Coronel v. Decker
Decision Date | 27 March 2020 |
Docket Number | 20-cv-2472 (AJN) |
Parties | Josefina CORONEL, et al., Petitioners-Plaintiffs, v. Thomas DECKER, et al., Respondents-Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Julie Ann Dona, Aadhithi Padmanabhan, The Legal Aid Society, Lilia Isobel Toson, New York, NY, Suchita Deolalikar Mathur, Zoe Pokempner Levine, Bronx, NY, for Petitioners-Plaintiffs.
Michael James Byars, Steven John Kochevar, United States Attorney's Office SDNY, New York, NY, for Respondents-Defendants.
Petitioners bring this writ of habeas corpus and complaint seeking immediate release from the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS their motion for a temporary restraining order, and orders Petitioners to be immediately RELEASED from immigration detention on conditions.
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioners in this matter are civil immigration detainees, currently being held in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Br. at 1.1 Each of them "suffers from medical conditions that render them particularly vulnerable to severe illness or death if infected by COVID-19—vulnerabilities that are heightened in detention." Id. Petitioner Jose Otero has been detained in ICE custody for four months. Ostolaza Decl. ¶¶ 9-10. "Otero was the victim of a violent assault that forced him to have a nephrectomy (removal of left kidney), partial liver resection, and left lung resection ... As a result of having major organs of his body partially removed, his immune system is significantly compromised." Ostolaza Decl. ¶ 10. Petitioner Jose Madrid has been in ICE custody since January 2020. Id. ¶ 4. He suffers from type 2 diabetes and obesity. Id. ¶ 6. Petitioner Juan Morocho Sumba, who has been in ICE custody since December 2019, suffers from aortic valve disease, hypertension, and an enlarged heart. He has been unable to see a cardiologist in ICE custody even though he experiences ongoing chest pain. See Kim Decl. ¶¶ 23-25. Petitioner Miguel Miranda, who has been in ICE custody since February 2020, has type 2 diabetes and gastrointestinal problems. Ostolaza Decl. ¶¶ 14-17.
Petitioners allege that they face a uniquely serious medical risk from COVID-19, a global pandemic, due to their underlying health conditions. They note that each of these medical conditions alone places them in high-risk categories with respect to COVID-19. And that risk is further amplified because the conditions are "co-morbidities." Br. at 2. Moreover, Petitioners have represented in both their briefing and at the March 2 hearing that there have been confirmed cases at two of the three facilities where Petitioners are detained. Id. ; Mar. 26 Hr'g Tr. at 52.
On March 20, 2020, Petitioners began this action by filing "a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Complaint for Injunctive Relief." See Dkt. No. 1. Their complaint alleges two claims for relief: first, that the Government violated their substantive due process rights by being deliberately indifferent to their medical needs, and second, that the Government violated their procedural due process rights by failing to provide them with an adequate bond hearing. Each petitioner also seeks habeas relief, requesting either immediate release or a bond hearing within 48 hours. Id. Petitioners then filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, seeking their immediate release from ICE custody. Dkt. No. 16. On March 25, 2020, Petitioners sought emergency relief from the Court and submitted a proposed Order to Show Cause. Dkt. No. 20. Yesterday, the Court held oral argument on the motion now before the Court. At oral argument, the parties consented to resolution of this TRO motion on the factual record now before the Court. See Mar. 26 Hr'g Tr. at 4:10–5:18.
As a threshold matter, the Court considers the Government's argument that the claims of the Petitioners should be severed and brought in separate habeas petitions rather than joined in a single action. While severance may be appropriate, the Court will not decide the issue at this early stage of the litigation, on a motion for emergency relief, and without the benefit of full briefing on the issue. Considerations of judicial economy—the Court has already read and digested the record and heard lengthy oral argument on this motion—and the urgent need to timely decide Petitioners' motion for a temporary restraining order in light of the immediate risk to the health of the Petitioners counsel against severance at this juncture. Cf. Golden Goose Deluxe Brand v. Aierbushe , No. 19-cv-2518 (VEC), 2019 WL 2162715, at *3–4 ( ).
Because the Court did not receive briefing on this issue from Petitioners, the parties shall meet and confer and propose a briefing schedule within three days of the date of this Opinion and Order so that the Court may address severance going forward.
"A preliminary injunction is an equitable remedy and an act of discretion by the court." Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper , 804 F.3d 617, 622 (2d Cir. 2015). The same standard governs consideration of an application for a temporary restraining order. Andino v. Fischer , 555 F. Supp. 2d 418, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). In general, a party seeking a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order "must ... show a likelihood of success on the merits, a likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in the party's favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest." Clapper , 804 F.3d at 622 (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council , 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) ). The burden on the moving party is even higher where, as here, a party seeks a mandatory injunction—that is, an injunction commanding a positive act, as opposed to one that merely maintains the status quo. The Second Circuit has instructed that a mandatory injunction "should issue ‘only upon a clear showing that the moving party is entitled to the relief requested, or where extreme or very serious damage will result from a denial of preliminary relief.’ " Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entm't, Inc. , 60 F.3d 27, 34 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Abdul Wali v. Coughlin , 754 F.2d 1015, 1025 (2d Cir. 1985) ).
"The showing of irreparable harm is ‘[p]erhaps the single most important prerequisite for the issuance of a" temporary restraining order. Kamerling v. Massanari , 295 F.3d 206, 214 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co. , 719 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1983) ). Under this prong, parties seeking a temporary restraining order "must show that, on the facts of their case" and in the absence of the requested injunction, they will suffer a harm that "cannot be remedied after a final adjudication, whether by damages or a permanent injunction." Salinger v. Colting , 607 F.3d 68, 81–82 (2d Cir. 2010). In addition, the harm must be "neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent." Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer , 408 F.3d 112, 114 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Petitioners establish irreparable harm in two different ways. First, "the alleged violation of a constitutional right ... triggers a finding of irreparable harm," Jolly v. Coughlin , 76 F.3d 468, 482 (2d Cir. 1996), and Petitioners allege in their petition that their substantive and procedural due process rights have been violated. Accordingly, "no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary." Mitchell v. Cuomo , 748 F.2d 804, 806 (2d Cir. 1984) ().
Second, irreparable harm exists where, as here, petitioners "face imminent risk to their health, safety, and lives." Henrietta D. v. Giuliani , 119 F. Supp. 2d 181, 214 (E.D.N.Y. 2000), aff'd sub nom. Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg , 331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003). Due to their serious underlying medical conditions, all Petitioners face a risk of severe, irreparable harm if they contract COVID-19. Indeed, an "[a]nalysis of close to 1,600 COVID-19 cases in China found that patients with at least one co-morbidity—including cardiovascular disease, diabetes and chronic kidney diseases —‘had a 79% greater chance of requiring intensive care or a respirator or both, or of dying.’ " Br. at 2 . Moreover, being in immigration detention places Petitioners at significantly higher risk of contracting COVID-19. Individuals in carceral settings are at a "significantly higher" risk of spreading infectious diseases. See Mishori Decl. ¶ 16. It is not possible to isolate immigration detainees from the outside world (including from staff and vendors who may have been exposed to COVID-19), nor is it possible to isolate them from one another. See id. ¶ 24, 34–35; Letter from Dr. Scott A. Allen, Professor, Univ. of Cal. Riverside Sch. of Med. & Dr. Josiah "Jody" Rich, Professor, Brown Univ. to Bennie Thompson, Chairman, House Comm. on Homeland Sec., et. al. 5 (Mar. 19, 2020). As a result, jails will struggle to contain any eventual outbreak of COVID-19. See Mishori Decl. ¶¶ 19, 42–43. The imminence of this risk is underscored by the fact that two of the three jails housing the remaining Petitioners have confirmed cases of COVID-19. See Velesaca v. Wolf , No....
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