Corrigan v. Pironi

• Decision Date: 17 November 1891
• Citation: 23 A. 355,48 N.J.E. 607
• Parties: CORRIGAN v. PIRONI.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

23 A. 355

48 N.J.E. 607

CORRIGAN

v. PIRONI.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Nov. 17, 1891.

Appeal from court of chancery; Pitney, Vice-Chancellor.

Bill in chancery by Mary Pironi against Patrick Corrigan. Decree for complainant. Defendant appeals. Reversed in part.

William E. Skinner and Theodore Runyon, for appellant.

William M. Johnson, for respondent.

BEASLEY, C.J. This bill was exhibited by Mary Pironi. the respondent, to set aside a conveyance of land made by her to the appellant, Patrick Corrigan. The equity alleged is that the complainant's husband treated her cruelly, and, being desirous of a separation, she applied to the appellant, who is a Catholic priest, to effect that purpose; that he finally proposed to her that he would bring about such separation if she would convey to him her real property, subject to her use for life, and that assenting to this proposition she made the conveyance in question; that at the time of its execution the appellant produced a roll of bills which he offered her, but before she understood what it was, and without any explanation, he quickly took the bills again into his possession; that she has been informed that the appellant claims to have paid her, at the time referred to, the sum of $1,000, which is the consideration mentioned in the deed, but she denies that she received that or any other sum, and affirms that the roll of bills shown to her was intended as an apparent, but unreal, consideration of the conveyance, that the appellant failed to fulfill his promise to rid her of her husband. The answer, to state it in brief, denies that the procurement of a separation between the respondent and her husband was the consideration of the conveyance; and alleges that she had previously devised this property to him, and that, having destroyed the will, she put her original purpose in the form of the conveyance adopted, which passed a remainder to him in fee, limited on an estate for life in herself; and that he paid her, at the time of the transaction, the sum of $1,000. On these pleadings, in connection with the proofs, his honor, the vice-chancellor, decided against the appellant the two points constituent of the litigation, namely, that the conveyance should be vacated, and that the appellant had not paid the $1,000 in dispute.

This decree, so far as it relates to the cancellation of this deed, we think cannot be disturbed. After a careful examination of the facts in proof, it appears clear to me that the appellant's version in this respect of this transaction is the correct one. He had a right to believe, as he says he did, that his undertaking to do what he could to prevent the husband of the respondent from longer molesting her was no part of the consideration of the conveyance of this property. She had antecedently made a will in his favor, giving him her entire estate; and not being satisfied, for some reason that does not appear, with this instrument, she had destroyed it, and thereupon proposed to bestow upon him these lands as a gift; and that in view of such proffered benefaction he voluntarily promised to give her $1,000, to be applied in the renovation or improvement of the premises thus to be donated. This is the reverse in which the appellant asserts that he understood the affair, and, as has been said, the circumstances fully justified such construction. But, while this conclusion is an absolute justification of the moral rectitude of the appellant in this business, it does not follow that it is a vindication of its legality. The respondent was in point of religion a Roman Catholic, and the appellant a priest of that order, the consequence being that a relationship existed between them which in a legal point of view is deemed confidential. In the presence of such a spiritual ascendancy, all gifts or benefactions from the subject of such an influence to the possessor of it have been frequently avoided on grounds of public policy, and without any suspicion that fraud or imposition of any kind had been practiced. Such a situation in itself naturally suggests the idea of a donor possessed with a general purpose, without thought or self-guidance as to the mode of its execution, and ready to adopt without hesitation any suggestion on the subject. In such a pretense of thought, it is incumbent on the donee to show, not only that his own conduct has been fair and wholly unobjectionable, as has been shown in the case, but to show, further, that the donor has not acted from the induence of an implicit confidence, rather than from the exercise of her own reason. It cannot be said that in the present instance such an exposition has been made by the appellant. This donor was between 70 and 80 years of age. She was ignorant, eccentric, and entirely illiterate, for she could neither read nor write. The first suggestion of making this conveyance occurred in a private conversation between herself and her donee, no one else being present. Her instructions to draw the necessary instruments were conveyed to his own...