Corron v. Corron

• Citation: 531 N.E.2d 708,40 Ohio St.3d 75
• Decision Date: 14 December 1988
• Docket Number: No. 88-548,88-548
• Parties: CORRON et al., Appellants, v. CORRON et al., Appellees.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio

Page 75

40 Ohio St.3d 75

531 N.E.2d 708

CORRON et al., Appellants, v. CORRON et al., Appellees.

No. 88-548.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Sept. 28, 1988.

Decided Dec. 14, 1988.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Proceedings in probate court are restricted to those actions permitted by statute and by the Constitution, since the probate court is a court of limited jurisdiction. Schucker v. Metcalf [ 1986], 22 Ohio St.3d 33, 22 OBR 27, 488 N.E.2d 210, followed.)

2. A will is ambulatory in nature, and until the death of the testator, and until the law admits such instrument to probate, it gives no accrued rights to the potential takers of benefit.

3. R.C. 2107.71 through 2107.77 are the exclusive sections under which a will contest may be brought in the probate court.

George W. Corron died on August 3, 1984. He had executed a will on January 8, 1982, which was admitted to probate on August 24, 1984. George's second wife and surviving spouse, Evelyn M. Corron, was appointed executrix of the will on August 27, 1984. In December 1984, plaintiffs-appellants, Barbara A. Thomas and Eugene R. Corron, the natural children of the testator, filed a will contest action in the Probate Court of Hancock County. The complaint alleged that the January 8, 1982 will (hereinafter "second will") executed by George Corron was obtained by undue influence, fraud or duress. The principal defendants to the suit are the testator's surviving spouse, Evelyn Corron; her son-in-law, Blair E. Breece; and Evelyn's grandson, Mark W. Clymer.

In 1985, plaintiffs were granted leave to amend the complaint to add two new claims for relief. Plaintiffs' second claim for relief alleged that George Corron had executed a will in May 1980, and a codicil to the 1980 will in November 1981. The codicil was executed in order to address certain tax issues, but made no substantive changes in the devisees of the will. Plaintiffs argue that this 1980 will was also obtained by undue influence, fraud or duress and accordingly requested that the 1980 will be declared invalid along with the 1982 will. Plaintiffs' third claim for relief challenged the validity of certain inter vivos transfers executed by George between May 1980 and January 1982. In separate transactions, George deeded to Evelyn 43.15 acres of land and an undivided one-half interest in nine other parcels of land totaling over seven hundred acres. The third inter vivos transaction gave Blair Breece and Mark Clymer an option to purchase an undivided one-half interest in George's breeding stock and equipment. In January 1982, Blair and Mark exercised their purchase option.

The devises in the 1980 and 1982 wills are similar. George gave Evelyn, for her life, all rights, title and interest in any real property he had retained and coupled the devises with a general or special power of appointment over said property. Both wills provide for the manner of distribution of each parcel of real property in the event Evelyn failed to exercise her power of appointment. In that event, either Mark Clymer or Blair Breece was to receive title to particular parcels, subject to making a number of payments to certain stepchildren, stepgrandchildren, and to either or both plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs requested that the probate court exercise jurisdiction over claims two and three pursuant to R.C. 2721.05 and 2721.03 of the Declaratory Judgments Act, R.C. 2101.24 (jurisdiction of the probate court), and Civ.R. 18 (joinder of claims and remedies). Their argument is that because all three claims are based on the same transactions, include the same parties, and allege undue influence, fraud or duress, it is proper for the probate court to consider all three matters in one proceeding. Upon motion by defendants, the probate court dismissed plaintiffs' second and third claims for relief, finding that it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of these claims. The Court of Appeals for Hancock County affirmed, holding that plaintiffs have no standing to contest the inter vivos transfers since, even if such challenge were successful, the property in question would not pass to plaintiffs under the will. The appellate court further held that the probate court does not have jurisdiction to consider the terms of a will not admitted to probate.

The cause is before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Kolb, Kolb & Kolb and Richard Kolb, Toledo, for appellant Eugene R. Corron.

Weasel & Brimley and John Kostyo, Findlay, for appellant Barbara A. Thomas.

William B. Balyeat Co., L.P.A., William B. Balyeat, Lima, and Robert B. Weaver, Leipsic, for appellees.

MOYER, Chief Justice.

The issue presented by this appeal is whether the probate court has jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment regarding the validity of a will not admitted to probate and the legal status of certain inter vivos transfers by the testator of property unrelated to the administration of the estate.

It is well-settled that proceedings in probate court are restricted to those actions permitted by statute and by the Constitution, since the probate court is a court of limited jurisdiction. Schucker v. Metcalf (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 33, 22 OBR 27, 488 N.E.2d 210; Alexander v. Compton (1978), 57 Ohio App.2d 89, 11 O.O.3d 81, 385 N.E.2d 638. The statute granting that jurisdiction is R.C. 2101.24(C):

"The probate court has plenary power at law and in equity to dispose fully of any matter that is properly before the court, unless the power is expressly otherwise limited or denied by statute."

Those matters that may be properly placed before the court are enumerated and limited in scope by R.C. 2101.24(A) to (P), now (A)(1) to (18), amended in March 1986. Here, the matter placed before the court was the 1982 will which was admitted for probate and which became the subject of a will contest action. The probate court has jurisdiction to consider matters relating to the administration of George Corron's estate and to determine the validity of that will admitted for probate.

We must also consider the statutory provisions authorizing declaratory judgments. R.C. 2721.03 provides:

"Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writing constituting a contract, or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a constitutional provision, statute, rule as defined in section 119.01 of the Revised Code * * * may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under such instrument * * * and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.

"The testator of a will may have the validity of the will determined at any time during his lifetime pursuant to sections 2107.081 to 2107.085 of the Revised Code."

R.C. 2721.05 provides for the determination of rights or legal relations as follows:

"Any person interested as or through an executor, administrator, trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary, creditor, devisee, legatee, heir, next of kin, or cestui que trust, in the administration of a trust, or of the estate of a decedent * * * may have a declaration of rights or legal relations in respect thereto in any of the following cases:

" * * *

"(C) To determine any question arising in the administration of the estate or trust, including questions of construction of wills and other writings."

R.C. 2107.081 provides for the filing of a petition for a judgment declaring the validity of a will:

"(A) A person who executes a will allegedly in conformity with the laws of this state may petition the probate court of the county in which he is domiciled * * * for a judgment declaring the validity of the will. * * * "

These three statutes, taken together, provide a method for a person, still living, to have the validity of his or her own testamentary instruments considered by the probate court. In addition, other written instruments potentially affecting the rights and property that are the subject of an estate or trust administration may also be considered. There are two crucial factors in these provisions limiting the persons who may be parties in, and the instruments that may be considered by, the probate court.

First, according to the plain language of R.C. 2107.081(A), only the testator himself may have a judgment rendered as to the validity of his will. Because such a will would not yet have been admitted to probate, persons who are potential beneficiaries or heirs at law have no actionable interest in the document. A will is ambulatory in nature, and until the death of the testator, and until the law admits such instrument to probate, it gives no accrued rights...