the penalty phase of the trial, unanimously recommended death sentences on the four murder counts. (DE 722.) On December 15, 2004, the trial court followed the jury's recommendations and sentenced Mr. Corley to death on Counts 3, 5, 9, and 10, and to a total term of 600 months of imprisonment on Counts 1, 2, 4, and 6. (DE 737.)
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Corley, 519 F.3d 716. The court rejected Mr. Corley's claims concluding that: (1) the government permissibly exercised a peremptory challenge to excuse a potential juror, id. at 722-23; (2) during the penalty phase of trial, the court properly admitted evidence of an unadjudicated murder, id. at 723-27; (3) the prosecution engaged in no misconduct when cross-examining Mr. Corley or during its penalty phase closing arguments, id. at 727-29; and (4) the trial court properly refused to give a residual doubt instruction during the sentencing phase of trial, id. at 729-30. The Supreme Court subsequently denied a petition for writ of certiorari. Corley v. United States, 555 U.S. 1140 (2009).
Mr. Corley then timely moved to vacate convictions and sentences. (DE 883.) After numerous and prolonged continuances while the case was pending before reassignment, the motion is now briefed, and ready for ruling on all grounds, except ground 7, which requires an evidentiary hearing.
Section 2255(a) of Title 28 provides that a federal prisoner “claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” Id. The Seventh Circuit has recognized that § 2255 relief is appropriate only for “an error of law that is jurisdictional, constitutional, or constitutes a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” Harris v. United States, 366 F.3d 593, 594 (7th Cir. 2004). Relief under § 2255 is extraordinary because it seeks to reopen the criminal process to a person who has already had an opportunity of full process. Almonacid v. United States, 476 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Kafo v. United States, 467 F.3d 1063, 1068 (7th Cir. 2006)).
Most of Mr. Corley's § 2255 motion rests on his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. A criminal defendant is entitled to the assistance of counsel for his defense, U.S. Const. amend. VI; Strickland v Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), and a defendant who was denied effective assistance of counsel can receive relief under § 2255, Edmond v. United States, 899 F.3d 446, 452-53 (7th Cir. 2018). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show: 1) that his counsel's performance was deficient, meaning that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and 2) that he was prejudiced by the deficiencies in his counsel's performance, meaning that there is a reasonable probability that the results of the proceeding would have been different with effective representation. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Edmond, 899 F.3d at 452-53; Koons v. United States, 639 F.3d...
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