Cornet Stores v. Superior Court In and For Yavapai County

• Citation: 108 Ariz. 84,492 P.2d 1191
• Decision Date: 21 January 1972
• Docket Number: No. 10468,10468
• Parties: CORNET STORES, a California corporation, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF YAVAPAI et al., Respondents.
• Court: Supreme Court of Arizona

Page 1191

492 P.2d 1191

108 Ariz. 84

CORNET STORES, a California corporation, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizona IN AND FOR the COUNTY OF YAVAPAI et al., Respondents.

No. 10468.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

Jan. 21, 1972.

Favour & Quail, by Keith F. Quail, Prescott, for petitioner.

Richard Walraven, Prescott, for respondent Dent.

STRUCKMEYER, Justice.

This is an original proceeding by special action to prohibit the respondent, The Honorable Jack L. Ogg, Judge of the Superior Court of Yavapai County, from enforcing an order requiring the Cornet Stores, Inc. to answer certain interrogatories propounded by respondent Dent, plaintiff in the Superior Court. We accepted jurisdiction to settle the claim that the Superior Court abused its discretion and, hence, acted in excess of its jurisdiction. For the reasons given petitioner's request for relief is denied.

Cornet Stores is a California corporation owning 133 variety and discount stores, all located in the western United States (Hawaii, California, Oregon, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, Wyoming, and Idaho). In June 1957, the Respondent Real Party in Interest, Virgil Dent, undertook employment with Cornet Stores, serving in various capacities, including six years as a district supervisor. Some time in 1967 he became the manager of Cornet's new Prescott, Arizona store as the result of an oral agreement between respondent and Joe Cornet, Jr., Cornet's Executive Vice President. The terms of the agreement were that Dent would receive 25% Of the net profits of the store upon the condition that he remain in the employ of petitioner to and including the last day of the fiscal year May 31st. Dent was to be paid $200.00 per week with any balance of the 25% In the form of a bonus at the end of the fiscal year. He continued in the capacity of manager until January 10, 1970, when the district supervisor called at the store and informed him that, 'I have to let you go.' No other reason was given by the district supervisor for Dent's discharge.

It is Dent's position that he was discharged because his earnings as manager exceeded those paid by petitioner to other managers in comparable stores. He alleges that he was the highest paid manager and one of only two paid on a percentage basis. Petitioner, on the other hand, asserts in its answer to Dent's suit that he consistently violated company policies and failed to comply with the orders of his superiors.

Dent submitted twenty-one written interrogatories under Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b) and 33, 16 A.R.S. to petitioner. Petitioner objected to eleven of them, and the Superior Court held that six of the interrogatories were proper, but that others were improper.

The interrogatories held proper requested information concerning the names, addresses, and terms of employment of each store manager both at the time Dent commenced his managerial duties in 1967 and at the time he was discharged in 1970; that is, whether each was salaried or paid a percentage of the profits, the total earnings of the current managers for the fiscal years 1969 and 1970, the terms of employment of the present manager of the Prescott store, and the earnings of each of the Cornet Stores for the years 1967 through 1970. Petitioner instituted this special action to prohibit the enforcement of such part of the order as pertained to the six interrogatories. Petitioner's basis for objection is that the proffered interrogatories are irrelevant, not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, would require the disclosure of trade secrets, were oppressive, burdensome, and would be expensive to formulate in that some 1200 individual answers would be required.

The general rule is that in matters of discovery, trial courts are vested with wide discretion, and their decisions will not ordinarily be disturbed. In addition, the burden of proving the validity of the objection is upon the objecting party. Newell v. Phillips Petroleum, 144 F.2d 338, 340 (10th Cir., 1944); Carson v. City of Fort Lauderdale (Fla.App.), 173 So.2d 743 (1965); Petersen v. City of Vallejo, 259 Cal.App.2d 757, 782, 66 Cal.Rptr. 776, 791, 792 (1968); And see Stover v. Central Broadcasting Co. (Iowa), 247 Iowa 1325, 78 N.W.2d 1, 4 (1956), cert. den. 352 U.S. 1016, 77 S.Ct. 565, 1 L.Ed.2d 549.

Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure are in the main taken from the federal rules and those dealing with interrogatories are almost identical. 4 A Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed. 1971), 33.27, 33--151, 152, in a discussion generously supported by authorities, states:

'General objections, such as the objection that the interrogatories will require the party to conduct research and compile data, or that they are unreasonably burdensome, oppressive, or vexations, * * * or that they are irrelevant and immaterial, * * * are insufficient.

The burden of persuasion is on the objecting party to show that the interrogatories should not be answered * * *.'

It is also a common principle that the rules of discovery are to be broadly and liberally construed to facilitate identifying the issues, promote justice, provide a more efficient and speedy disposition of cases, avoid surprise, and prevent the trial of a lawsuit from becoming a 'guessing game.' See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947); Watts v. Superior Court, 87 Ariz. 1, 347 P.2d 565 (1959), and citations; DiPietruntonio v. Superior Court, 84 Ariz. 291, 327 P.2d 746 (1958). In the past we have upheld objections to interrogatories. See Industrial Commission v. Holohan, 97 Ariz. 122, 367 P.2d 624 (1964); Dean v. Superior Court, 84 Ariz. 104, 324 P.2d 764 (1958), where there were blanket requests for all documents and, hence, were too sweeping and undetailed to require compliance.

In the light of these common principles, petitioner contends that the requested information is irrelevant and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. It argues as a basis for its position that if it had a legal right to terminate Dent's employment, the particular reason for termination is irrelevant. Rule 26(b), Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S. provides that any matter relevant to the subject matter or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence is discoverable and, of course, conversely irrelevant matters or those not reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence are not discoverable. See Connolly v. Great Basin Insurance Co., 6 Ariz.App. 280 at 288, 431 P.2d 921, 73 A.L.R.2d 1 (1968).

We said in State ex rel. Willey v. Whitman, 91 Ariz. 120 at 123, 370 P.2d 273 at 276 (1962), in quoting from Hickman v. Taylor, supra, that:

'It seems clear and long has been recognized that discovery should provide a party access to anything that is evidence in his case.'

Particularly applicable to the issues in this case is the statement of the court in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Superior Court, 263 Cal.App.2d 12 at 22, 69 Cal.Rptr. 348 at 354:

'It is now well settled that, in an action at law for damages, the plaintiff is entitled in appropriate pretrial discovery proceedings to seek information directly relevant to the issue of damages even though the issue of defendant's liability has not been tried and determined. (Citations omitted.)'

The terms of employment of the store managers, their names and addresses, and the net profits of their stores is directly relevant to Dent's burden of proof. By the acquisition of such information, he will have available for use at the trial the proof of his allegations that under the terms of his contract he was the highest paid manager and one of only two paid on a percentage basis and inferentially that this was the reason for his discharge.

Petitioner argues that if there is proved an employment agreement under which Dent could not be legally discharged without cause and if petitioner fails to establish that it had cause to discharge him, he is entitled to damages without regard to the motive Cornet had in discharging him. Therefore, the names, addresses, and the terms of employment of the manager of each store are immaterial and irrelevant. However, we think that it is Dent's burden as plaintiff to first establish that the discharge was without cause and that to do that he may show the actual reason for the termination of his services. Petitioner's motive might tend to contradict any other reason assigned for Dent's discharge. The principle quoted from Moore, supra, that the burden to show why interrogatories should not be answered is on the objecting party is stated somewhat differently but, nonetheless, appropriately in Ex parte Reserve Life Ins. Co., 38 Ala.App. 32, 77 So.2d 388, 391 (1954):

'Interrogatories should be answered unless it appears affirmatively that the evidence sought is patently objectionable and inadmissible.'

Petitioner also objects for the reason that it is willing to stipulate that respondent was its highest paid manager. We think, however, that a party to litigation has the right to prove its case in the fashion it deems most satisfactory and may not be compelled by the court to accept an offer to stipulate, the effect of which may not have the same impact upon a jury as the evidence which establishes the fact. It is conceivable that the compensation of respondent when contrasted with that of...