Cornette v. Department of Transp., No. S089010.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Writing for the Court: BROWN, J.
• Citation: 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 1,26 P.3d 332,26 Cal.4th 63
• Parties: Stacy CORNETTE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant and Respondent.
• Decision Date: 12 July 2001
• Docket Number: No. S089010.

109 Cal.Rptr.2d 1
26 Cal.4th 63
26 P.3d 332

Stacy CORNETTE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant and Respondent

No. S089010.

Supreme Court of California.

July 12, 2001.

Rehearing Denied August 22, 2001.

109 Cal.Rptr.2d 2

Grassini & Wrinkle and Roland Wrinkle, Woodland Hills, for Plaintiffs and Appellants

William M. McMillan, Breland C. Gowan, Sacramento, David R. Simmes, Larry R. Danielson, Jill Siciliano, Los Angeles and Kenneth G. Nellis, for Defendant and Respondent.

Pollak, Vida & Fisher, Daniel P. Barer and Girard Fisher, Los Angeles, for 105 California Cities and California State Association

109 Cal.Rptr.2d 3

of Counties, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent

BROWN, J.

A public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury sustained, and the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the condition a sufficient time before the injury to have taken preventive measures. (Gov.Code, § 835, subd. (b);¹ Baldwin v. State of California (1972) 6 Cal.3d 424, 427, 99 Cal.Rptr. 145, 491 P.2d 1121 (Baldwin).)

However, a public entity may avoid such liability by raising the affirmative defense of design immunity. (§ 830.6.) A public entity claiming design immunity must establish three elements: (1) a causal relationship between the plan or design and the accident; (2) discretionary approval of the plan or design prior to construction; and (3) substantial evidence supporting the reasonableness of the plan or design. (Grenier v. City of Irwindale (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 931, 939, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 454 (Grenier); Higgins v. State of California (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 177, 185, 62 Cal. Rptr.2d 459 (Higgins); Hefner v. County of Sacramento (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1007, 1013-1014, 243 Cal.Rptr. 291 (Hefner).)

Design immunity does not necessarily continue in perpetuity. (Baldwin, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 434, 99 Cal.Rptr. 145, 491 P.2d 1121.) To demonstrate loss of design immunity a plaintiff must also establish three elements: (1) the plan or design has become dangerous because of a change in physical conditions; (2) the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition thus created; and (3) the public entity had a reasonable time to obtain the funds and carry out the necessary remedial work to bring the property back into conformity with a reasonable design or plan, or the public entity, unable to remedy the condition due to practical impossibility or lack of funds, had not reasonably attempted to provide adequate warnings. (§ 830.6; Baldwin, at p. 438, 99 Cal.Rptr. 145, 491 P.2d 1121.)

The third element of design immunity, the existence of substantial evidence supporting the reasonableness of the adoption of the plan or design, must be tried by the court, not the jury. Section 830.6 makes it quite clear that "the trial or appellate court" is to determine whether "there is any substantial evidence upon the basis of which (a) a reasonable public employee could have adopted the plan or design or the standards therefor or (b) a reasonable legislative body or other body or employee could have approved the plan or design or the standards therefor."

The question presented by this case is whether the Legislature intended that the three issues involved in determining whether a public entity has lost its design immunity should also be tried by the court. Our examination of the text of section 830.6, the legislative history of that section, and our prior decisions leads us to the conclusion that, where triable issues of material fact are presented, as they were here, a plaintiff has a right to a jury trial as to the issues involved in loss of design immunity.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case arises from an automobile accident suffered by plaintiffs Stacy and Rodney Cornette while they were driving

109 Cal.Rptr.2d 4

northbound on the Antelope Valley Freeway (State Route 14) in Los Angeles County. Another northbound vehicle sideswiped plaintiffs' car and forced it across the open median of the freeway and into the southbound lanes, where it came to rest before being hit by a southbound vehicle. The accident occurred just beyond the end of a median barrier that defendant Department of Transportation (Caltrans) had constructed from the south. Plaintiffs, both of whom suffered substantial injuries, filed suit against a number of parties. We are concerned only with their claim against Caltrans, which was based on the allegedly dangerous condition of the highway created by the absence of a median barrier at the location of the accident

When the case was called for trial, Caltrans, which had raised the affirmative defense of design immunity, asked the court to bifurcate the proceeding and try that issue first. (Code Civ. Proc, § 597.) The trial court granted this request and went on to rule that none of the issues relating to the existence of design immunity or its loss would be submitted to the jury; rather, these issues would be tried solely by the court as the trier of fact. This was done over the objection of plaintiffs who contended that, with the exception of the third element of design immunity (substantial evidence of the reasonableness of the adoption of the design), all of the issues relating to design immunity or its loss should be tried to the jury.

There was no real dispute about whether the absence of a median barrier at the location of the accident had made the highway dangerous by the time the accident occurred on May 23, 1992. Plaintiffs stipulated that designing the freeway without a median barrier was reasonable when the freeway was built in 1964. However, the physical conditions had changed in the interim. Both the traffic volume and the number of cross-median accidents had significantly increased. As a result, on August 21, 1990, Caltrans decided to install a median barrier along a five-mile stretch of the freeway that included the location where this accident would later occur, and on July 27, 1991, the Caltrans district office recommended that a high priority be given to the project because five more cross-median accidents, three with injuries and two with fatalities, had occurred in 1990. Unfortunately, the project was not completed until January 18, 1996, long after this accident occurred.

What was in dispute was (1) when Caltrans had notice that changed physical conditions had made the freeway at that location dangerous without a median barrier; and (2) whether the installation of the barrier was unreasonably delayed. The evidence presented by plaintiffs tended to show that Caltrans had notice by May 30, 1989, that the cross-median accident rate at that location greatly exceeded Caltrans guidelines for the installation of median barriers, and that, given the high priority the agency should therefore have attached to the project, Caltrans reasonably should have installed at least a temporary median barrier before the accident occurred almost three years later. The evidence presented by Caltrans, on the other hand, tended to show that Caltrans did not have notice until August 1990, and that a median barrier project usually takes Caltrans four and a half to five years to complete, so that Caltrans could not have been reasonably expected to have installed the barrier before this accident occurred in 1992.

Resolving the factual disputes in favor of Caltrans, the trial court found that Caltrans had established design immunity and had not lost it. Judgment was entered for Caltrans, plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeal reversed and remanded

109 Cal.Rptr.2d 5

for a new trial. The trial court, the Court of Appeal held, had improperly denied plaintiffs their right to a jury trial of the disputed issues pertaining to the question whether Caltrans had lost its design immunity. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

DISCUSSION

1. A Public Entity May Rely upon Design Immunity as a Defense to a Claim of Liability for a Dangerous Condition

Section 835, subdivision (b) provides that a public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by a dangerous condition of its property if the dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind of injury sustained, and the public entity had actual or constructive notice of the condition a sufficient time before the injury to have taken preventive measures.² (Baldwin, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 427, 99 Cal.Rptr. 145, 491 P.2d 1121.) The state's failure to erect median barriers to prevent cross-median accidents may result in such liability. (Ducey v. Argo Sales Co. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 707, 720, 159 Cal.Rptr. 835, 602 P.2d 755.) However, under section 830.6, the public entity may escape such liability by raising the affirmative defense of "design immunity." Section 830.6 provides in relevant part: "Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable under this chapter for an injury caused by the plan or design of a construction of, or an improvement to, public property where such plan or design has been approved in advance of the construction or improvement by the legislative body of the public entity or by some other body or employee exercising discretionary authority to give such approval or where such plan or design is prepared in conformity with standards previously so approved, if the trial or appellate court determines that there is any substantial evidence upon the basis of which (a) a reasonable public employee could have adopted the plan or design or the standards therefor or (b) a reasonable legislative body or other body or employee could have approved the plan or design or the standards therefor."

In other words, a public entity claiming design immunity must establish three elements: (1) a causal relationship between the plan or design and the accident; (2) discretionary approval of the plan or design prior...