Corren v. Corren
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Florida |
Writing for the Court | THOMAS; ADAMS; ROBERTS |
Citation | 43 A.L.R.2d 632,47 So.2d 774 |
Decision Date | 01 August 1950 |
Parties | CORREN v. CORREN. |
Page 774
v.
CORREN.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 12, 1950.
Rush & Pierce and George A. Pierce, Jacksonville, for appellant.
Marks, Gray, Yates & Conroy, Jacksonville, for appellee.
THOMAS, Justice.
In this case the appellant sued her husband for damages alleged to have resulted from the negligent operation of an automobile by the daughter of both parties to whom the husband had entrusted the car.
The circuit judge held the view that one spouse could not sue the other because, under the common law, they were one person and this fiction had not been changed either by Section 708.08 or 708.09, Florida Statutes, 1941, and F.S.A. So he sustained the demurrer to the declaration and entered a judgment for the defendant.
This situation is the foundation for the sole question here, whether the wife may recover from her husband for negligent injury to her person.
Counsel for appellant has faithfully traced the history of the development of married women's rights since the enactment in 1829 of what now appears as Section 2.01, Florida Statutes, 1941, and F.S.A., declaring the common and statute laws of England, in effect July 4, 1776, to be in force in this state where consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the acts of the legislature of this state, through the laws, constitutional provisions, and judicial decisions of this state until the passage of the laws of 1943, to which we shall eventually refer, in his effort to convince us that there has been a definite trend in the emancipation of the wife to the point where now she may sue her husband for injuries inflicted upon her by the driver of his car.
We see no occasion to digest the provisions of Section 1 of Article XI of the Constitution, F.S.A., or any of the statutes on the subject now collected in Chapter 708, Florida Statutes, 1941, and F.S.A., except two of these, 708.08 and 708.09, the sections which the circuit judge thought had not changed the common law status of the man and the wife, for in 1932 when the court decided the case of Webster v. Snyder, 103 Fla. 1131, 138 So. 755, these statutes, and of course the constitutional provisions, were in effect, and it was held that the action of a young woman against a person who was alleged to have injured her while serving as the agent of another should be abated upon her marriage to the one causing the injury. We interpret this decision as holding in effect that at that time the common law adopted by Section 2.01, supra, had not been so altered that a woman could sue her husband, or rather, continue a suit against a person who, subsequent to the alleged injury and the institution of the suit, had become her husband.
The appellant regards Chapter 21932, supra, as having destroyed the 'unity of the marriage association' as it theretofore existed and reasons that if the wife may enter into agreements, as is provided in Section 2 of the act, and may 'sue and be...
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