Cornella v. City of Lander

• Decision Date: 18 January 2022
• Docket Number: S-21-0135
• Citation: 2022 WY 9
• Parties: CALLI CORNELLA, PHILLIP CORNELLA, and CALLI and PHILLIP CORNELLA as next friends of JPC, BNC and SPC, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. CITY OF LANDER, WYOMING, Appellee (Defendant).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

2022 WY 9

CALLI CORNELLA, PHILLIP CORNELLA, and CALLI and PHILLIP CORNELLA as next friends of JPC, BNC and SPC, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. CITY OF LANDER, WYOMING, Appellee (Defendant).

No. S-21-0135

Supreme Court of Wyoming

January 18, 2022

Appeal from the District Court of Fremont County The Honorable Marvin L. Tyler, Judge

Representing Appellant: Sky D. Phifer of Phifer Law Office Lander, Wyoming; Zachary H. Mahlum of Mahlum Law Office Lander, Wyoming. Argument by Mr. Phifer.

Representing Appellee: Richard Scott Rideout of Law Offices of Richard Rideout, P.C., Cheyenne, Wyoming. ^[*]

Before FOX, C.J., and DAVIS ^[**] , KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

BOOMGAARDEN, JUSTICE

[¶1] The Cornella family brought a negligence claim against the City of Lander under Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (WGCA) § 1-39-112 (LexisNexis 2021) after an officer removed a bat from their home and lost it before it could be tested for rabies. The district court concluded that the Cornellas' claim was barred by governmental immunity and granted summary judgment to the City. The Cornellas appeal, arguing that the court erred both procedurally and as a matter of law when it granted summary judgment. Because we conclude the court erred in both respects, and the City was not otherwise entitled to summary judgment on the record presented, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

ISSUES

[¶2] The issues are:

I. Did the district court err procedurally when it granted summary judgment to the City?

II. Did the district court err as a matter of law when it granted summary judgment to the City?

FACTS

[¶3] On September 12, 2016, Ms. Cornella found a bat in her sons' bedroom and called the Animal Control Division of the Lander Police Department. Officer Fred Cox responded to the Cornella's home.^[1] He found the bat inside the home, captured it with a net, and put the net in the bed of his pickup truck to transport the bat to the Wyoming Game and Fish Department office so it could be tested for rabies. Shortly thereafter, Officer Cox called Ms. Cornella to let her know that the bat had escaped from the net during transport and could not be tested.

[¶4] Ms. Cornella reached out to Game and Fish and was told to call the public health office. The public health office referred her to State Veterinarian, Karl Musgraves. Dr. Musgraves told Ms. Cornella that seven bats in the area had recently tested positive for rabies. He advised her to have her sons checked by a doctor for bite marks but cautioned that bat bite marks were not always visible. He recommended that the whole family get rabies vaccines even if they had no visible bite marks.

[¶5] The Cornellas' physician found no visible bite marks on the two boys. The Cornellas then took all three of their children to the hospital, where an emergency room doctor concurred that the whole family should get rabies vaccines. The Cornellas all received their first dose that night, and followed up with the three-, seven-, and fourteen-day doses to complete the regimen. The medical bills for their vaccines totaled $83, 007.60.

[¶6] In July 2019, the Cornellas filed a complaint against the City seeking $133, 007.60 in damages for the cost of the rabies vaccines, mental anguish, time spent coordinating with state officials and medical professionals, and damage to their credit ratings. The City filed a summary judgment motion, which the court granted in April 2021.

[¶7] Additional facts will be included in the discussion as necessary.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶8] "We review a district court's order granting summary judgment de novo and afford no deference to the district court's ruling." James v. James, 2021 WY 96, ¶ 23, 493 P.3d 1258, 1265 (Wyo. 2021) (quoting Candelaria v. Karandikar, 2020 WY 140, ¶ 11, 475 P.3d 548, 551 (Wyo. 2020)). We "review[] the same materials and use[] the same legal standard as the district court." Id. (quoting Candelaria, ¶ 11, 475 P.3d at 551). Summary judgment is only appropriate when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." W.R.C.P. 56(a).

[¶9] The interpretation of the rules of procedure is a question of law we review de novo. Vahai v. Gertsch, 2020 WY 7, ¶ 25, 455 P.3d 1218, 1226 (Wyo. 2020) (citation omitted). To the extent we need to interpret statutory language, our review is de novo. Bruce v. Bruce, 2021 WY 38, ¶ 26, 482 P.3d 328, 335 (Wyo. 2021) (citation omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. The district court erred procedurally when it granted summary judgment on grounds not raised by the parties without giving notice and time to respond.

[¶10] The Cornellas contend the district court failed to follow proper procedure when it granted summary judgment to the City on grounds not raised by the parties without giving them "notice and a reasonable time to respond."

[¶11] Summary judgment procedure is governed by W.R.C.P. 56. As a whole, W.R.C.P. 56 "clearly contemplates a motion and full adversary proceedings before a summary judgment is granted." Basic Energy Servs., L.P. v. Petroleum Res. Mgmt., Corp., 2015 WY 22, ¶ 20, 343 P.3d 783, 789 (Wyo. 2015) (quoting Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Caballo Coal Co., 2011 WY 24, ¶ 31, 246 P.3d 867, 875 (Wyo. 2011)). Under W.R.C.P. 56(f)(2), the court may, "[a]fter giving notice and a reasonable time to respond," "grant the motion on grounds not raised by a party[.]" "The basic premise . . . is to require a full presentation of the issue to the district court before judgment is rendered." Id. (citing Caballo Coal, ¶ 33, 246 P.3d at 875-86).

[¶12] The Cornellas brought their claim under § 1-39-112 of the WGCA, which provides that "[a] governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from tortious conduct of peace officers while acting within the scope of their duties." Specifically, the Cornellas claimed that Officer Cox was negligent in capturing and delivering the bat for testing, and that Police Chief Robert Cecrle, Officer Cox's supervisor, was negligent in training Officer Cox on how to properly secure a potentially rabid bat. The Cornellas' complaint alleged:

25. At all times herein, [Officer] Cox and [Chief] Cecrle were peace officers of the City of Lander in the City of Lander's Police Department and were each acting within the scope of their duties as a Lander peace officer.

The City answered:

25. The Defendant admit[s] the allegations contained in paragraph 25 of the Plaintiffs' Complaint.

[¶13] The City moved for summary judgment, primarily asserting that the torts of "negligent transportation" and "negligent failure to train" were not recognized exceptions to governmental immunity, see infra ¶¶ 17-18, and that the Cornellas could not establish negligence to satisfy their § 1-39-112 claim because they could not show that Officer Cox or Chief Cecrle owed them a duty of care.^[2] The Cornellas responded to the motion, the City filed a reply, and the Cornellas supplemented their response-the parties' arguments remained within the scope of those made in the City's summary judgment motion. The court held a hearing on the motion in December 2020.^[3]

[¶14] The court recognized in its summary judgment order that the primary issue was whether Officer Cox or Chief Cecrle owed a duty to the Cornellas. But it explained:

In analyzing whether a duty exists based upon operation of a statute, the [court] literally stumbled upon Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-103(a)(1), [^[4] which dispositively changed the primary [summary judgment] issue from the existence of a duty to the focus of whether governmental immunity was waived under the WGCA exception in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-39-112. This statute (i.e., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-103(a)(1)) was never cited or raised by either party in their summary judgment submittals or in their arguments.

W.R.C.P. 56 requires that the parties be permitted to fully present their positions and arguments upon the issues, and the accepted due process procedure is to have the parties submit additional briefing and arguments upon the discovery of a previously unaddressed issue before a court makes a determination and/or enters a dismissal. Jenkins v. Miller, 2008 WY 45, ¶¶ 20-21, 180 P.3d 925, 932-33 (Wyo. 2008); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Caballo Coal Co., 2011 WY 24, ¶ 31, 246 P.3d 867, 875 (Wyo. 2011); Basic Energy Services, L.P. v. Petroleum Resource Management, Corp., 2015 WY 22, ¶ 20, 343 P.3d 783, 789 (Wyo. 2015). However, in this instance, the [c]ourt cannot ignore the legislative intent specifically expressed in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-103(a)(1) regarding governmental immunity.

Then, relying on Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-2-101 through -107 (LexisNexis 2021), which generally address peace officers' statutory authority, ^[5] the court concluded that neither Officer Cox nor Chief Cecrle were acting within the scope of their duties as peace officers at the times relevant to the Cornellas' claim. It determined they were instead acting as an animal control officer, and an animal control supervisor, respectively. Thus, the City was immune from tort liability under § 1-39-112 by operation of § 15-1-103(a)(1), and the City was entitled summary judgment as a matter of law.

[¶15] The court's conclusion it could not "ignore" § 15-1-103(a)(1) was in error, as we have consistently held that the procedural protections afforded by Rule 56(f)(2) reign supreme. See Caballo Coal, ¶ 31 246 P.3d at 875 ("The concepts of notice, [] and opportunity to be heard are ancient primaries . . . However correct the conclusion below may be in the end, we cannot allow the shaving of principles for expediency when those precepts assure order and justice." (quoting Kimbley v. Green River, 642 P.2d 443, 445-46 (Wyo. 1982))). Accordingly, once the court sua...