Cornelius v. Roberts

• Decision Date: 05 June 2013
• Citation: 71 A.3d 345
• Parties: Mary CORNELIUS, Administratrix of the Estate of Akeem L. Cornelius, deceased v. Isaac ROBERTS, Edward Grynkewicz, III and The Harrisburg Police Bureau, City of Harrisburg. Appeal of: Edward Grynkewicz, III and The Harrisburg Police Bureau, City of Harrisburg.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

71 A.3d 345

Mary CORNELIUS, Administratrix of the Estate of Akeem L. Cornelius, deceased

v.Isaac ROBERTS, Edward Grynkewicz, III and The Harrisburg Police Bureau, City of Harrisburg.

Appeal of: Edward Grynkewicz, III and The Harrisburg Police Bureau, City of Harrisburg.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued June 4, 2012.

Decided June 5, 2013.

Scott D. McCarroll, Harrisburg, for appellants.

David J. Chapman, Harrisburg, for appellee.

BEFORE: McGINLEY, Judge, SIMPSON, Judge, and JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge.

OPINION BY Senior Judge JAMES GARDNER COLINS.

Appellants Edward Grynkewicz, III, (Officer) and the Harrisburg Police Bureau of the City of Harrisburg (collectively Defendants) appeal the May 24, 2011 order of the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas (Trial Court) dismissing Defendants' preliminary objections. On June 29, 2011, the order was amended by the Trial Court to allow for an interlocutory appeal by permission. ¹

The events at issue here began late on April 18, 2010, leading into the early hours of April 19, 2010, in the area of 13th and Berryhill Streets in the city of Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. (Complaint ¶¶ 7, 11.) Isaac Roberts (Roberts) was operating a vehicle and engaged in activity that caught the attention of the Officer. (Complaint ¶ 8.) The Officer activated his lights and began to pursue Roberts, who failed to pull over and stop his vehicle. (Complaint ¶ 9.) Instead, Roberts continued Northbound on 7th Street at a high rate of speed with his vehicle headlights turned off. (Complaint ¶ 8.) The Officer, also traveling at a high rate of speed, continued to pursue Roberts. (Complaint ¶ 9.) At the intersection of North 7th Street and Maclay Street, the vehicle operated by Roberts collided with the right passenger side of a vehicle traveling Eastbound that was operated by James Peck. (Complaint ¶¶ 7, 13.) As a result of the collision, Akeem L. Cornelius, a passenger in the vehicle operated by James Peck, was taken to Harrisburg Hospital, where he ultimately died from severe injuries sustained in the collision. (Complaint ¶ 14.)

On October 14, 2010, Mary Cornelius, Administratrix of the Estate of Akeem L. Cornelius, deceased (Plaintiff), filed a civil action complaint sounding in tort against Defendants. In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the Officer operated his vehicle in a negligent manner, initiating and maintaining a high speed pursuit in violation of Harrisburg Police Bureau regulations. (Complaint–Count I.) Plaintiff also alleges that the Harrisburg Police Bureau was negligent in failing to train and supervise the Officer involved in the vehicle pursuit. (Id.) Defendants filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer on the grounds that the Officer did not owe a duty of care to the decedent and that the Harrisburg Police Bureau is protected from negligence claims for failure to train and supervise the Officer by governmental immunity. (Preliminary Objections I & II.)

Following argument on the Defendants' preliminary objections, the Trial Court dismissed Defendants' preliminary objections without prejudice, stating:

[w]hether or not the actions of the police vehicle and its operator in initiating and/or maintaining the pursuit of the vehicle operated by Defendant Isaac Roberts, became a liability issue factually causing the events that followed, we are unable to say with the requisite legal certainty at this juncture that no viable cause of action may be maintained as pled by Plaintiff.

(Trial Court Order, May 24, 2011.) On August 17, 2011, following certification by the Trial Court, this Court granted Defendants' petition for permission to appeal the Trial Court's interlocutory order.²

Before this Court, Defendants contend that a local agency and its police employees do not owe a common law duty to innocent bystanders during police pursuits of fleeing suspects. Defendants also argue that, under Section 8541 of the Judicial Code (Tort Claims Act) ³, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541, a local agency and its police employees are immune from negligence claims stemming from a police pursuit, where the alleged negligence is based on the act of pursuing a fleeing wrongdoer and not the actual operation of the vehicle. Plaintiff contends that the Defendants' conduct falls within the vehicle exception to governmental immunity, because the manner in which the pursuit was conducted cannot be severed from the operation of the police vehicle. Plaintiff also argues that a local agency and its police employees do have a common law duty to innocent bystanders during a police pursuit.

The issues raised by the parties here directly address this Court's opinion in Aiken v. Borough of Blawnox, 747 A.2d 1282, 1285 (Pa.Cmwlth.), allocator denied,564 Pa. 714, 764 A.2d 1072 (2000), which Defendants argue was wrongly decided. Aiken followed upon the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v. Chieffo, 549 Pa. 46, 700 A.2d 417 (1997)⁴, which addressed the issue of whether innocent bystanders could recover under the Tort Claims Act for injuries allegedly sustained due to the negligent operation of an agency vehicle during a police pursuit. Overruling an earlier decision, Dickens v. Horner, 531 Pa. 127, 611 A.2d 693 (1992), the Court in Jones held that negligent or criminal acts of fleeing suspects do not, as a matter of law, constitute a superseding cause that prevents a trier of fact from finding negligent acts by police officers a substantial factor in causing innocent bystanders harm. The Court stated:

We cannot hold as a matter of law that [the police officer's] alleged negligence was not a substantial factor causing [the innocent motorist's] injuries. A jury must make that determination. Similarly, Dickens should have gone beyond the pleadings stage to discover whether there was support for the plaintiff's allegation that the officer negligently failed to follow pursuit procedures. This result is consistent with Crowell and Powell, which establish that a governmental party is not immune from liability when its negligence, along with a third party's negligence, causes harm.

549 Pa. at 52, 700 A.2d at 420.⁵ Following Jones, this Court recognized in Aiken, that a local agency and its employees owe a common law duty to innocent bystanders in the operation of a police vehicle during police pursuits of fleeing suspects, stating, “[W]e hold that innocent bystanders, like Appellant, can maintain an action against the government alleging that police officers negligently maintained a high-speed pursuit.” 747 A.2d at 1285.Aiken involved a high-speed police pursuit of a fleeing suspect that ended when the fleeing suspect collided with a vehicle driven by an innocent bystander. 747 A.2d at 1283. The innocent bystander sustained permanent injury and subsequently filed a civil action against the local agency involved, alleging permanent disability as a result of a negligently maintained high-speed pursuit of a fleeing suspect. Id. The innocent bystander in Aiken alleged that the local agency was liable under the vehicle exception to the Tort Claims Act; the local agency moved for summary judgment, claiming governmental immunity, and following a grant of summary judgment, the innocent bystander appealed to this Court. 747 A.2d at 1284. In overruling the lower court's grant of summary judgment, this Court reasoned that Jones and amendments to the vehicle exception to the Tort Claims Act required the conclusion that an innocent bystander can maintain a cause of action against a local agency for negligent maintenance of a high-speed police pursuit. 747 A.2d at 1285.

Section 8541 of the Tort Claims Act provides that local agencies and agency employees are immune from tort liability:

Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.

42 Pa.C.S. § 8541. The text of Section 8541 unequivocally shields local government units from tort liability, but the “except as otherwise provided language” also makes clear that this grant of immunity is not absolute. Id. Section 8542 of the Tort Claims Act sets forth eight enumerated exceptions under which a local agency or its employees may still be liable for damages for acts that cause injury to persons or property. 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541–8542. Prior to an examination of whether a claim may fall within one of these exceptions, Subsection 8542(a) requires that the following two conditions must be established: (1) that damages would be recoverable under common law or a statute creating a cause of action if the injury were caused by a person not having available the defense of immunity; and (2) that the injury was caused by a negligent act of the local agency or its employee acting within the scope of his or her office or duties. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(a)(1)-(2). If a plaintiff is able to satisfy these initial conditions, a plaintiff must then demonstrate that the alleged negligent act falls within one of the eight enumerated exceptions to governmental immunity in Subsection 8542(b). 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(a). However, the General Assembly's clear intent to insulate local agencies and agency employees from tort claims mandates that Pennsylvania courts construe these eight exceptions to immunity narrowly. Love v. City of Philadelphia, 518 Pa. 370, 374, 543 A.2d 531, 532 (1988) ( citing Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 514 Pa. 351, 523 A.2d 1118 (1987)).

The vehicle exception to local governmental immunity provides that a local agency or its employees may be liable for damages on account of an injury to a person or property arising out of the operation of any motor vehicle in the possession or control of the local agency. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(1). ⁶ The vehicle exception also contains an exception to the exception, which prevents those who flee from or aid those fleeing from police from recovering for injuries brought upon...