Corp.. of Harpers Ferry v. Taylor
| Decision Date | 26 May 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 101438.,101438. |
| Citation | 711 S.E.2d 571,227 W.Va. 501 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | CORPORATION OF HARPERS FERRY, A West Virginia Municipal Corporation, Defendant Below, Appellantv.Ralph TAYLOR, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court
1. “As a general rule each litigant bears his or her own attorney's fees absent a contrary rule of court or express statutory or contractual authority for reimbursement.” Syllabus point 2, Sally–Mike Properties v. Yokum, 179 W.Va. 48, 365 S.E.2d 246 (1986).
2. “There is authority in equity to award to the prevailing litigant his or her reasonable attorney's fees as ‘costs,’ without express statutory authorization, when the losing party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons.” Syllabus point 3, Sally–Mike Properties v. Yokum, 179 W.Va. 48, 365 S.E.2d 246 (1986).
3. “ Syllabus point 3, Richardson v. Town of Kimball, 176 W.Va. 24, 340 S.E.2d 582 (1986).
Gregory A. Bailey, Arnold & Bailey, Shepherdstown, WV, for Appellant.J. Michael Cassell, Campbell Flannery, P.C., Charles Town, WV, for Appellee.
The corporation of Harpers Ferry, appellant/defendant below (hereinafter “the City” or “City Council”) appeals from an order of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County denying its motion to alter or amend a judgment. The circuit court's order denied the City's request to alter or amend a prior order awarding Ralph Taylor, appellee/plaintiff below (hereinafter “Mr. Taylor”), attorney's fees in the underlying declaratory judgment action.1 Here, the City contends that the evidence did not support an award of attorney's fees and that it was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issue of attorney's fees. After a careful review of the briefs, the record submitted on appeal, and the oral arguments of the parties, we affirm.
On December 12, 2005, Mr. Taylor submitted a request to the City for permission to create a path along Zachary Taylor Street 2 to accommodate a truck that would be used to access property he owned adjacent to the street.3 At the time of Mr. Taylor's request, Robert DuBose (hereinafter “Mr. DuBose”) was a City Council member who lived in a house adjacent to the proposed access path to Mr. Taylor's property. On January 9, 2006, the City approved Mr. Taylor's request to access his property, on the condition that Mr. Taylor use erosion control silt fences and reseed with rye grass. The City also requested that Mr. Taylor get an authorization letter from the Mayor documenting the requirements. Although Mr. DuBose abstained from voting on the request, he participated in all discussions.
Two days after the City's approval of Mr. Taylor's request, Mr. DuBose sent e-mails complaining about the City's approval of Mr. Taylor's request. He sent e-mails to a member of the Planning Commission, the Chief of Police, and all members of the City Council. In a letter dated January 17, 2006, the Mayor imposed additional conditions on Mr. Taylor. After Mr. Taylor consented to the additional conditions, he was informed on February 11, 2006, that he could proceed with his plan. However, at the request of Mr. DuBose, on April 25, 2006, the City Council conducted a Special Meeting for the sole purpose of discussing Mr. Taylor's project. At the meeting, the City Council decided to impose additional conditions on Mr. Taylor before he could create a path to access his property. The conditions included: (1) an additional survey; (2) a detailed description of the proposed work; (3) planting numerous dogwoods and other tree species; (4) a fill plan with specified materials to be used; (5) before and after drawings or photographs of all proposed changes to the land; (6) a topographic survey of the right-of-way with two to four foot contours; and (7) a site drawing plan with the location of each tree proposed to be removed. Mr. Taylor agreed to the additional terms.
On June 12, 2006, the City informed Mr. Taylor that he had to retain a professional engineer to prepare a full set of construction engineering drawings sealed by the engineer, at a cost of $25,000 to $30,000. Based upon Mr. Taylor's experience as a professional construction manager and architect, he concluded that the request was without merit because the professional engineer would have no standards or guidelines upon which to base the work. The City did not provide Mr. Taylor with a set of standards, guidelines, policies, or any guidance that would aid in obtaining the engineering drawings.
As a consequence of the burdensome conditions imposed upon him, Mr. Taylor filed a declaratory judgment action against the City on November 20, 2007. Mr. Taylor sought to establish that the conditions imposed upon him had no basis in law and were discriminatory. The case was heard by the circuit court without a jury on September 15, 2009. On December 4, 2009, the circuit court entered an order setting out findings of fact and conclusions of law. In that order, the circuit court concluded that (1) imposition of the engineering requirements upon Mr. Taylor were not authorized by law and were unreasonable and unenforceable, (2) the conduct by Mr. DuBose deprived Mr. Taylor of due process of law, and (3) Mr. Taylor could file an application seeking recovery of attorney's fees, costs and expenses. The City did not appeal the order. 4
Mr. Taylor filed a motion for an award of attorney's fees and costs on December 23, 2009. The circuit court entered a scheduling order on December 28, 2009, allowing the City to respond to Mr. Taylor's motion. The City filed a response opposing the award of attorney's fees on February 3, 2010. The circuit court entered an order on April 9, 2010, awarding Mr. Taylor attorney's fees and costs. The City subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment order awarding attorney's fees under Rule 59(e) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure. On June 29, 2010, the circuit court entered an order denying the City's motion to alter or amend. From these orders, the City now appeals.
This case is presented to this Court from an order of the circuit court denying the City's Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend a final order. We have held that:
The standard of review applicable to an appeal from a motion to alter or amend a judgment, made pursuant to W. Va. R. Civ. P. 59(e), is the same standard that would apply to the underlying judgment upon which the motion is based and from which the appeal to this Court is filed.
Syl. pt. 1, Wickland v. American Travellers Life Ins. Co., 204 W.Va. 430, 513 S.E.2d 657 (1998). The underlying judgment order appealed in this case was the circuit court's order awarding Mr. Taylor attorney's fees and costs. This Court has held that “[t]he decision to award or not to award attorney's fees rests in the sound discretion of the circuit court, and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal except in cases of abuse.” Beto v. Stewart, 213 W.Va. 355, 359, 582 S.E.2d 802, 806 (2003). See also Sanson v. Brandywine Homes, Inc., 215 W.Va. 307, 310, 599 S.E.2d 730, 733 (2004) (); Syl. pt. 2, Daily Gazette Co., Inc. v. West Virginia Dev. Office, 206 W.Va. 51, 521 S.E.2d 543 (1999) (“ ‘ “ ‘[T]he trial [court] ... is vested with a wide discretion in determining the amount of ... court costs and counsel fees, and the trial ... determination of such matters will not be disturbed upon appeal to this Court unless it clearly appears that [it] has abused [its] discretion.’ . We will consider the parties' arguments in light of these review standards.
The City raises two primary arguments in support of its petition for appeal. We deny both reasons and will discuss each individually.
The first argument raised by the City is that its conduct prior to, and during, the litigation did not support the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Mr. Taylor. This Court has held that “[a]s a general rule each litigant bears his or her own attorney's fees absent a contrary rule of court or express statutory or contractual authority for reimbursement.” Syl. pt. 2, Sally–Mike Props. v. Yokum, 179 W.Va. 48, 365 S.E.2d 246 (1986). However, “[t]here is authority in equity to award to the prevailing litigant his or her reasonable attorney's fees as ‘costs,’ without express statutory authorization, when the losing party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons.” Syl. pt. 3, id.
Although the City is correct in arguing that the evidence did not establish that it engaged in any bad faith conduct during the litigation, the trial court found that the City's conduct prior to the litigation warranted the award of attorney's fees. Specifically, the trial court's order awarding attorney's fees listed the following findings to support the award: (1) Mr. DuBose had a conflict of interest but failed to recuse himself from discussions conducted by the City Council; (2) Mr. DuBose conducted an active and persistent pattern of direct communication with City Council members and other City...
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