Corrigan v. Kansas City

• Decision Date: 13 May 1908
• Citation: 211 Mo. 608,111 S.W. 115
• Parties: CORRIGAN et al. v. KANSAS CITY et al.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

111 S.W. 115

211 Mo. 608

CORRIGAN et al. v. KANSAS CITY et al.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

May 13, 1908.

1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS—NATURE OF TAX.

Article 10, § 33, of the charter of the city of Kansas City, provides that all real estate, in each park district, exclusive of improvements thereon, may be assessed for maintaining, etc., the parks under the control of the park commissioners, and such assessment may be made, according to the valuation of real estate in each park district, for city purposes. An ordinance, adopted pursuant thereto, levied on all real estate, exclusive of improvements, in the west park district, a special assessment of 2½ mills on the assessed valuation of the real estate, exclusive of improvements, made for general city purposes. Held, that the tax levied by the ordinance was not a general tax, so as to be bound to conform to the legal requirements of general taxes, but was a special tax for local improvements, and the fact that there were five similar ordinances passed at the same time, applying to the other park districts throughout the city, did not render it a general tax, as the operation of each ordinance was distinct from that of the others.

2. SAME—EXEMPTIONS—VALIDITY.

Article 10, § 33, of the charter, being adopted in conformity to the provisions of Const. 1875, art. 9, §§ 16, 17 (Ann. St. 1906, pp. 265, 266), has the same force as an act of the General Assembly, and while it confers upon the city power to levy a tax on all real estate, exclusive of improvements, it is permissive in form, and the city need not levy a tax up to the full limit allowed; and hence the ordinance was not invalid, because it only imposed a tax on the real estate assessed for general city purposes, which did not include church property, etc.

3. SAME—UNIFORMITY—NECESSITY IN SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS.

Const. art. 10, § 3 (Ann. St. 1906, p. 275), requires taxes to be uniform, section 6 (page 280) exempts city property, etc., from taxation, and section 7 (page 282) prohibits any other exemptions. Article 10, § 33, of the charter of Kansas City, adopted pursuant to article 9, §§ 16, 17, Const. 1875 (Ann. St. 1906, pp. 265, 266), provides for the taxation of all real estate, exclusive of improvements, in each park district, for park purposes, and an ordinance, adopted pursuant thereto, levied a special assessment on the assessed valuation of real estate made for general city purposes, which excluded churches, etc. Held, that section 3 of the Constitution applied only to the general taxes, and did not forbid exemptions from special assessments for local improvements, if there was a fair classification of the property assessed, and, all property of the same class being taxed by the ordinance, based on the assessment for general city purposes, which excluded church property, etc., the classification was not beyond the legislative discretion of the common council.

4. SAME—MAINTENANCE OF PARKS—AUTHORITY TO MAKE ASSESSMENT—COMPLETION OF IMPROVEMENTS BEFORE ASSESSMENT—NECESSITY.

An ordinance of the city of Kansas City, adopted under article 10, § 32, of its charter, authorizing the assessment of real estate for maintaining parks, levied on all real estate a special assessment of 2½ mills on the assessed valuation of real estate made for general city purposes. Article 10, § 8, of its charter, requires at least one park in each park district. A small piece of land had been dedicated as a park when the special assessment was levied for a certain district, and a tract of several acres had been donated by the city with the right to reclaim reserved, and the park commissioners had laid out, and the city had adopted so far as it could, two large parks in the district and was conducting the litigation to establish them with diligence. Held, in a suit to enjoin the sale of property for delinquent special taxes, that the tax was not void, on the ground that there was no park in the district, where there was no showing that the city was not diligently prosecuting the proceedings for establishing the parks, or that they would not in due time be completed; and as courts of equity will often not strictly enforce a mere technical legal right when it would be inequitable, the enforcement of the tax will not be enjoined, because the parks have not been entirely completed.

5. SAME—PURPOSES OF ASSESSMENT — SUFFICIENCY OF STATEMENT.

An ordinance of the city of Kansas City, adopted under article 10, § 32, of its charter, which authorized the assessment of real estate for maintaining and improving parks, levied on all real estate, exclusive of improvements, a special assessment for that purpose, and provided that it should be used for the purpose of maintaining and improving the parks, etc., in the district. The city charter created a board of park commissioners, consisting of five, who shall be freeholders and electors of the city, having resided therein for five years prior to their appointment, and shall be men of integrity and intelligence. Held, that the ordinance was not objectionable as being too indefinite and uncertain in stating the purposes of the levy, as it would be difficult to make it more definite without impairing the powers of the board; and, in view of the high character of the commissioners required by the charter, they could be safely trusted to properly expend the assessments, and if they did not, the courts could correct any misconduct when it was shown.

6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — DUE PROCESS OF LAW—SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS.

Under an ordinance of the city of Kansas City, adopted under article 10, § 33, of its charter, which authorized the assessment of real estate for maintaining parks, levying on all real estate, exclusive of improvements, a special assessment on the assessed valuation of real estate made for general city purposes, the fact that the tax was levied without notice to property owners did not deprive them of their property without due process of law.

7. SAME—EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAW.

An ordinance of the city of Kansas City, adopted under article 10, § 33, of its charter, which authorized the assessment of all real estate, exclusive of improvements for park purposes, levied on all real estate, exclusive of improvements, 2½ mills on the assessed valuation made for general city purposes, which valuation did not include churches, railroad property, etc. Held, that the ordinance, by omitting church property, etc., from the special assessment, did not deny the property owners taxed thereunder the equal protection of the law, within the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution, as the charter was permissive, and did not require the city to tax up to the full limit, so long as it made a fair classification.

Burgess, Graves, and Woodson, JJ., dissenting.

In Banc. Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; Edward P. Gates, Judge.

Suit by Bernard Corrigan and others against the city of Kansas City and another, to enjoin the sale of land for delinquent special taxes. From a decree dissolving the injunction and dismissing the bill, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Warner, Dean, McLeod, Holden & Timmonds, for appellants. Edwin C. Meservey, Wm. A. Knotts, and D. J. Haff, for respondents.

VALLIANT, J.

This is a suit in equity to enjoin the defendants, the city and the city treasurer, from selling lands of the plaintiffs for delinquent special taxes, called by plaintiffs the "Park and Boulevard Maintenance Taxes"; they having paid all the other taxes assessed against these properties. A temporary injunction was issued at the institution of the suit, but on final hearing the injunction was dissolved, and the plaintiffs' bill dismissed, from which decree the plaintiffs appealed.

The suit is founded on the theory that the special taxes in question were invalid, and that theory involves the question of the validity of the city ordinance under which the assessment was made, and of the charter provision under which the common council acted in passing the ordinance. Kansas City is organized under a special charter, adopted in 1889, pursuant to sections 16, 17, art. 9, of the Constitution of 1875 (Ann. St. 1906, pp. 265, 266). By an amendment, adopted in 1893, what is now article 10, was added to the charter. That article provides for the establishment of a board of park commissioners, "to devise and adopt a system of public parks, parkways and boulevards," and to have general charge of the same. By its terms all the territory then in the city was divided into three park districts, one of which, designated as "West Park District," embraces the city lots of the plaintiffs in this suit. The area embraced in that district is about 3 miles in length by 1¼ to 1½ miles in width, including lots devoted to residences, and lots devoted to all kinds of business and other purposes which are naturally to be expected in a great and growing city like Kansas City, among which appellants call especial attention to lots owned and occupied for church purposes, lots owned by the city for fire engine houses, waterworks, etc., and also a large number of lots owned and occupied by railroad companies for their rights of way and other railroad purposes. This article 10 provides how land may be selected, the procedure for acquiring the same, and the assessment of benefits on the real estate in the district for the purpose of obtaining the money needed to pay for the land taken, the constructing, improving, and maintaining the parks, parkways, boulevards, etc. The particular part of that article which commands our attention in this case is section 33, which is as follows: "The real estate, exclusive of improvements thereon, in each park district may, upon recommendation of the board of park commissioners, be assessed annually for maintaining, adorning, constructing, repairing and otherwise improving the park or parks, parkways, road or roads, boulevard or boulevards, avenue or avenues, or portions thereof,...