Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 85-6024

• Citation: 816 F.2d 1514
• Decision Date: 14 May 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85-6024,85-6024
• Parties: Herman CORN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF LAUDERDALE LAKES, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Page 1514

816 F.2d 1514

Herman CORN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF LAUDERDALE LAKES, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 85-6024.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

May 14, 1987.

Gary M. Farmer, Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., for plaintiff-appellant.

Jean Freeman Reed, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Miami, Fla., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court, Southern District of Florida.

Before VANCE and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges and KEHOE ^*, District Judge.

KEHOE, District Judge:

Herman Corn ("Corn") appeals from the dismissal of his action brought pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, on the grounds the District Court misapplied Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985), to the facts of his case. A careful reading of the mandate of Williamson County in light of prevailing Florida law leads this Court to conclude that Corn's action indeed was erroneously dismissed. Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND this case for further proceedings consistent with this decision. ¹

I. Procedural History

The rather extensive background of this action commences on July 12, 1966, when the City of Lauderdale Lakes passed three zoning ordinances impacting on Corn's property, consisting of 261 acres of land in unincorporated Broward County. The ordinances, respectively, annexed Corn's property; applied a variety of zoning classifications to his land; and allowed Corn to construct mini-warehouses in a portion of his property zoned C-IA. After making initial site preparations, Corn began building single-family homes as authorized.

Following approval by the City's Planning and Zoning Board of Corn's site plan for condominiums, the City Council rezoned the multi-family parcels and denied Corn's request for a building permit. Corn then brought suit in state court for an injunction against the rezoning attempt. A final judgment rendered in Corn's favor estopped the City from rezoning the property during the pendency of Corn's ownership of it. Ten years later, in 1976, Corn again successfully sued the City when it refused to issue him a building permit for a shopping center on a portion of his land.

The next year, Corn submitted site plans for the building of a mini-warehouse/shopping center on that portion of his land zoned C-IA; the plans were approved in May, 1977. However, two months later, the City Council passed three new ordinances which effected a halt on development of Corn's property. Based on this rezoning, the City Council denied approval of Corn's site plans for the land previously zoned C-IA and refused issuance of a building permit.

Corn immediately filed suit in state court seeking issuance of a writ of mandamus, as well as injunctive relief, as to the C-IA parcel. The state court struck the new zoning ordinances as invalid and issued a writ of mandamus requiring the City to approve the site plans and grant a building permit, upon Corn's correction of three technical defects in the plans. On appeal to Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. City of Lauderdale Lakes v. Corn, 427 So.2d 239 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983). Corn then initiated an action in federal district court against the City of Lauderdale Lakes, its former Mayor and various City officials (collectively referred to as "the City"), pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 1983, seeking damages for their violation of his property rights, as guaranteed by the United States Constitution. On October 22, 1985, the District Judge dismissed Corn's action on the ground the Supreme Court's recent decision in Williamson County compelled him to do so.

II. The Mandate of Williamson County

In Williamson County, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a Section 1983 claim for money damages stemming from a regulatory taking of property in violation of federal constitutional rights is not ripe for review on the merits until the Plaintiff demonstrates, first, that a final decision by the relevant authority regarding application of the regulation to the subject property has been made, i.e., the "initial decision-maker has reached a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury," 473 U.S. at 193, 105 S.Ct. at 3120; and second, that no adequate state remedy, such as inverse condemnation, is available to redress the injury occasioned by the final decision. Id. at 196-97, 105 S.Ct. at 3122. The rationale of the Court is that, absent the state's denial to a property owner of just compensation, there can be no cognizable harm to any federal constitutional right. 473 U.S. at 194 n. 13, 105 S.Ct. at 3121 n. 13 ("The nature of the constitutional right therefore requires that a property owner utilize procedures for obtaining compensation before bringing a Sec. 1983 action."). ²

We note at the outset that there is no issue the first prong of Williamson County 's ripeness test has been satisfied. Finality is manifested by a showing that there is no beneficial use to which the property may be put, as determined, for instance, by the request and denial of a variance from application of the regulation. Id. at 191-92 n. 12, 105 S.Ct. at 3120 n. 12. Since the subject ordinances called for a complete moratorium on Corn's development of his property, any request for a variance would plainly have been futile. Accordingly, this Court finds, as the City has itself conceded, ³ that the zoning decision upon which Corn bases his present claim under Section 1983 was a final one within the meaning of Williamson County.

The remaining dispute centers on fulfillment of Williamson County 's second prong: whether, in fact, there exists an available and adequate state remedy to compensate Corn for his loss. In Williamson County, the Supreme Court specifically noted that the appellant could, pursuant to Tennessee statute, bring an action for inverse condemnation in Tennessee court, the relevant state forum, and therefore had an adequate, available state remedy. ⁴ Id. at 196-97, 105 S.Ct. at 3122. Although the Court did not expressly identify inverse condemnation as the only state remedy which would be adequate under the circumstances, the following statement appearing in the opinion supports such a construction:

Respondent has not shown that the inverse condemnation procedure is unavailable or inadequate, and until it has utilized that procedure, its taking claim is premature.

Id. Nevertheless, the Court did leave open the possibility that actual damages for a due process violation caused by a regulation that "goes too far," might provide, "where authorized and appropriate," a theory of recovery alternative to just compensation recoverable pursuant to a claim for inverse condemnation. Id. ⁵ Echoing that theory, the City argues that an action for monetary damages arising from a violation of due process, as guaranteed by the Florida Constitution, is available. It further argues an action in trespass is available to Corn. Absent Corn's unsuccessful pursuit of any of these procedures, the City contends his present action is premature. Because we conclude that Florida recognizes none of these theories of recovery for claims brought challenging zoning ordinances, we reject the City's argument, as well as its apparent adoption by the District Court.

III. Florida Law

In Dade County v. National Bulk Carriers, Inc., 450 So.2d 213 (Fla.1984), the Florida Supreme Court ruled that where a zoning ordinance is confiscatory, an action for inverse condemnation is "not necessary," id. at 216, and relief may be obtained by instituting a suit to declare the ordinance invalid and to enjoin its enforcement. Implicit in the holding of the Court, although not expressly set forth, is the additional determination that such equitable relief is the exclusive remedy available to a property owner injured by virtue of a confiscatory zoning regulation. This interpretation, supported by both the language and rationale of the Court, appears clearly to limit the "available" relief based on the nature of zoning itself:

We distinguished between a zoning change or denial on the one hand and a permit denial on the other hand in Key Haven. We explained that "[a] zoning ordinance is, by definition, invalid if it is confiscatory," 427 So.2d at 159 [Fla.1982], and, consequently, no inverse condemnation would be necessary. On the other hand, as in Key Haven, if the "statute authorizes a permit denial which is confiscatory," id., a separate condemnation proceeding is an appropriate remedy. Under the type of statutory permitting-scheme involved in Key Haven, Albrecht, [v. State, 444 So.2d 8 (Fla.1984) ], and Graham v. Estuary [Properties, Inc., 399 So.2d 1374 (Fla.1981) ], it was contemplated that its application may resultin a taking. Such is not the case in the application of a zoning ordinance. To be valid, it must be reasonable. If a zoning ordinance is confiscatory, the relief available is a judicial determination that the ordinance is unenforceable and must be stricken. See City of Miami Beach v. Lachman, 71 So.2d 148 (Fla.1953), appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 906, 75 S.Ct. 292, 99 L.Ed. 711 (1955), and Mailman Development Corp. v. City of Hollywood, 286 So.2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844, 95 S.Ct. 77, 42 L.Ed.2d 72 (1974). See also Kasser v. Dade County, 344 So.2d 928 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). We hold that this cause should be remanded to the circuit court for a determination of whether the county's action is confiscatory and constitutes a taking without just compensation, in which event the action of the board must be stricken. A denial of rezoning cannot be both reasonable and confiscatory.

Id. at 216.

It would appear that underlying the Court's ruling is the premise that because zoning is a function of the police power, monetary damages are not available as just compensation for a taking of property pursuant to the power...