Cornes v. State

• Decision Date: 20 August 1984
• Docket Number: No. 4-783A213,4-783A213
• Citation: 467 N.E.2d 425
• Parties: Leon CORNES, Sr., Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 425

467 N.E.2d 425

Leon CORNES, Sr., Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 4-783A213.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

Fourth District.

Aug. 20, 1984.

James W. Boswell, Terre Haute, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Richard Albert Alford, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

YOUNG, Judge.

Leon Cornes was convicted after a jury trial of theft, a Class D felony under IND.CODE 35-43-4-2 (1982), and contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a Class A misdemeanor under IND.CODE 35-46-1-8 (1982). On appeal he contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. ¹

In deciding whether the evidence was sufficient to support the appellant's convictions, we will consider only the evidence most favorable to the state, and we will affirm if there is substantial evidence on each element from which the jury might reasonably infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Harris v. State, (1981) Ind., 425 N.E.2d 112. The theft statute under which Cornes was convicted provides that "A person who knowingly or intentionally exerts unauthorized control over property of another person, with intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use, commits theft, a Class D felony." IC 35-43-4-2. Appellant's conviction was also based upon IC 35-41-2-4, which in part provides that "A person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense ...."

The evidence before the jury disclosed that, on January 14, 1982, Cornes was in an apartment with several other people, including D.D. At that time, D.D. was fifteen years old. After some conversation with Cornes, D.D. said, "Let's go and get some coats." Cornes told D.D. he would take him. The two got into a station wagon, and Cornes drove to Azar's Army Surplus Store. Cornes let D.D. out behind the store, with an agreement to meet him in an alley behind a nearby grocery store. Entering the surplus store, D.D. put on one coat and picked up another, then fled without paying for them. He found Cornes waiting in the arranged place, with his car's engine running. D.D. jumped in and told Cornes to hurry because he thought he was being pursued. Cornes drove a short distance, then D.D. jumped out of the car and fled on foot, taking the stolen coats with him.

Cornes argues this evidence was insufficient to support his theft conviction because there was no showing that he knew D.D. intended to steal the coats. We disagree. Cornes's actions in dropping D.D. off behind the surplus store and hiding in a nearby alley with his car running to wait for D.D. show Cornes knew D.D. intended to steal the coats. Thus, by driving D.D. to and from the store, Cornes knowingly and intentionally aided him in committing theft. This was sufficient to support Cornes's theft conviction. See Jones v. State, (1978) 177 Ind.App. 584, 380 N.E.2d 604 (evidence that defendant waited in a car with the engine running while friends committed robbery and transported them from the scene sufficient to convict defendant of robbery).

Cornes also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to prove he contributed to the delinquency of a minor. That offense is defined as follows:

A person eighteen (18) years of age or older who knowingly, or intentionally encourages, aids, induces, or causes a person under eighteen (18) years of age to commit an act of delinquency as defined by IC 31-6-4-1 commits contributing to delinquency, a Class A misdemeanor.

IC 35-46-1-8 (1982). Cornes does not dispute that D.D.'s theft of the coats was an act of delinquency under IC 31-6-4-1. Rather, he claims there is no evidence to show he knowingly committed this offense, absent proof that he knew D.D. intended to commit theft and that he knew D.D. was under eighteen.

As we have already noted, there was sufficient evidence to prove Cornes knew D.D. planned to commit theft and thus knowingly aided him in doing so. As for the contention that Cornes did not know D.D. was under eighteen, we note that D.D. was in fact fifteen at the time of the offense. One person who witnessed the theft testified D.D. appeared to be fifteen or sixteen. Finally, since D.D. testified at trial, the jury was entitled to consider his physical appearance in deciding whether Cornes knew he was under eighteen. Such evidence has been held sufficient to prove a...