Corona v. City of L. A.
| Decision Date | 10 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. CV 17-2913-VBF (KK) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | VICKI CORONA, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, et al., Defendants. |
This Final Report and Recommendation is submitted to the Honorable Valerie Baker Fairbank, Senior United States District Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
On April 18, 2017, Plaintiff Vicki Corona ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Complaint ("Complaint") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") alleging defendants City of Los Angeles, Eric Garcetti, and Does 1 through 10 ("Defendants") violated her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiff also raised state law claims, as well as violations of Sections 80.07 and 80.10 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code. For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends the Complaint be DISMISSED for failure to state a claim and without leave to amend.
On April 18, 2017, Plaintiff filed a Complaint pursuant to Section 1983 against Defendants. ECF Docket No. ("Dkt.") 1.
On May 9, 2017, the Court found the Complaint suffered from numerous deficiencies and dismissed the Complaint with leave to amend for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) ("Order"). Dkt. 7, Order. The Court granted Plaintiff until May 31, 2017 to file a First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). Id.
On June 20, 2017, Plaintiff filed a response to the Court's May 9, 2017 Order ("Response"). Dkt. 10. In the Response, Plaintiff claims she has sufficiently stated a claim against Defendants and expressly declines to file a FAC. See id. at 12.
On July 13, 2017, the Court issued a Report and Recommendation recommending dismissal because Plaintiff expressly declined to file a FAC and, thus, failed to cure any of the deficiencies identified by the Court's June 20, 2017 Order. Dkt. 13.
On July 24, 2017, Plaintiff filed Objections to the Court's Report and Recommendation. Dkt. 15. In the Objections, Plaintiff again argues she has sufficiently stated a claim and, thus, has "found no reason to amend." Id. at 7.
According to the Complaint, in January 2017, defendant Garcetti issued Ordinance # 184590 ("Ordinance"), which Plaintiff alleges is "discriminatory" and "wages war against the homeless through widespread deceit, fraud, misconduct, extortion, and misrepresentations of the Supreme Law of the Land."Dkt. 1 at 1, 3. Plaintiff claims that because of the "national economic downturn during the last few years," many individuals have been forced "to make their car their home." Id. Plaintiff alleges the Ordinance targets this "specific group of vulnerable people, forbidding them to park within 500 feet of a park, school, or daycare center at all times, as well as residential streets between 9 PM and 8 AM." Id. at 3. Plaintiff further alleges those targeted by the Ordinance "were promised safe, parking spots, yet no such designated lots or space exist." Id. Plaintiff claims, as a result of the Ordinance, people "are being criminalized, bullied, discriminated against, harassed, displaced, threatened, and thrown into isolated, obscure, unfamiliar, outlying areas of the CITY." Id. Specifically, Plaintiff claims the Ordinance places her, as a single female, "into unimaginable danger and severely limits or denies her access to places essential to her work and well-being." Id.
Plaintiff alleges the Ordinance violates her due process right under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because it deprives her of her "right to be secure in her property" by "destroy[ing] its value" and "restrict[ing] or interrup[ing] its common, necessary or profitable use." Id. at 5. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges the Ordinance infringes upon her right "to travel and park without licensing, registration, etc." Id. at 6. Plaintiff also claims the Ordinance violates her Fourth Amendment right because it "allows government employees to peer through car windows to determine if someone is living therein."1 Id. Lastly, Plaintiff appearsto allege a violation under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause because the Ordinance specifically targets homeless individuals living in their car. Id. at 3, 6.
Plaintiff additionally raises state law claims for (1) fraud because her car does not fall under the definition of "motor vehicle" and thus is not subject to the Ordinance; and (2) extortion because the Ordinance threatens fines and force for "infractions which are not crimes and are not arrestable offenses." Id. at 8, 10. Lastly, Plaintiff claims the Ordinance violates Sections 80.07 and 80.10 of the Los Angeles Municipal Code, which require sign postings to inform Los Angeles residents of the Ordinance. Id. at 7-11.
As a result of these claims, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and $500,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 13.
As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must screen the Complaint and is required to dismiss the case at any time if it concludes the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim for screening purposes, the Court applies the same pleading standard from Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 8") as it would when evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Under Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim "where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory." Zamani v. Carnes, 491 F.3d 990, 996 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). In considering whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all of the material factual allegations in it. Hamilton v. Brown, 630 F.3d 889, 892-93 (9th Cir. 2011). However, the court need not accept as true "allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Although a complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, it "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Cook v. Brewer, 637 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)). A claim is facially plausible when it "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Cook, 637 F.3d at 1004 (citation omitted).
"A document filed pro se is to be liberally construed, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Woods v. Carey, 525 F.3d 886, 889-90 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). "[W]e have an obligation where the p[laintiff] is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the p[laintiff] the benefit of any doubt." Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
If the court finds the complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim, the court has discretion to dismiss with or without leave to amend. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000). Leave to amend should be granted if it appears possible the defects in the complaint could be corrected, especially if the plaintiff is pro se. Id. at 1130-31; see also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). However, if, after careful consideration, it is clear a complaintcannot be cured by amendment, the court may dismiss without leave to amend. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1107-11; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2009).
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantees that "[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. V, XIV. "[I]ndividuals must receive notice and an opportunity to be heard before the Government deprives them of property." United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 48, 114 S. Ct. 492, 126 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1993).
Additionally, under the Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause as applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "private property [shall not] be taken for public use without just compensation." U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. V. There are two types of "per se" takings: (1) permanent physical invasion of the property, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426, 102 S. Ct. 3164, 73 L. Ed. 2d 868 (1982); and (2) a deprivation of all economically beneficial use of the property, Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 120 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1992).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege a permanent physical invasion of her property or a deprivation of her personal property. Instead, Plaintiff appears to allege the Ordinance violates her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights because it deprives her of one of its economically beneficial uses - namely her vehicle's function ofproviding her with shelter. Compl. at 5. Plaintiff, however, fails to...
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