Corry v. Commissioned Officers' Mess (Open)

• Decision Date: 15 June 1951
• Docket Number: No. 2032,2032
• Parties: CORRY v. COMMISSIONED OFFICERS' MESS (OPEN). Eq.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 689

81 A.2d 689

78 R.I. 264

CORRY v. COMMISSIONED OFFICERS' MESS (OPEN).

Eq. No. 2032.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

June 15, 1951.

Matthew J. Faerber, Newport, for petitioner.

Hinckley, Allen, Salisbury & Parsons, S. Everett Wilkins, Jr., and Thomas J. Hogan, all of Providence, for respondent.

CAPOTOSTO, J.

This is an employee's appeal from a decree of the superior court denying her original petition for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act, General Laws 1938, chapter 300.

The facts in this case are undisputed. Petitioner was employed as a receptionist at the Commissioned Officers' Mess (Open), hereinafter called the club, at the Quonset Naval Air Station in this state. It is clear that in the course of her employment petitioner was permitted to go to any part of the premises, if necessary. Shortly after starting her work on the morning of August 5, 1948 she went to the ladies' room on the second floor of the club and then, not 'feeling too good that day,' she walked out onto a nearby terrace believing that if she 'got a little bit of fresh air' she would feel better. The outer edge of the terrace had a railing 35 inches high, beyond which there was a drop of over 40 feet to the ground below. The petitioner, who was described by the trial justice in his rescript as 'fairly tall,' was wearing shoes with heels about two and one-half inches high on that day. If she were standing against the railing it would reach a point approximately two thirds up on her thigh.

Petitioner, who was the only witness respecting the accident, testified that after standing for a few minutes near the center of the terrace she walked over to the railing but did not lean on it; that her mind then became blank; that she regained consciousness while she was 'in the middle of the air'; and that she landed on the ground below, suffering substantial injuries. She also positively denied that she was overcome by the heat of that day, or that she had taken any liquor, or that the occurrence was the result of any willful act on her part. The manager of the club testified that the door to the terrace was unlocked when the club was opened for business; that all employees were entitled to take rest periods both morning and afternoon at no set time; and that the terrace was a permissible and customary place for female employees to go during their rest periods.

Petitioner's appeal concerning the findings in paragraphs numbered 7 and 8 of the decree raises the question of law in this case. In those paragraphs the trial justice in effect found the fall to be an accident, but he denied compensation because in his judgment her injuries did not arise out of and in the course of employment. In view of such finding it is important to note here that, as only the employee appealed from the decree, the employer in the circumstances is now precluded from claiming that there was no accident within the purview of the act on August 5, 1948.

The controlling issue presently before us therefore is whether there was causal connection between petitioner's accidental injury and her employment. It is now generally so well settled as to require no citation of authorities that an employee is not entitled to compensation if the injury was caused by an untoward happening in no way connected with the employment. While the clear purpose of the act is to relieve distress usually attendant upon injury to an employee by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, it is not the object of such legislation to provide health or accident insurance for every accident that might befall him. An employer is not an insurer. Hemphill Co. v. Provencher, 74 R.I. 173, 59 A.2d 540. Before an injured employee is entitled to the benefits of the act he must establish that the injury arose out of and in the course of the employment. The rules governing the determination of those issues are simple, but considerable difficulty is often encountered in applying them to the facts of a particular case. Such a situation confronts us in the case at bar.

Respondent first contends that since there was legal evidence to support the findings in question we are precluded from disturbing them in the absence of fraud. In urging that contention respondent apparently overlooked the cases of Lupoli v. Atlantic Tubing Co., 43 R.I. 299, 111 A. 766, and Bacon v. United Electric Ry. Co., 51 R.I. 84, 150 A. 818, 69 A.L.R. 544. The Lupoli case holds that where the only question before the superior court is as to the legal effect of certain admitted facts the question is one of law, which is subject to review on appeal. The Bacon case is to the same effect. Those cases are controlling in the case at bar. Here we are not dealing with a finding of fact but with the legal effect of uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence not inherently improbable as to whether petitioner's injury arose out of and in the course of employment within the meaning of the statute. The contention under consideration is therefore without merit.

Respondent next contends that the real cause of petitioner's injury was a fainting spell or other idiopathic condition, and also that the accident did not happen in the course of her employment. The rescript of the trial justice sets forth no reasons for his decision. Following a brief recital of the undisputed facts and citing Nowicki v. Byrne, 73 R.I. 89, 92, 54 A.2d 7, he expressed himself as follows: 'Assuming the fall to be an accident, we think the evidence fails to establish that any causal connection exists between the injury and petitioner's employment or the conditions under which it was required to be performed.'

The Nowicki case, which is entirely different in its facts from the instant case, was undoubtedly cited by the trial justice for the test therein approved and applied by which to determine whether an accident arises out of the employment. According to that test an accident arises out of the employment if it happens (1) within the period of employment; (2) at a place where the employee may reasonably be; and (3) while he is reasonably fulfilling the duties of the employment or doing something incidental thereto or to the conditions under which it is to be performed. In Connelly v. Samaritan Hospital, 259 N.Y. 137, at page 140, 181 N.E. 76, at page 77, it is stated that every risk, whether great or small, usual or extraordinary, is incident to the employment where some condition of the employment is 'a factor in the combination of circumstances out of which the accidental injury arose.'

Before the...