Corona v. Malm

• Decision Date: 18 August 2000
• Docket Number: No. 2-99-1218.,2-99-1218.
• Citation: 248 Ill.Dec. 818,735 N.E.2d 138,315 Ill. App.3d 692
• Parties: Amelia CORONA and Epifanio Antunez, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Kenneth MALM and Tyra Malm, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

735 N.E.2d 138

315 Ill. App.3d 692

248 Ill.Dec. 818

Amelia CORONA and Epifanio Antunez, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Kenneth MALM and Tyra Malm, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 2-99-1218.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

August 18, 2000.

Alvaro Cook, Booth & Cook, Ltd., North Aurora, for Epifanio Antunez, Amelia Corona.

Ellen L. Green, Michael Resis, Thomas P. Scherschel, O'Hagan, Smith & Amundsen, Geneva, for Kenneth Malm, Tyra Malm.

Justice INGLIS delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal comes before us from an order of the circuit court of Kane County granting summary judgment for defendants, Kenneth Malm and Tyra Malm, in an action for personal injuries and property damage. The injuries occurred when a car driven by plaintiff Epifanio Antunez, in which plaintiff Amelia Corona was a passenger, collided with a horse that had escaped from defendants' property. Plaintiffs filed a four-count complaint, counts I and III alleging that defendants violated the Illinois Domestic Animals Running at Large Act (Act) (510 ILCS 55/1 (West 1998)) and counts II and IV alleging common-law negligence.

On November 5, 1997, a horse named "Pretty Girl," owned by Douglas Maloney, galloped directly across the path of the car driven by Antunez, causing the front end to collide with the left side of the horse. At the time of the accident, the horse was boarded by defendants at their stable.

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) plaintiffs presented no evidence that defendants failed to use reasonable care in restraining the horse or that they had knowledge that the animal was running at large; and (2) any action for injuries or damages sustained by a runaway horse must be predicated on the Act and, therefore, plaintiffs' common-law negligence actions should be dismissed. The trial court agreed and granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on all counts. Believing that it was bound by this court's opinion in Abadie v. Royer, 215 Ill.App.3d 444, 158 Ill. Dec. 913, 574 N.E.2d 1306 (1991), the trial court held that under the Act plaintiffs had the burden of proving defendants failed to exercise reasonable care in restraining a runaway animal and that defendants had knowledge that the animal was a runaway. Because plaintiffs did not present any evidence that defendants failed to exercise reasonable care or that defendants had knowledge that the horse had escaped, the court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The trial court further held that, because liability for injuries caused by animals running at large must be predicated on the Act, plaintiffs were precluded from bringing an action for common-law negligence. Plaintiffs timely appeal.

We note at the outset that summary judgment is appropriate only when the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1998). Summary judgment is a drastic means of disposing of litigation and therefore should be allowed only when the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt. Rivas v. Westfield Homes of Illinois, Inc., 295 Ill.App.3d 304, 307-08, 230 Ill.Dec. 193, 692 N.E.2d 1359 (1998). In determining the presence of a genuine issue of material fact, the court must construe the evidence strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the opponent. Largosa v. Ford Motor Co., 303 Ill.App.3d 751, 753, 237 Ill.Dec. 179, 708 N.E.2d 1219 (1999). We conduct a de novo review of the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment. Rockford Memorial Hospital v. Department of Human Rights, 272 Ill.App.3d 751, 754, 209 Ill.Dec. 471, 651 N.E.2d 649 (1995).

Plaintiffs first contend that the trial court misconstrued the burden-of-proof provision of the Act and thus erred in granting summary judgment for defendants on counts I and III. The trial court held that it was bound by this court's opinion of Abadie. In that case, however, the issue on appeal was whether there were any genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the defendants exercised reasonable care. In analyzing the evidence concerning the defendants' exercise of reasonable care, the court in Abadie cited O'Gara v. Kane, 38 Ill.App.3d 641, 348 N.E.2d 503 (1976), for the proposition that, to recover under the Act, "plaintiff must allege and prove that defendants did not use reasonable care in restraining the animal and that defendants had no knowledge that the animal was running at large." Abadie, 215 Ill.App.3d at 450, 158 Ill.Dec. 913, 574 N.E.2d 1306.

Plaintiffs claim that we should reverse our holding in Abadie because the plain reading of the Act places the burden on a defendant to establish the exercise of due care as a defense to an alleged violation of the Act. Defendants counter that case law from this district and others has interpreted the Act as placing the burden on a plaintiff to establish that the defendant failed to exercise due care. Defendants conclude that, because plaintiffs failed to introduce any evidence of the lack of due care, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in their favor. We agree with plaintiffs.

Section 1 of the Act provides that no person or owner of livestock shall allow livestock to run at large in the state. 510 ILCS 55/1 (West 1998). It further provides:

"All owners of livestock shall provide the necessary restraints to prevent such livestock from so running at large and shall be liable in civil action for all damages occasioned by such animals running at large; Provided, that no owner or keeper of such animals shall be liable for damages in any civil suit for injury to the person or property of another caused by the running at large thereof, without the knowledge of such owner or keeper, when such owner or keeper can establish that he used reasonable care in restraining such animals from so running at large." 510 ILCS 55/1 (West 1998).

Historically, the Act imposed strict liability on an owner or keeper for damages caused by animals that ran at large. 1895 Ill. Laws 4; McKee v. Trisler, 311 Ill. 536, 143 N.E. 69 (1924). In 1931, the legislature amended the Act to provide innocent owners with relief from the harsh consequences of strict liability if they acted with due care in restraining the animal and did not know of its escape. Estes v. Maddrell, 208 Ill.App.3d 813, 153 Ill.Dec. 66, 566 N.E.2d 916 (1991). The amendment therefore balances the interests of the public at risk from straying animals with those of the livestock owner; the livestock owner is no longer strictly liable if he or she can show that he or she used reasonable care and had no knowledge that his or her animal was running at large. Nevious v. Bauer, 281 Ill.App.3d 911, 915, 217 Ill.Dec. 681, 667 N.E.2d 1074 (1996).

In Fugett v. Murray, 311 Ill.App. 323, 35 N.E.2d 946 (1941), the plaintiff was killed and his wife was injured when their motorcycle collided with a runaway horse. The action was tried on the theory that a duty rested with the defendant to show he used reasonable care to prevent the horse from running at large. In construing the statute, this court determined that the amendment passed by the legislature provided relief to the animal's owner from the harshness of the law. We concluded that, under the general rule involving accidents as a result of the violation of the statute making it unlawful for stock to run at large, there is a presumption of negligence by the owner or keeper of stock sufficient to bring the case to the jury. We further stated: "The defendant claims the benefit of the proviso. The proof to be established under the proviso was within the knowledge of the defendant and not the plaintiffs. The burden of evidence, after the plaintiffs rested their case in chief, was on the defendant." Fugett, 311 Ill.App. at 328, 35 N.E.2d 946.

In Wakefield v. Kern, 58 Ill.App.3d 837, 16 Ill.Dec. 299, 374 N.E.2d 1074 (1978), we came to a similar construction of the Act. We held that under the Act a keeper or owner of a horse may avoid liability if he meets a two-part test: if he is able to establish that (1) he used reasonable care in restraining his livestock, and (2) he did not have knowledge that the animal was running at large. Wakefield, 58 Ill.App.3d at 840, 16 Ill.Dec. 299, 374 N.E.2d 1074; see also Estes, 208 Ill.App.3d at 816, 153 Ill.Dec. 66, 566 N.E.2d 916.

The First District, in Guay v. Neel, 340 Ill.App. 111, 91 N.E.2d 151 (1950), after quoting our analysis in Fugett, confused the analysis by concluding that the plaintiff had the burden to prove her case by a preponderance of the evidence and that, once she made out a prima facie case, the burden of proceeding shifted to the defendant. "The burden of proof remained, however, on the plaintiff." Guay, 340 Ill. App. at 118, 91 N.E.2d 151.

Similarly, the Fifth District in O'Gara v. Kane, 38 Ill.App.3d 641, 348 N.E.2d 503 (1976), came to the same conclusion. The court noted that the Act was amended by the proviso that an owner would not be held liable if he were able to prove that he used reasonable care in restraining his animals and if he was without knowledge that they were running at large. O'Gara, 38 Ill.App.3d at 643, 348 N.E.2d 503. However, the court then, without explanation, followed the conclusion reached in Guay and held that, once the plaintiff made out a prima facie case, the burden shifted to the defendant; the burden of proof, however, remained on the plaintiff. O'Gara, 38 Ill.App.3d at 644, 348 N.E.2d 503.

In Nevious v. Bauer, 281 Ill.App.3d 911, 912, 217 Ill.Dec. 681, 667 N.E.2d 1074 (1996), the plaintiff brought an action against the defendants under the Act for injuries sustained in a car collision with the defendants' bull. The plaintiff argued on appeal that the trial court misconstrued the burden-of-proof provisions of the Act and therefore...