MEMORANDUM
Petitioner Justin M. Corliss ("Petitioner" or "Corliss") filed the instant petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1), accompanied by a supporting brief (Doc. 2), seeking relief from his judgment of sentences entered in Monroe County Court of Common Pleas, Pennsylvania, criminal cases 1749-CR-2013 for involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, incest, attempted involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, corruption of minors, indecent assault, endangering welfare of minors, indecent exposure, and 2173-CR-2013 for aggravated indecent assault. (Doc. 1, pp. 1, 2).
The petition is ripe for disposition. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the petition.
I. FEDERAL COURT PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Upon initiation of the proceedings, an Order issued notifying Corliss of the limitations upon his right to file another habeas petition in the future if his petition is considered by the Court. (Doc. 8). Specifically, the Order notified him of the following:
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A), no second or successive habeas petition under section 2254 is allowed unless there are exceptional circumstances and the petitioner has obtained permission from the appropriate court of appeals. See United States v. Miller, 197 F.3d 644, 649 (3d Cir. 1999); Mason v. Meyers, 208 F.3d 414, 417 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying Miller requirements to section 2254 habeas petitions as well as to section 2255 petitions). This means that if your current 2254 habeas petition is considered on the merits and rejected, you no longer have the right simply to file another 2254 petition in this Court raising other grounds for relief, even if you are attempting to raise grounds that you did not think of before filing the current petition. Instead, you would have to move in the Court of Appeals for a certificate allowing you to file that second 2254 petition. Further, the grounds upon which you could rely to obtain that certificate, and proceed with a subsequent 2254 petition, are limited to two extremely rare circumstances: (1) "the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable", or (2) "the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence" and "the facts underlying the claim ... would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2).
(Id.). The Order afforded him the opportunity to have the petition ruled on as filed or withdraw the petition and file one all-inclusive petition. (Id. at 3). On January 18, 2019, Corliss elected to have the petition ruled on as filed. (Doc. 13).
The Court ordered the petition served and Respondent responded. (Doc.21). Corliss filed a Traverse. (Doc. 22). Since then, he has filed a multitude of exhibits, supplements, updates and amendments. (Docs. 19, 20, 29-31, 33, 41, 43).
A recent review of the Corliss' state court electronic dockets revealed that he initiated Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9541-46, proceedings in both criminal matters. https://ujsportal.pacourts.us. This prompted the Court to stay the matter in accordance with the stay and abeyance rule announced in Crews v. Horn, 360 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding that "[s]taying a habeas petition pending exhaustion of state remedies is a permissible and effective way to avoid barring from federal court a petitioner who timely files a mixed petition") and administratively close the case. Corliss immediately moved to vacate the Order, indicating that he desired to proceed with the petition as filed. (Doc. 38). The Court again notified him of the limitations on his right to file another habeas petition in the future. (Doc. 39). He chose to forego the benefit of the stay, indicated that he understood that he loses his ability to file a second or successive petition absent certification by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and that his potential for relief is further limited in a second or successive petition. (Docs. 40, 42). On July 14, 2020, we lifted the stay, reopened the case, and indicated that a decision in the matter would be forthcoming. (Doc. 42).
II. STATE COURT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND In its Memorandum addressing Corliss' direct appeal of the convictions obtained in 1749-CR-2013 and 2173-CR-2013, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania ("Superior Court") set forth the following factual and procedural histories:1
[Appellant] operated a pet store in Monroe County. In 1993, [appellant] commenced a romantic relationship with his coworker, K.V. Shortly thereafter, [appellant] moved in the residence K.V. shared with her minor daughter, R.V. In 1995, when R.V. was approximately nine years old, [appellant] began to molest R.V. At first, [appellant] would tickle R.V. when they played together. [Appellant's] behavior escalated, however, and he began placing his hands down R.V.'s pants. [Appellant] digitally penetrated R.V. on multiple occasions between 1995 and 1997. The abuse occurred at K.V.'s residence, often while K.V. was in another room. On one occasion, [appellant] inappropriately touched R.V. during a car trip to New York. The molestation continued until 1997, when [appellant] moved out of K.V.'s residence. R.V. did not immediately report the abuse.
In 1996, fourteen-year old [D.B.1] began to work at [appellant's] pet store. [footnonte 1: At the time of appellant's 1998 trial, D.B. was known as D.G. For the purposes of continuity, we will refer to her as D.B. throughout this memorandum.]. [D.B.]'s father was a regular customer at the pet store, and [appellant] had known [D.B.] since she was eleven years old. After [D.B.] started working at the pet store, [appellant] would tickle her. [Appellant's] behavior escalated, and he began placing his hands down [D.B.]'s pants. Eventually, [appellant] and [D.B.] engaged in sexual intercourse. [Appellant] also performed oral sex on [D.B.] on multiple occasions.
The abuse occurred at the pet store during regular business hours. On two occasions, [D.B.]'s twelve-year-old friend witnessed the sexual activity. [Appellant] also fondled [D.B.] during car trips to New York.[D.B.] testified that [appellant] took her on these trips "almost every single Monday" to pick up supplies for the pet store. In addition to the liaisons at work, [appellant] molested [D.B.] at K.V.'s residence at least once. In 1997, [D.B.]'s mother learned about the abuse and immediately informed the police.
At No. 743 of 1997, the Commonwealth charged [appellant] with multiple offenses related to the molestation of [D.B.] Following a trial in 1998, a jury convicted [appellant] of two (2) counts of statutory sexual assault and one (1) count each of aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault, and corruption of minors. On August 20, 1998, the [trial] court sentenced [appellant] to an aggregate term of four (4) to ten (10) years' imprisonment. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on November 30, 1999. See Commonwealth v. Corliss, 750 A.2d 366 (Pa.Super. 1999) (unpublished memorandum).
Prior to the start of the 1998 trial, [appellant] met C.T. at the pet store. [Appellant] and C.T. married, and C.T. became pregnant before [appellant's] sentencing hearing. C.T. gave birth to [appellant's] daughter, C.C., in 1999 while [appellant] was incarcerated. [Appellant] remained incarcerated until 2008. Upon his release, [appellant] returned to live with C.T. and C.C. C.T. had no concerns about [appellant] being around C.C., because [appellant] had convinced C.T. that he was actually innocent of the charges pertaining to [D.B.]
When [appellant] would play with C.C., C.T. noticed that [appellant] tickled the child and scratched the child's back. The tickling started to bother C.C., and she asked [appellant] not to touch her, but C.T. did not intervene. [Appellant's] relationship with C.T. ended in 2010, after C.T. discovered that [appellant] was having an affair with another teenager. In 2013, C.C. informed C.T. that [appellant] had molested her. C.C. claimed that [appellant] would put his hands down her pants and touch her vagina, exposed his penis to C.C., and attempted to force the child to perform oral sex on him.
Police arrested [appellant] for the offenses against C.C. in July 2013. The media reported on [appellant's] arrest, and R.V. saw the coverage. R.V. decided to contact police and inform them of the abuse shesuffered from 1995 until 1997. At No. 1749 of 2013, the Commonwealth charged [appellant] with sex offenses committed against C.C. At No. 2173 of 2013, the Commonwealth charged [appellant] with sex offenses committed against R.V. [Footnote 1] On September 24, 2013, the Commonwealth informed [appellant] that Nos. 1749 and 2173 of 2013 would be joined for trial. [Appellant] filed counseled pretrial motions on October 3, 2013, including a motion to sever the cases. Ultimately, the [trial] court granted [appellant's] motion to sever the cases for trial.
[Footnote 1:] At No. 1748 of 2013, the Commonwealth also charged [appellant] with offenses related to his failure to register with state police pursuant to Megan's Law. The matters of No. 1748 of 2013 are not at issue in this appeal.
Commonwealth v. Corliss, No. 2091 EDA 2014, unpublished memorandum (Pa. Super. filed July 14, 2015).
The trial court provided the following procedural history:
[Appellant] was convicted by a jury on June 1, 2016 of various offenses following a trial in which these two (2) cases were consolidated. In case # 1749 CR 2013, [appellant] was convicted of Count 1,
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