Corrigal v. Ball & Dodd Funeral Home, Inc.

Decision Date20 April 1978
Docket NumberNo. 44918,44918
Citation577 P.2d 580,89 Wn.2d 959
PartiesJoseph CORRIGAL and Mary Jane Corrigal, husband and wife, Appellants, v. BALL AND DODD FUNERAL HOME, INC., a corporation, Respondent.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Clinton J. Henderson, Clarkston, Steven C. Miller, Cheney, for appellants.

Lukins, Annis, Bastine, McKay & Van Marter, P.S., Robert G. Beaumier, Jr., Spokane, for respondent.

STAFFORD, Associate Justice.

Appellant Mary Jane Corrigal appeals the trial court's dismissal of her complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We reverse and remand for trial.

Appellant's son, David Brannan, drowned in the Spokane River. Prior to recovery of his body, appellant contacted respondent Ball and Dodd Funeral Home concerning cremation of the body. Respondent informed appellant that a suitable container would be needed for interment of the remains after cremation and provided appellant with a catalog from which to select a burial urn. Appellant selected an urn and paid respondent for it and the cost of cremation.

David Brannan's body was subsequently recovered and sent to respondent for cremation. Later, when appellant claimed her son's remains, she was given a sealed cardboard box. Appellant took the box home where she opened it fully expecting to find the burial urn within which the ashes should have been placed. Upon opening the box appellant discovered a plastic sack. Believing the sack to contain packing material protecting the burial urn, appellant placed her hands into the material to locate the urn. When she found no urn, appellant suddenly realized that what she had mistakenly believed to be packing material was in fact the cremated bones and residue of her son's body.

Appellant filed this action against respondent alleging outrage, negligence and breach of contract. While denying most of appellant's allegations, respondent admitted agreeing to perform funeral services, including cremation of the body and delivery of the son's ashes to appellant. Respondent also admitted returning the decedent's ashes in a plastic bag encased within a sealed cardboard box. Thereafter, respondent moved for a "summary judgment" dismissing appellant's complaint. Although the motion was denominated "summary judgment", respondent's supporting memorandum makes it abundantly clear that respondent actually sought "to test the plaintiff's allegations within the meaning of CR 12(b)(6)."

During argument on the motion, respondent's counsel appears to have conceded his client's failure to provide the burial urn. Following argument, the trial court entered a written memorandum decision which granted respondent's motion to dismiss the complaint after treating it essentially as a CR 12(b)(6) motion on the pleadings. Later, the court entered judgment dismissing the complaint after noting respondent had tendered the $64.00 already paid by appellant for the missing urn. Appellant appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals which certified the matter to this court.

Initially respondent moves to dismiss the appeal as untimely. Although appellant's notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after entry of the memorandum decision, our rules require only that the notice be filed within 30 days of the entry of judgment. See RAP 2.1(a)(2); 5.2(a), (c); CR 58. Appellant's notice of appeal was filed within 14 days of the entry of judgment. Thus, the appeal is timely and respondent's motion is denied.

The only substantive issue before us is whether the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim under CR 12(b)(6). 1 We have repeatedly said that a motion made pursuant to CR 12(b)(6) must be denied unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts, consistent with the complaint, which would entitle the plaintiff to relief. Halverson v. Dahl, 89 Wash.2d 673, 674, 574 P.2d 1190 (1978); Berge v. Gorton, 88 Wash.2d 756, 759, 567 P.2d 187 (1977). Factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true for purposes of the CR 12(b)(6) motion. Berge v. Gorton, supra at 759, 567 P.2d 187; Stanard v. Bolin, 88 Wash.2d 614, 615, 565 P.2d 94 (1977); see also Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 88 Wash.2d 735, 742, 565 P.2d 1173 (1977).

Appellant has stated a cause of action for negligent infliction of mental distress under Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wash.2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976). In Hunsley we said that a plaintiff who undergoes mental suffering has a cause of action; that is, the defendant has a duty to avoid the negligent infliction of such distress. Physical impact or threat of an immediate invasion of the plaintiff's personal security is no longer required to be alleged or proven. Hunsley v. Giard, supra at 435, 553 P.2d 1096. Rather, the confines of a defendant's liability are now measured by the strictures imposed by negligence theory, i. e., foreseeable risk, threatened danger, and...

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  • Glacier Nw., Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local Union No. 174
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • December 16, 2021
    ...to relief.’ " Orwick v. City of Seattle , 103 Wash.2d 249, 254, 692 P.2d 793 (1984) (quoting Corrigal v. Ball & Dodd Funeral Home, Inc. , 89 Wash.2d 959, 961, 577 P.2d 580 (1978) ). We accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, but we need not accept any legal conclusions stat......
  • Kammerer v. Western Gear Corp.
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • October 29, 1981
    ...injury, when there was intentional or reckless conduct which was "outrageous and extreme." See also Corrigal v. Ball & Dodd Funeral Home, Inc., 89 Wash.2d 959, 577 P.2d 580 (1978). Given such wide latitude in the area of compensatory damages, juries are allowed to award what they regard as ......
  • Keenan v. Allan
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Washington
    • May 12, 1995
    ...i.e., foreseeable risk, threatened danger, and unreasonable conduct measured in light of the danger." Corrigal v. Ball & Dodd Funeral Home, 89 Wash.2d 959, 962, 577 P.2d 580 (1978) (citing other authority). "Mental suffering, to be compensable, however, must at least be manifested by object......
  • Cutler v. Phillips Petroleum Co.
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • September 29, 1994
    ...Federal Practice § 1357, at 604 (1969)); Orwick v. Seattle, 103 Wash.2d 249, 254, 692 P.2d 793 (1984); Corrigal v. Ball & Dodd Funeral Home, Inc., 89 Wash.2d 959, 961, 577 P.2d 580 (1978); Lawson v. State, 107 Wash.2d 444, 448, 730 P.2d 1308 (1986); Bowman v. John Doe, 104 Wash.2d 181, 183,......
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2 books & journal articles
  • Table of Cases
    • United States
    • Washington State Bar Association Washington Appellate Practice Deskbook (WSBA) Table of Cases
    • Invalid date
    ...442 P.2d 950 (1968): 8.6 Corona v. Boeing Co., 111 Wn. App. 1, 46 P.3d 253 (2002): 21.5(3)(c) Corrigal v. Ball & Dodd Funeral Home, Inc., 89 Wn.2d 959, 577 P.2d 580 (1978): 5.5(2) Cosmopolitan Eng'g Grp., Inc. v. Ondeo Degremont, Inc., 159 Wn.2d 292, 149 P.3d 666 (2006): 17.6 Costanich v. D......
  • § 5.5 Time Allowed to File Notice
    • United States
    • Washington State Bar Association Washington Appellate Practice Deskbook (WSBA) Chapter 5 Initiating Review- Who, Where, When, and How
    • Invalid date
    ...which an appeal can be taken and from which the time for notice of appeal begins to run. See Corrigal v. Ball & Dodd Funeral Home, Inc., 89 Wn.2d 959, 961, 577 P.2d 580 (1978). Appeal need not be taken from a verbal dismissal and can await a written order. State v. Rundquist, 79 Wn. App. 78......

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