Corporate Authorities of Scottsboro v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 10 May 1899
• Citation: 25 So. 809,121 Ala. 397
• Parties: CORPORATE AUTHORITIES OF SCOTTSBORO v. JOHNSON.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

25 So. 809

121 Ala. 397

CORPORATE AUTHORITIES OF SCOTTSBORO v. JOHNSON.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 10, 1899

Appeal from circuit court, Jackson county; William L. Stephens Special Judge.

Action by the corporate authorities of Scottsboro against Stokes Johnson. From a judgment in favor of defendant, the authorities appeal. Affirmed.

J. E Brown, for appellants.

R. M Clopton and Tally & Proctor, for appellee.

DOWDELL J.

The appellee was prosecuted and convicted in mayor's court of the town of Scottsboro for the violation of one of the ordinances of the municipality; the charge being, "for disorderly conduct in resisting arrest by the marshal." From this conviction the appellee appealed to the circuit court of Jackson county, in which court he was tried and acquitted. From the judgment of the circuit court the corporate authorities of Scottsboro appeal to this court.

On the trial in the circuit court the evidence, without conflict showed that the appellee, Stokes Johnson, had been previously tried in the mayor's court for disorderly conduct, and fined in the sum of one dollar; and, in default of payment of said fine, the mayor entered up a sentence to hard labor upon the streets of said town for two days, but at the same time permitted the defendant to go at large, and return to his ordinary business and duties, upon a promise, then made to the mayor, that he (defendant) would pay said fine of one dollar. After the lapse of five days, the defendant not having paid the fine of one dollar, the mayor directed the marshal to arrest the defendant and put him to labor. It was in the making of this arrest by the marshal that the defendant offered resistance, and for which he is now prosecuted for "disorderly conduct in resisting arrest by the marshal." It is a clear proposition that the defendant was not an escape, for he was at large by the order of the court that tried him. So the law as to the rearrest of an escaped convict has no application in this case.

As a general rule, the day on which a prisoner is sentenced will be reckoned as a part of his imprisonment. Ex parte Meyers 44 Mo. 279; Whart. Cr. Pl. (8th Ed.) § 925. At the time of this arrest of the defendant by the marshal under the mayor's direction, the time of the sentence had expired, and any further restraint of the defendant in his liberty after the expiration of the term of his sentence would have been illegal. In case of an...