Cornealius v. State, A14-92-01018-CR

• Decision Date: 06 January 1994
• Docket Number: No. A14-92-01018-CR,A14-92-01018-CR
• Citation: 870 S.W.2d 169
• Parties: Clifton E. CORNEALIUS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. (14th Dist.)
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 169

870 S.W.2d 169

Clifton E. CORNEALIUS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. A14-92-01018-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas Houston (14th Dist.).

Jan. 6, 1994.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 27, 1994.

James Supkis, Houston, for appellant.

J. Harvey Hudson, Houston, for appellee.

Before J. CURTISS BROWN, C.J., and ELLIS and LEE, JJ.

OPINION

LEE, Justice.

Appellant was charged in a multi-count indictment with the murders of three persons and the attempted murder of a fourth person during the commission of an aggravated robbery. Appellant was arrested following a two-month investigation. ¹ Pursuant to a plea bargain agreement, appellant pled guilty to two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of murder, and one count of attempted capital murder. Upon an affirmative finding of the use of a deadly weapon, the trial court found appellant guilty and assessed punishment at 45 years for each count. Appellant brings thirteen points of error complaining of the trial court's jurisdiction and the denial of his pretrial motions, the rehabilitation of a recused trial judge, and the legality of his arrest as a juvenile. We affirm.

We begin with appellant's fourth point of error, in which he contends that the trial court erred in concluding that a peace officer does not need to obtain an arrest warrant to arrest a juvenile. Appellant cites Lanes v. State, 767 S.W.2d 789 (Tex.Crim.App.1989) in support of his position. However, the court in Lanes was confronted with the specific issue of "whether the probable cause requisite of Art. I, Sec. 9 of the Texas Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth, (sic) applies to the arrest of a child." 767 S.W.2d at 791. After an exhaustive analysis of the juvenile justice system, the Court concluded that the probable cause requirement of Art. I, Sec. 9 and the Fourth Amendment should be extended to juvenile proceedings. 767 S.W.2d at 800. The Court did not however, as appellant contends, hold that a warrantless arrest of a juvenile was prohibited. On the contrary, the Court expressly stated that, "juveniles can freely be arrested without a warrant." 767 S.W.2d at 801; see also Vasquez v. State, 739 S.W.2d 37, 41-42 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) reh'g denied, 816 S.W.2d 750 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). The Court reasoned that "at the very least, law enforcement officers can be expected to personally have probable cause for a juvenile arrest and also be held responsible for a reasonable articulation of such at a later hearing." Id. The requirement that the arresting officer possess probable cause to arrest a juvenile does not extend to requiring an arrest warrant in the juvenile setting.

In fact, the Legislature, in adopting Article 52.01 of the Family Code, expressed an intent to allow a juvenile suspect to be taken into custody without a warrant. Subsection (a) of Article 52.01 provides that a child may be taken into custody: (1) pursuant to an order of the juvenile court; (2) pursuant to the laws of arrest; (3) by a law-enforcement officer who reasonably believes that the child has engaged in delinquent conduct; or (4) by a probation officer if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the child has violated a condition of probation imposed by the juvenile court. TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 52.01(a)(1)-(4). Appellant's fourth point of error is overruled.

In his first point of error appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding his arrest was based upon sufficient probable cause. Appellant contends that at the hearing on his motion to suppress, the State did not produce an arrest warrant and thus had the burden of establishing the evidentiary facts necessary to show probable cause. Appellant argues that the State failed to meet such burden in that it failed to offer into evidence the statement of co-defendant, Deandrea Allen, which identified appellant as the third participant in the triple murder, or failed to establish Allen as a credible and trustworthy informant.

As stated previously, the Court of Criminal Appeals extended the probable cause requirement of Article 1, Section 9 and the Fourth Amendment to juvenile proceedings. Lanes, 767 S.W.2d at 800. Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officer, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a reasonable and prudent man in believing that a particular person has committed or is committing a crime. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); Hawkins v. State, 660 S.W.2d 65, 70 (Tex.Crim.App.1983), cert. pending, 506 U.S. 1089, 113 S.Ct. 1147, 122 L.Ed.2d 498 (1993). A statement against penal interest is inherently credible and may be sufficient, in and of itself, to establish probable cause. Williams v. State, 644 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Tex.App.--Beaumont 1982, no pet.). In reviewing the sufficiency of probable cause, the appellate court will look to the facts and circumstances of each case. Woodward v. State, 668 S.W.2d 337 (Tex.Crim.App.1982) (opinion on reh'g), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1181, 105 S.Ct. 939, 83 L.Ed.2d 952 (1985).

The following facts were known to the police when appellant was taken into custody:

1. Manuel Carrillo, Francesca Rincon-Garza, and Abraham Ramos were murder victims of a robbery.

2. Julio Gallegos survived the assault and was seriously wounded.

3. Julio Gallegos identified the perpetrators as three black males.

4. Police first arrested Kenneth Brown, who confessed to his participation in the crime and identified his cousin and a third person, namely Deandrea Allen, as co-participants.

5. Upon his arrest, Deandrea Allen identified himself, Kenneth Brown, and Brown's cousin, Clifton Cornealius as participants in the murders.

6. Brown, Allen, and Cornealius are all black males. This is consistent with the statement made by the only surviving victim.

7. When first informed by police that they were conducting a homicide investigation, Cornealius responded by saying "he didn't know anything about any murders."

We hold that the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officer, and of which he had reasonable trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that appellant had committed the offenses against Carrillo, Garza, Ramos, and Gallegos. While it is true that the police had never dealt with Deandrea Allen prior to this occasion and did not know of his credibility, Allen's statement that he was part of the criminal combination was sufficient to establish his credibility and trustworthiness. See Williams, 644 S.W.2d at 752. We further hold that the arresting officer had sufficient probable cause to take appellant into custody. Appellant's first point of error is overruled.

In his third point of error appellant argues that because he was arrested without a warrant at his residence the State has the burden of establishing the reasonableness of his arrest. Appellant contends that he lives with his grandmother, and it was at her house where police arrested him. ² According to appellant, the State failed to establish that the house from which appellant was arrested was not his home. As such, appellant contends that his statement was taken illegally and should have been suppressed.

The warrantless entry into a home for the purpose of either arrest or search is prohibited by the Fourth Amendment unless both probable cause and exigent circumstances are present. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 740, 104 S.Ct. 2091, 2093, 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1378, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). See also Jefferson v. State, 830 S.W.2d 320 (Tex.App.--Austin 1992, pet. ref'd); State v. Williams, 812 S.W.2d 46 (Tex.App.--Corpus Christi 1991, no pet.); State v. Lopez, 763 S.W.2d 939 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, pet. ref'd). Indeed, the protections extended under Art. 1, Sec. 9 to private residences, apply as well to appurtenances necessary for the comfort of the home or place of business. See TEX.CONST. Art. 1, Sec. 9, interp. commentary (Vernon 1984).

Having found in point of error number one that probable cause existed, we now turn our attention to the existence of exigent circumstances to determine whether appellant's arrest was illegal. In Payton v. New York, supra, the United States Supreme Court made it clear that absent exigent circumstances, police may not enter a suspect's home to make a warrantless arrest. 445 U.S. at 583, 100 S.Ct. at 1378. In Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 101 S.Ct. 1642, 68 L.Ed.2d 38 (1981), the Court went a step further and announced that although police may be armed with an arrest warrant, they may not enter the home of a third party to effect the intended arrest absent exigent circumstances or a search warrant. 451 U.S. at 204-206, 222-224, 101 S.Ct. at 1644, 1653.

Since appellant has established that he was arrested without a warrant, the burden is shifted to the State to prove the reasonableness of the seizure. Russell v. State, 717 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Jamail v. State, 731 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1987), aff'd, 787 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.Crim.App.1990); See TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 14.04 (Vernon 1977). There has been no showing by the State that the circumstances surrounding appellant's arrest were such that procuring a warrant was impracticable. Absent such proof, the State has failed to show that arresting appellant at his home or the home of his grandmother was reasonable.

Having concluded that the arrest of appellant was improper, it is generally necessary that all evidence obtained as a direct result of the illegal arrest of appellant be suppressed under the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 9. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); Boyle v. State, 820 S.W.2d 122, 130 (Tex.Crim.App.1989...