Corporation Nine v. Taylor

Decision Date17 August 1973
Docket NumberNo. 12983,12983
Citation30 Utah 2d 47,513 P.2d 417
Partiesd 47 CORPORATION NINE, a Utah corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ray L. TAYLOR and Neva W. Taylor, his wife, Defendants and Respondents. Ray L. TAYLOR and Neva W. Taylor, his wife, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. CORPORATION NINE, a Utah corporation, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

Victor G. Sagers, Midvale, for plaintiff-appellant.

Lawrence L. Summerhays, of Strong & Hanni, Salt Lake City, for defendants-respondents.

CROCKETT, Justice:

This controversy arises out of a real estate contract wherein Ray L. Taylor and his wife Neva, as sellers, undertook to sell 50 acres of unimproved land in the southeast part of Salt Lake County to plaintiff, Corporation Nine, Inc., buyer. After certain of the payments had been made, and some tracts of the land had been conveyed seriatim, as the contract provided, dispute arose. Corporation Nine brought action seeking specific performance and damages, alleging wrongful refusal by the sellers Taylors to accept tender of payments and convey further tracts of the land. Taylors brought their own separate action against Corporatin Nine alleging that it had defaulted. They asked to have the contract terminated, and that they be released from any obligation to convey the rest of the land.

The actions were consolidated and tried to the court. It found the issues in favor of the Taylors: that plaintiff Corporation Nine had defaulted, and that its rights under the contract were terminated; and awarded the Taylors $6,099.87 for past due interest, and $1,000 attorney's fees. Corporation Nine appeals. The Taylors urge affirmance of the judgment, except they claim entitlement to a greater amount of attorney's fees.

The contract by which Corporation Nine (in this decision regarded as plaintiff) agreed to buy and the Taylors (herein regarded as defendants) agreed to sell the 50 acres above mentioned was executed January 24, 1968. Mr John New General manager, and an owner in Corporation Nine, handled the transactions for it. The contract stated the purchase price as $240,000: $20,000 down and $25,000 March 1, 1969, and a similar amount on March 1 of each year thereafter, plus interest at four percent on unpaid balances. Concurrent with its execution the sellers (Taylors) were to convey six acres, and on receiving the payment on March 1 of each year were to convey an additional five acres. The sellers retained possession, and all incidents and duties pertaining to ownership, including paying taxes thereon, until the payment was received and the land conveyed. The contracts also stated that Corporation Nine had no privilege of prepayment without prior written consent of the sellers.

It is the position of Corporation Nine that because the main contract was not followed literally, but was departed from by modification by the parties, it was not bound to keep its strict terms. In the first transaction, February 1, 1968, Corporation Nine paid the $20,000 down payment and received its six acres. It also requested and received an extra .567 acre and executed a promissory note for $12,835 to the Taylors payable in three years. (This note was finally paid off in June of 1971.) This side transaction was explained by the Taylors thus: that the actual agreed purchase price was $250,00 and the Taylors wanted $30,000 down; but that Mr. New explained that Corporation Nine did not have $30,000, but if the contract price were shown to be only $240,000, it could obtain a $20,000 loan from the bank; and that it would give a promissory note secured by a mortgage for the other $10,000 of the down payment, plus the $2,835 for the .567 acre, which would account for the $12,835 promissory note. On the question of the purchase price, the trial court found in favor of Corporation Nine that the purchase price was $240,000. That finding stands as correct, particularly in view of the parol evidence rule. 1

The following year, in February 1969, Corporation Nine again asked the Taylors for more land than the five acres provided for in the contract. This was because, in variance of their plan of building cluster type housing, they planned to house the 1969 Utah Home Show. The Taylors agreed to convey more land, at a value of $5,000 per acre for the additional acreage. Three separate parcels were conveyed at that time: 8.618 acres; 4.45 acres; and 1.18 acres. Corporation Nine made the following payments: $30,900 on February 17, 1969; $22,500 on October 9, 1969; and $18,090 on January 7, 1970. Some difficulty appears in these figures because the payments made do not correspond exactly to the values of those individual parcels. The payment of $30,900 paid for the largest tract included payment of $5,900 for the separate 1.18 acre tract, and also for the defendant's five-acre obligation to purchase that year. This leaves 3.618 acres to be taken care of by the $18,090 payment.

It is of considerable significance that with respect to the other tract, the 4.45 acres, the parties prepared and signed a letter of instructions to the Security Title Company. It stated that when the payment for that tract (the $22,250) was made, it would be applied to the next annual installment under the contract. That amount was paid in October 1969, and was applied to the 1970 installment. The Taylors did not demand that the remaining $2,750 owed be paid by Corporation Nine to complete their performance for that year.

In February 1970 Taylors sent a statement of account, including interest for the previous year on the balance of the contract, to be due March 1, 1970. Upon the request of Mr. New Taylors extended the due date several times, and after some tentative considerations concerning forfeiture, payment was finally made in November 1970. The next year, in February 25, 1971, Taylors sent notice of payments to be due March 1, 1971, $25,000 principal, plus $5,837 interest. On March 24, 1971, Corporation Nine sent a check for $9,197, which it asserted covered the interest and principal due, and demanded a conveyance of .752 of an acre. It asserted that this would complete the amount of land it had agreed to take up to that time and the payment therefore. The Taylors refused to accept that proposition and on March 31, 1971 sent Corporation Nine notice of default and their intent to terminate the contract unless it was remedied within five days. The parties stood pat on their respective positions, and these lawsuits resulted.

The foregoing tender and refusal is the heart of the controversy in this case. Corporation Nine contends that all of the three parcels conveyed in 1969, and the payments therefore, should be credited in advance on their performance of their annual obligations on the contract; whereas plaintiffs Taylors contend to the contrary, and particularly that the 1.18 acres and the amount of $5,900 paid therefore was not part of the main contract; but that it was an entirely separate transaction. It is undisputed that this small tract is not within the 50 acres described in the contract, but in in other land belonging to the Taylors. Upon disputed evidence, the trial court found this issue in favor of the Taylors: that the 1.18 acres was a separate transaction, and that the $5,900 paid therefore was not to be credited on the main contract. But it did credit all other payments made by Corporation Nine against the total of the main contract.

In regard to prepayment, the provision of the contract was: that the buyer has no privilege of prepayment other than consistent with the terms of this agreement, unless prior written consent first had and obtained from the sellers.' The court interpreted this clause...

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9 cases
  • Ashworth v. Bullock
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • 18 Abril 2013
    ...rule that a seller need not have legal title during the entire executory period of a real estate contract”); Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417, 421 (1973) (“[T]he law does not require the vendor to have clear and marketable title at all times during the performance of ......
  • Lone Mountain Prod. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Utah
    • 5 Abril 1989
    ...606 F.2d at 213. The burden of proof and persuasion on issues of estoppel is on the party who asserts it. Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417, 420 (1973). Because the test for estoppel is objective in nature, the party asserting it must show that his reliance was reasona......
  • Madsen v. Anderson
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • 30 Junio 1983
    ...or "shock the conscience of the Court." Compare, e.g., Park Valley Corp. v. Bagley, Utah, 635 P.2d 65 (1981); Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417 (1973); Strand v. Mayne, 14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d 396 (1963), upholding a forfeiture provision, with Soffe v. Ridd, supra; Jo......
  • Avila v. Winn, 880482
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • 1 Junio 1990
    ...person conclude under the circumstances." See also Big Butte Ranch, Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690 (Utah 1977); Corporation Nine v. Taylor, 30 Utah 2d 47, 513 P.2d 417 (1973). ...
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