Cornwell v. Union Pac. R.R.

Decision Date14 June 2011
Docket NumberCase No. 08-CV-638-JHP-TLW
PartiesDENNIS R. CORNWELL, Individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Renia A. Cornwell, Deceased, Plaintiff, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Oklahoma
OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are Plaintiffs'1 Motion to Dismiss Dennis R. Cornwell in His Individual Capacity and Brief in Support Thereof (Docket No. 353) (hereinafter "Motion to Dismiss") and the subsequent Response and Reply thereto (Docket Nos. 364, 369) and Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company's Motion for Sanctions (Docket No. 372) (hereinafter "Motion for Sanctions") which was responded to by Plaintiff (Docket No. 373). For the reasons discussed herein, the Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Dennis R. Cornwell in His Individual Capacity (Docket No. 353) is DENIED, and the Defendant's Motion for Sanctions (Docket No. 372) is DENIED.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This case was commenced September 19, 2008 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. Docket No. 1.2 After the resolution of numerous pretrial motions, trial began on September 14, 2010. See Docket No. 333. Jury verdict was entered for Defendant on September 21, 2010 and the Judgment followed in accordance on October 15, 2010. Docket Nos. 347, 348.

The Judgment assessed costs against the Plaintiffs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 and 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Judgment at 2, Docket No. 348. Three days later, the Defendant filed its Bill of Costs totaling $68,189.78. Docket No. 349. Plaintiffs objected to the Bill of Costs.3 After conducting a hearing, the Clerk of Court entered an order taxing costs against the Plaintiffs in the amount of $18,807.30. Docket No. 367. Prior to the Clerk's hearing on the Bill of Costs, Plaintiffs filed their "Motion to Dismiss Dennis R. Cornwell in His Individual Capacity and Brief in Support Thereof," arguing that Mr. Cornwell, individually, should be dismissed from the case because Oklahoma law provides the personal representative of the estate of the decedent the exclusive right to bring a wrongful death action. See generally, Motion to Dismiss, Docket No. 353. Defendant responded with a collateral attack on the Oklahoma County Probate Court's Order appointing Mr. Cornwell the personal representative of Renia A. Cornwell's estate. Defendant argued that because the Probate Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, the Order was void, and no administrator existed for the estate. See Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company's Response to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Dennis R. Cornwell in His IndividualCapacity at 3-6, Docket No. 364 (hereinafter "Response to Motion to Dismiss").4 Plaintiffs' Reply renewed their argument that Mr. Cornwell, individually, was not a proper party to the lawsuit and additionally argued that the Oklahoma County Probate Court's Order appointing Mr. Cornwell administrator of the estate could not be collaterally attacked. See generally Plaintiff's Reply in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Dennis R. Cornwell in His Individual Capacity, Docket No. 369.

Subsequently, on December 20, 2010, Defendant filed its Motion for Sanctions, which generally alleges that Plaintiffs violated the pleading standards set out in Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) by bringing the Motion to Dismiss. See generally Motion for Sanctions, Docket No. 372. Plaintiffs responded to the Motion for Sanctions on January 10, 2011. Plaintiffs Response and Brief in Support Thereof in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Sanctions, Docket No. 373 (hereinafter "Response to Motion for Sanctions"). The Motion for Sanctions is discussed infra.

DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Dennis R. Cornwell in His Individual Capacity

Plaintiffs brought the pending Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that Mr. Cornwell, in his individual capacity, was not a proper plaintiff to this suit because Oklahoma law provides that, if an administrator has been appointed to the decedent's estate, that administrator of a decedent's estate has the exclusive right to prosecute a wrongful death claim. Plaintiffs' have correctly stated Oklahoma law. The Oklahoma wrongful death statute provides, "[w]hen thedeath of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the personal representative of the former may maintain an action therefor against the latter . . . if the former might have maintained an action, had he or she lived, against the latter . . . for an injury for the same act or omission." Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 1053. The Oklahoma Supreme Court interpreted this statute in National Valve & Manufacturing Co. v. Wright:

When the Legislature, upon the appointment of an administrator in such case, vested the cause of action in him and gave him, and him only, authority to bring and maintain the action, it thereby took from the beneficiaries, who are entitled to receive the judgment recovered, any right to control, settle, or otherwise dispose of the action, and gave to the administrator alone the full right of control.

1951 OK 381, ¶ 7, 240 P.2d 766, 768 (holding that a decedent's widow was without the authority to enter into settlement in a wrongful death case, when widow was not also serving as administrator of decedent's estate). Thus, the Oklahoma wrongful death statute clearly allows only the personal representative of the decedent's estate to maintain a wrongful death action. In contrast, if no personal representative has been appointed over the decedent's estate, a decedent's next of kin may maintain the wrongful death action. Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 1054 (when death was caused in accordance with the wrongful death statute and decedent was a resident of Oklahoma, if "no personal representative is or has been appointed, the [wrongful death] action . . . may be brought by the widow, or where there is no widow, by the next of kin of such deceased").

These statutes work in tandem, providing the cause of action to the personal representative, if one exists, and if there is no personal representative, providing the cause of action to the next of kin. Therefore, Plaintiff has correctly stated that, under Oklahoma law, either the personal representative of the decedent's estate or the decedent's next of kin mayprosecute a wrongful death cause of action. Applying this rule to the instant case, Mr. Cornwell cannot properly bring this case as plaintiff in both his individual capacity and his capacity as personal representative of the estate of Renia A. Cornwell; Mr. Cornwell is a proper plaintiff in only one of his legal capacities. The parties appear to agree on this rule of law and its application to this case, but disagree in which of Mr. Cornwell's legal capacities is the proper plaintiff. The key issue in the resolution of this dispute is whether the Oklahoma County Probate Court's Order appointing Mr. Cornwell personal representative of the estate is jurisdictionally sound.

Title 58 of the Oklahoma Statutes addresses probate procedure, and section five therein provides the basis for probate venue and jurisdiction. "Wills must be proved, and letters testamentary or of administration granted in the following applicable situations: (1) In the county of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death, regardless of where he died . . . ." OKLA. STAT. tit. 58, § 5(1).5 Interpreting this statute, the 10th Circuit held that, "[t]he residence of [decedent] in the [county proposed for probate] at the time of his death is a prerequisite to the exercise of probate jurisdiction by the County Court of that County over his Estate." Merrell v. United States, 140 F.2d 602, 606 (10th Cir. 1944); see also In re Davis' Estate, 1935 OK 242, ¶ 6, 43 P.2d 115, 116 (interpreting predecessor Oklahoma statute) ("The question of residence is one of jurisdiction, and unless the decedent's residence was in [the county of probate], the county court did not have jurisdiction to probate his will."); James v. Sanders, 1923 OK 690, ¶ 2, 218 P.877, 878 (interpreting predecessor Oklahoma statute) (if decedent is a resident of Oklahoma at the time of death, jurisdiction for probate proceedings lies only in the county in which deceased was a resident at time of death; ordering dismissal of probate case undertaken in county where Oklahoma decedent was not a resident at time of death).

The orders and judgments of Oklahoma state probate courts may be subject to collateral attack in federal courts under certain circumstances. If an Oklahoma state court has first exercised jurisdiction, "its judgment is exclusive of Federal jurisdiction, and not subject to collateral attack unless, of course, the absence of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or lack of power to render judgment, affirmatively appears from the fact of the proceedings'" Merrell, 140 F.2d at 606 (collecting Oklahoma cases) (emphasis added). Further, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that "[a] final judgment or decree is void on its face if from examination of the judgment roll6 it may be determined that [subject matter jurisdiction] is absent . . . ." Chandler v. Denton, 1987 OK 109, ¶ 12, 747 P.2d 938, 942.

Renia A. Cornwell was a resident of Oklahoma at the time of her death.7 Thus, Title 58, section 5(1) of the Oklahoma statutes applies to this case: Renia A. Cornwell's county of residence at the time of her death has exclusive jurisdiction over the probate of her estate. See Okla. Stat. tit. 58, § 5(1). Therefore, if the probate of the estate was not brought in her county of residence at death, and such fact appears on the face of the judgment roll, any Order issued by such county court would lack subject matter jurisdiction and be vulnerable to collateral attack.Mr. Cornwell brought a Petition for Letters of Special Administration in Oklahoma County on September 24, 2008. See Response to Motion to Dismiss, Exh. 1 at 1, Docket No. 364. In the Petition, Mr. Cornwell stated,

Petitioner would show
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