Corrigan v. Donilon

• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: KELLEHER
• Citation: Corrigan v. Donilon, 433 A.2d 198 (R.I. 1981)
• Decision Date: 04 August 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80-332-A,80-332-A
• Parties: E. Robert CORRIGAN et al. v. Edward T. DONILON et al. ppeal.

Page 198

433 A.2d 198

E. Robert CORRIGAN et al. v. Edward T. DONILON et al.

No. 80-332-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Aug. 4, 1981.

Natale L. Urso, Thomas J. Liguori, Westerly, for plaintiffs.

Vincent J. Piccirilli, Providence, for defendants.

OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island seeks the advice of the justices of this court pursuant to our Rule 6. The question posed by the District Court is as follows:

"What rights under the statutory law of the State of Rhode Island, if any, do the above named long-term substitute teachers, on the basis of the facts found in the decision of the Federal District Court, attached hereto, have with respect to notice and hearing upon termination of their status as long-term substitute teachers?"

This inquiry arises because of a suit filed in the District Court by a group of long-term substitute teachers who had worked within the Providence school system. They claim that the Providence School Committee (the committee) and the Superintendent of Schools (the superintendent) have violated their rights to due process by terminating their positions as long-term substitutes without a hearing.

The controversy was submitted to the District Court on an agreed statement of facts. The court found that the long-termers had been employed for at least three years when they received letters dated February 4, 1977, from the superintendent, advising them that their employment would terminate on the last day of school in June of that year. The letter noted that a resolution to this effect would be considered by the committee at its mid-February 1977 meeting. The teachers were invited to attend the meeting and be heard before the resolution was acted upon. The committee adopted the resolution, and plaintiffs were subsequently notified of the termination of their employment, effective at the end of the 1976-77 school year.

In early March 1977, plaintiffs asked the committee for a statement explaining why their employment was being terminated and for an opportunity to appear before the committee. It is conceded that although the committee had every intention of listening to plaintiffs, the hearings were supposed to take place after the committee had heard from other teachers who for a variety of reasons had received their termination notices. As of the date when the District Court sought our assistance, plaintiffs had not appeared before the committee.

The plaintiffs seek relief in the Federal Court pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1974), claiming that they were denied their due-process rights by the committee's failure to provide either pre- or post-termination hearings and that the committee, in terminating their employment, acted arbitrarily and capriciously. ¹ The District Court concluded that before it could properly assess plaintiffs' claim, it must, before proceeding any further, determine the nature of their "entitlement" under state law. Thus, the District Court's request for our assistance ensued.

Throughout this litigation, plaintiffs have contended that because they served continuously and satisfactorily for a period of at least three years within the Providence school system, they had acquired tenure pursuant to the pertinent provisions of G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) chapter 13 of title 16, otherwise known as the Teachers' Tenure Act (Tenure Act). Accordingly, they argue that they are entitled to all the rights accruing to a tenured teacher, including the right not to be dismissed except for good and just cause. They also claim that it matters little what title the committee chose to give them; once they had completed three successive years of labor in the educational vineyard, they had acquired tenure together with all its due-process safeguards.

In Jacob v. Board of Regents for Education, 117 R.I. 164, 169, 365 A.2d 430, 433 (1976), we pointed out that the key to tenure as provided by G.L. 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 16-13-3 is the successful completion of three successive annual contracts, which three-year term of service constitutes a probationary period. Once such an individual has passed muster for three years, he or she can only be dismissed after a hearing at which the school committee must show that there is good and just cause for the teacher's dismissal. See Schiavulli v. School Committee, 114 R.I. 433, 334 A.2d 416 (1975). We also noted in the Jacob case that even though § 16-13-2 entitled a probationary teacher to a statement about the reasons for dismissal or nonrenewal, the good-and-just-cause standard of § 16-13-3 and its burden of proof were inapplicable. The probationary teacher, we said, because of § 16-13-2 was to be afforded the opportunity to appear before the committee and attempt to convince the committee that it had made a mistake in reaching the conclusion that it did. We also emphasized that the committee should listen to the probationary teacher in an objective manner and fairly consider its original decision.

Although there is no statutory definition regarding what constitutes a long-term substitute, the litigants have apparently adopted the definition set forth in the collective-bargaining agreement in effect between the teachers and the school committee for the 1976-77 school year. This agreement defines a long-term substitute as "a person appointed by the School Committee to serve in a position for a period of time not to exceed one semester."

After a thorough examination of the applicable statutes and the case law decided thereunder, we are convinced that a long-term substitute teacher is not encompassed within the provisions of the Tenure Act. Hence, a long-termer serving under a semester contract does not acquire tenure no matter how long the length of service. The Tenure Act specifically provides that to acquire tenure, the teacher must have served for a period covered by three successive annual contracts. In fact, § 16-13-2 in its pertinent portion specifically provides:

"Teaching service shall be on the basis of an annual contract, except as hereinafter provided, and such contract shall be deemed to be continuous unless the governing body of the schools shall notify the teacher in writing (on or before March 1) that the contract for the ensuing year will not be renewed * * *."

The three-year probationary period serves two purposes. It gives the school committee and its administrative staff an opportunity to evaluate the probationary teacher, and at the same time it provides the probationer with an opportunity to correct any deficiencies that may arise prior to a determination of the grant of tenure. It is only after an individual has successfully completed the probationary period that tenure is awarded. However, the General Assembly has made it clear that...