Corona's Auto Parts, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of City of Hartford

• Decision Date: 06 May 1969
• Citation: 158 Conn. 244,259 A.2d 618
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CORONA'S AUTO RARTS, INC. v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF the CITY OF HARTFORD.

Page 618

259 A.2d 618

158 Conn. 244

CORONA'S AUTO RARTS, INC. v. ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS OF the CITY OF HARTFORD.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

May 6, 1969.

Edward J. Daly, Jr., Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was George A. Silvester, Hartford, for appellant (plaintiff).

Richard M. Cosgrove, Deputy Corp. Counsel, with whom, on the brief, was John M. Fitzgerald, Corp. Counsel, for appellee (defendant).

Before KING, C.J., and ALCORN, HOUSE, THIM and RYAN, JJ., concurring.

ALCORN, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff has appealed from a judgment of the Court of Common Pleas dismissing its appeal from a decision of the defendant zoning board of appeals.

The plaintiff onws slightly over eighteen acres of land which is in an industrial zone in what is popularly called the south meadows area of Hartford. The operation of an automobile junk yard is permitted in an industrial zone under the Hartford zoning regulations, and about fifteen acres of the land are being used for such purpose at the present time. Pursuant to § 21-16 of the General Statutes (Rev. 1958), the plaintiff applied to the defendant zoning board of appeals for approval of the remaining 3.137 acres as a suitable location for an automobile junk yard. A certificate from the defendant board that the land was not located within an established district restricted against such use, and that the location was suitable for such use, consideration being given to factors specified in § 21-17 of the General Statutes, was required as a prerequisite to the issuance of a license by the commissioner of motor vehicles before the plaintiff could use the property for an automobile junk yard. The material part of the statute is quoted in the footnote. ¹ There is no claim, and there is nothing in the record to indicate, that either the zoning or the planning authorities had adopted any rules, orders or regulations imposing restrictions on the use of property in the area for motor vehicle junk yards as might have been done pursuant to § 21-23.

In considering the application, the defendant board was required to take into account 'the nature and development of surrounding property; the proximity of churches, schools, hospitals, public buildings or other places of public gathering; the sufficiency in number of other such yards or businesses in the vicinity; the health, safety and general welfare of the public and the suitability of the applicant to establish, maintain or operate such yard or business and to receive a license therefor.' General Statutes (Rev.1958) § 21-17. In passing on the application, the board was acting as an administrative agency of the state rather than in a zoning capacity. Petrillo v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 147 Conn. 469, 472, 162 A.2d 508.

A hearing was held on the plaintiff's application at which no one appeared in opposition. At the start of the hearing, however, a paper was read into the record by the chairman of the defendant board which he described as 'the remarks of the City Plan.' The paper was later introduced into evidence. It did not contain a recital of any formal action, vote or resolution by the commission on the city plan. Instead, it purported to be a field investigation of the plaintiff's property, reciting in substance that the property is bounded on the north by a large industrial lot, which is partially vacant; on the south by a welding shop; on the east by industrial property; and on the west by vacant land. The neighborhood is stated to be developing into heavy commercial and industrial uses. Two photographs and a line drawing of the area are included. The plaintiff's property is stated to be fully occupied by junk automobiles. It is further stated that the city has plans for 'phasing out' the storage of junk automobiles in the south meadows area and for encouraging industrial development which would require the removal of the plaintiff's junk yard and that approval of the present application would legalize an existing unauthorized use of the property in conflict with those plans. The paper is authenticated only by the signature of two individuals who signed it as 'associate director' and 'director' without any indication of the authority which they purport to represent in the stated capacities. The parties, however, have seen fit to treat the paper as a report from the commission on the city plan. Consequently, we shall do likewise.

Following the hearing, the defendant board unanimously denied the plaintiff's application. The only reason given was the following: 'The Board in making their decision noted that this property is located in a section of the City now being developed into a modern industrial park.' There is nothing in the record before us to support the reason given for the board's decision unless it can be found in the 'remarks of the City Plan.' Nor do we find any other basis in the record for a denial of the plaintiff's application, having in mind the controlling considerations specified in General Statutes (Rev.1958) § 21-17. There is no indication in the record that any question was raised as to the plaintiff's suitability to operate a motor a motor vehicle junk yard, and it does not appear that any of the area involved abuts a residential zone.

The defendant zoning board of appeals exists under authority of the city charter. Hartford Charter, c. 19, § 9 (1964); 25 Spec.Laws No. 30, p. 86 § 9; 28...