Cornel v. Hawaii
Decision Date | 17 June 2020 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 19-00236 JMS-RT |
Parties | ELIZABETH CORNEL, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF HAWAII; HAWAII PAROLING AUTHORITY; DEXTER KAUAHI, BADGE NO. 1199, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii |
Pending before the court is Defendant Dexter Kauahi's ("Defendant" or "Kauahi") Second Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 39,1 seeking to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") brought by Plaintiff Elizabeth Cornel ("Plaintiff" or "Cornel") against Kauahi and co-Defendants State of Hawaii ("State") and the Hawaii Paroling Authority ("HPA"). To be clear, the Motion toDismiss only concerns claims against Kauahi; neither the State nor the HPA has filed a motion. The court has reviewed the Motion to Dismiss, Opposition, Reply, and supplemental memoranda requested by the court, and decides the matter under Local Rule 7.1(c) without a hearing. Based on the following, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
"At the motion-to-dismiss stage, [courts] take all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true, construing them 'in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,' and then determine[s] 'whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.'" Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 2018) ( ).
Applying that standard, the SAC alleges that Kauahi (a sheriff employed by the State of Hawaii, Department of Public Safety) arrested Cornel (who was released from prison, but had been on parole under authority of the HPA) on February 2, 2018, by serving "a stale and/or invalid warrant, nearly seven years old." SAC ¶ 15, ECF No. 17 at PageID #159. "[A]s such[,] Dexter Kauahi lacked probable cause and/or made an unlawful arrest based on an invalid warranton its face." Id. The SAC explains the circumstances of the arrest and the context for that arrest warrant—and understanding those details is critical in assessing the parties' arguments as to whether the SAC states valid claims. The court sets forth key portions of that background in a timeline fashion:2
Plaintiff filed suit on October 25, 2018 in the First Circuit Court of the State of Hawaii. ECF No. 1 at PageID #2. Defendants removed the action to federal court on May 7, 2019, after a First Amended Complaint, ECF No. 1-1, added federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff filed the SAC on August 28, 2019; the SAC simply corrected the name of the sheriff who served the re-take warrant by substituting Kauahi for a different name. See ECF Nos. 13, 17.
The SAC is not a model of clarity. In an overlapping manner, the SAC alleges five counts: (1) false arrest/false imprisonment; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (3) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (4) gross negligence; and (5) "Unlawful seizure and Detention." ECF No. 17 at PageID #162-67. Counts one, two, and three appear to be directed only at the HPA—they speak in terms of "HPA" and do not mention Kauahi at all. See, e.g., SAC ¶ 33, ECF No. 17 at PageID #162 ("HPA unduly delayed in executing the Arrest Warrant[.]") (emphasis added). Counts four and five, however, arespecifically directed at "defendants," and also sometimes specifically mention Kauahi. See, e.g., id. ¶ 75, ECF No. 17 at PageID #168 ("As a direct and foreseeable result of said acts and omissions of the defendants[,] the plaintiff was illegally arrested and held in custody[.]"); id. ¶ 77 (). Moreover, count five appears to include both state law claims for false arrest, and federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unlawful seizure and denial of due process under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. See id. ¶¶ 80-81, ECF No. 17 at PageID #169-170.4
Accordingly, the court construes the SAC as making claims against Kauahi for (1) false arrest/imprisonment, (2) gross negligence, and (3) constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—as does Kauahi in his Motion to Dismiss. See ECF No. 39-1 at PageID #226 (arguing that the SAC's allegations "do[] not constitute false imprisonment, gross negligence, or an illegal seizure").
Kauahi filed his Motion to Dismiss on January 16, 2020, ECF No. 39; Cornel filed an Opposition on March 27, 2020, ECF No. 47; and Kauahi filed a Reply on April 6, 2020, ECF No. 48. On May 8, 2020, the court ordered Cornel to supplement the record with a copy of the re-take warrant, and requested supplemental briefing. ECF No. 51. Both parties filed their supplemental briefing on May 22, 2020. ECF Nos. 53, 54.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a motion to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]" A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper when there is either a "'lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged.'" UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)).
Although a plaintiff need not identify the legal theories that are the basis of a pleading, see Johnson v. City of Shelby, Mississippi, 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (per curiam), a plaintiff must nonetheless allege "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This tenet—that the court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in thecomplaint—"is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id. Accordingly, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) ().
Rather, "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In other words, "the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation." Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. Factual allegations that only permit the court to infer "the mere possibility of misconduct" do not show that the pleader...
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