Corpron v. Safer Foods, Inc.
Citation | 126 N.W.2d 14,22 Wis.2d 478 |
Parties | Clarence E. CORPRON et al., Appellants, v. SAFER FOODS, INC., a Wis. corporation, et al., Respondents. |
Decision Date | 04 February 1964 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wisconsin |
Phillips, Hoffman & Phillips, Milwaukee, for appellants.
Kivett & Kasdorf, Jerome T. Safer, Milwaukee, John M. Swietlik and James G. Forester, Milwaukee, of counsel, for respondents.
1. Safe place statute. The circuit court declined to instruct the jury that defendants had obligations under the safe place statute, since the court was of the opinion that the public sidewalk was not a place of employment as defined in sec. 101.01(1), Stats.
Plaintiffs claim that the sidewalk was a place of employment for which defendants were responsible because 'they used the public sidewalk for the purpose of having their customers enter from their parking lot to their store.' The case of Miller v. Welworth Theatres 1 is directly in point. In that case patrons of the theater were required to stand on the public sidewalk while purchasing tickets at a window, and to walk on the sidewalk from the ticket window to the entrance. Plaintiff purchased a ticket and started toward the entrance, and was injured as a result of a defect in the sidewalk. This court held the public sidewalk was not a place of employment, and the theater owner had no statutory obligation to maintain it is safe condition. We followed this decision in the recent case of Hansen v. Schmidman Properties. 2
Plaintiffs rely on Schwenn v. Loraine Hotel Co. 3 where a driveway within the boundaries of the public street was held to be a place of employment. We pointed out in Hansen, supra, that in Schwenn v. Loraine Hotel Co., supra, 'the defendant Hotel Company and the defendant Cab Company, for a great many years, exercised complete and exclusive dominion over the area in question' although such area was owned by the city. Further, in Schwenn, supra, employees of defendants were on duty in the area frequently and regularly.
The ruling of the circuit court in this case, that the safe place statute was inapplicable to the public sidewalk, was correct.
2. Error in admission of evidence. Plaintiffs' original attorney of record, Mr. Hillis, having disassociated himself during the course of the trial, testified as to an observation he made of the canopy long after the event. During the summer of 1959 he went to the premises with the Corprons. He saw four or five cracks in the underside of the canopy near the east end. The cracks ran north and south the width of the canopy and were all within seven to eight feet of the east end of the canopy. Water stains spread out from these cracks for about ten or twelve inches. Apparently the under surface of the canopy was made of plaster. Defendants objected to the testimony, but it was received.
In considering motions after verdict, the court concluded that the testimony was immaterial. The court concluded that the other testimony in the record would not support a verdict that defendants were negligent.
Mr. Hillis' testimony indicated that at some time before his observation water had leaked through the canopy. It would be a reasonable inference that it would have required some appreciable lapse of time for the stains he described to have been created. But we think it would be speculation to infer that the leaking must have been in process five months or more before Mr. Hillis saw the cracks and stains.
This court has said:
* * *' 4
The rule has been summarized in a digest as follows:
* * *' 5
We agree that it was error to admit the Hillis testimony.
3. Whether the record could support a finding of negligence. It is sufficiently established that the ice was formed by water which dripped from the canopy. Mr. Corpron testified: 'It was dripping off the canopy and walking * * * and running down on the side of the building too.' Mrs. Corpron testified: 'Well, it was dripping from the top of the canopy.'
Presumably there was a substantial amount of snow on top of the canopy which was melting...
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