Correas v. Davis
Decision Date | 23 May 2016 |
Docket Number | No. 3:14-cv-4311-K-BN,3:14-cv-4311-K-BN |
Parties | SALVADOR CORREAS (TDCJ No. 1481981), Petitioner, v. LORIE DAVIS, Director Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Petitioner Salvador Correas, a Texas inmate proceeding pro se, has filed an application for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons explained below, the application should be denied.
In 2008, following a jury trial, Correas was convicted of one count of burglary and two counts of attempted aggravated sexual assault, and he was sentenced to concurrent terms of 30-, 60-, and 50-years' confinement. See State v. Correas, Nos. F-06-68809-Q, F-06-68795-Q, & F-06-68865-Q (204th Dist. Ct., Dallas Cnty., Tex. Jan. 9, 2008). His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. See Correas v.State, Nos. 05-08-00100-CR, 05-08-00101-CR, & 05-08-00102-CR, 2009 WL 1493004 (Tex. App. - Dallas May 29, 2009). And the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ("CCA") denied his petition for discretionary review. See Correas v. State, PD 895-09 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 30, 2009).
The CCA also denied Correas's first three state habeas applications (one for each conviction) without written orders on the findings of the trial court made without a live hearing. See Ex parte Correas, WR-80,012-01, -02, & -03 (Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2013) [Dkt. Nos. 13-12, 13-13, & 13-14].
Correas later filed three new state habeas application, which the CCA also denied without written orders. See Ex parte Correas, WR-80,012-04, -05, & -06 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 8, 2014) [Dkt. Nos. 13-15, 13-16, 13-17, 13-18, 13-19, & 13-20]. Those three denials, the factual predicates of which are based on a December 30, 2012 article in the Dallas Morning News concerning the drug use of a victim/witness at Correas's trial, are the state court adjudications now before this Court. And, therefore, the timeliness of Correas's Section 2254 application is based on - and Respondent concedes that the current application is timely under - 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). See Dkt. No. 14.
The facts underlying Correas's convictions are summarized in the Dallas Court of Appeals's decision, which refers to the then-minors by the pseudonyms assigned to them at trial:
In the state habeas applications filed after the Dallas Morning News story, Correas asserted that he was actually innocent because (1) one of the complainants (Mariela) was alleged to be addicted to drugs at the time of the offense, (2) the same complaint allegedly gave false testimony by not divulging her alleged drug addiction, (3) the State failed to disclose that she allegedly suffered from a drug addiction, and (4) the State suborned perjury by portraying the complainant "as an innocent and honest young school girl." Dkt. No. 13-16, state habeas trial court findings of fact and conclusions of law, at 58.
The state court found that the first two grounds could have been raised in Correas's first round of state habeas applications, because he first became aware of the underlying facts on December 30, 2012, while those applications were pending, and,therefore, the court found that those grounds should be denied for abuse of the writ. See id. at 58-59 (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.07 § 4(a)). But the state court found that the third and fourth grounds - concerning "the State's knowledge of this information and its failure to disclose it" - "could not have been presented in the original applications," and the court reviewed those grounds on their merits. Id. at 59.
The third and fourth grounds adjudicated in state court parallel the third and fourth grounds raised in Correas's current Section 2254 application. See Dkt. No. 3 at 7-8. And the undersigned will address those below, after taking up the first two (procedurally-barred) grounds and Correas's actual innocence assertions.
To the extent that through any ground in the federal habeas petition Correas asserts a stand-alone claim of actual innocence, such a claim is itself not an independent ground for federal habeas corpus relief and therefore should be denied. See McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931 (2013) (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404-05 (1993)); Reed v. Stephens, 739 F.3d 753, 766 (5th Cir. 2014) (collecting cases); see also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314 (1995) ( ).
Correas first asserts that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because any investigation counsel performed did not reveal the drug addiction issue discussed in the Dallas Morning News article. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 3 at 6. Although Correas raised an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel ("IAC") claim in his first round of state habeas applications, see, e.g., Dkt. No. 13-16 at 57-58, the state-court adjudications of those petitions are not now before this Court. And, because Correas failed to include an IAC claim in his second round of state habeas applications - the adjudications of which are before this Court for review - Correas has failed to exhaust this IAC claim.
This Court may not, moreover, consider the current IAC claim, focused on counsel's failure to uncover the information revealed in the Dallas Morning News article, exhausted because a previous IAC claim focused on unrelated allegations was exhausted. See Dkt. No. 13-16 at 35-37 (...
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