Cortez v. Ford Motor Co., UAW-CIO

• Decision Date: 31 July 1957
• Docket Number: No. 600,No. 61,UAW-CIO,600,61
• Citation: 349 Mich. 108,84 N.W.2d 523
• Parties: Beatrice E. CORTEZ, Freda Stinnette and Anne Cooper, as joint assigness of the individuals named in Paragraph 1 of the Declaration, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware corporation; International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Workers of America, Affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (), a voluntary unincorporated association; Ford Local(), a voluntary unincorporated association; and Archie Acciacca, jointly and severally, Defendants and Appellees.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 523

84 N.W.2d 523

349 Mich. 108

Beatrice E. CORTEZ, Freda Stinnette and Anne Cooper, as joint assigness of the individuals named in Paragraph 1 of the Declaration Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware corporation; International Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Workers of America, Affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations (UAW-CIO), a voluntary unincorporated association; Ford Local No. 600 (UAW-CIO), a voluntary unincorporated association; and Archie Acciacca, jointly and severally, Defendants and Appellees.

No. 61.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

July 31, 1957.

Dee Edwards and A. Albert Sugar, Detroit, for plaintiffs-appellants.

William T. Gossett, Dearborn, for Ford Motor Co., appellee.

Richard B. Darragh and Joseph A. O'Reilly, Dearborn, of counsel.

Harold A. Cranefield, Kurt L. Hanslowe and Redmond H. Roche, Jr., Detroit, for defendants, appellees and cross-appellants.

Before the Entire Bench, except BOYLES, J.

EDWARDS, Justice.

The issues involved herein are of increasing importance to labor, to management, and to millions of individuals whose jobs are governed by seniority provisions in various collective bargaining contracts.

The term 'seniority' as used in this case may be defined as a system for the laying off and rehiring of employees, based generally upon original date of employment by the company concerned. It is a concept of job protection unknown to the common law and founded upon no statute law in this State.

Indeed in the period preceding the advent of the union-management contract, employers had the unqualified legal right to lay off or discharge any employee without any regard to original date of hire. Even today, in the absence of contract, or, much more rarely, specific statute, the only legal restriction upon such unqualified rights in found in the unfair labor practice provisions of the National Labor Relations Act and its counterparts in the several States. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158; C.L.1948, § 423.8, C.L.S.1954, § 423.16 (Stat.Ann.1950 Rev. §§ 17.454, 17.454). See Annotations 'Seniority Rights-Disputes as to-Jurisdiction', 142 A.L.R. 1055.

Since the development of collective bargaining agreements as a method of bringing order out of the chaos of industrial disputes, a good deal of case law dealing with seniority has developed. These cases universally hold that seniority rights, being generally the creation of the union-management contracts wherein they are described, may be enforced only in accordance with the terms of such contracts. Ryan v. New York Central R. Co., 267 Mich. 202, 255 N.W. 365; Hartley v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station Employees, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N.W. 885; Zdero v. Briggs Manfg. Co., 338 Mich. 549, 61 N.W.2d 615; Emmons v. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 340 Mich. 368, 65 N.W.2d 736; Elder v. New York Central R. Co., 6 Cir., 152 F.2d 361.

The cases likewise illustrate a notable reluctance on the part of the courts to assume the role of umpire in industrial disputes, particularly when adequate machinery exists within the industry for such purpose. Emmons v. Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, supra; Slocum v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. Co., 339 U.S. 239, 70 S.Ct. 577, 94 L.Ed. 795.

Our instant proceeding comes to us by appeal from the dismissal of plaintiffs' declaration on defendants' motions by a judge of the Wayne county circuit court. We of course, accept as true for our review all well-pleaded facts in plaintiffs' declaration. General Motors Corporation v. Attorney General, 294 Mich. 558, 293 N.W. 751, 130 A.L.R. 429; Zdero v. Briggs Manfg. Co., supra.

Plaintiffs are 3 women who sue in their own right and as joint assignees of 105 women employees of the Ford Motor Company. All were employed, at the time of origin of this dispute, in Ford's Dearborn stamping plant. The defendants are the Ford Motor Company, the International Union UAW-CIO, the Ford Local 600 of said union, and an individual, Archie Acciacca, the president of the Dearborn stamping unit of Ford Local 600. The individual defendant, the local union and the international union all join in their motion to dismiss, alleging identical grounds. For convenience, they will henceforth be referred to as the union, the defendant Ford Motor Company as the company, and the 108 women as the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs' declaration in its first count alleges that they were laid off from employment in the company's Dearborn stamping plant during the period from November, 1950, through November, 1951; that male employees of lesser seniority were retained in employment in that unit during the period of their layoffs; that they filed grievances with the union concerning their layoffs, but the union refused to process said grievances; that their layoffs and the refusal of the union to process their grievances violated the seniority and grievance provisions of the UAW-CIO-Ford Motor Company contract; that they are third-party beneficiaries of said contract; and that they are entitled to damages in the sum of $3,000,000. As a second count, plaintiffs allege a conspiracy between the various defendants to discriminate against them in these layoffs and claim similar damages therefor.

In their motions to dismiss the declaration, both company and union deny that any cause of action is stated in the assumpsit count. Further, they deny that the contract was violated, and they assert that plaintiffs have failed to make use of the grievance procedure set up by the contract. They also assert that no facts are alleged upon which the conspiracy count may be founded.

Plaintiff set forth in their brief what we assume to be their claimed well-pleaded facts as follows:

Allegation of Plaintiffs

(other than formal)

'Employment by defendant Company.

'Existence of collective agreement of 9/28/49 and 3/16/50 as amended 9/4/50.

'That plaintiffs are 3rd party beneficiaries.

'That representation of employees, under the contract, is on a 'Unit' basis and plaintffs were represented by Dearborn Stamping Unit.

'That Local Union has no power to modify, amend or interpret.

'That a seniority system based on units, occupational groups and a general labor pool, etc., was created by the contract, to govern layoffs, rehiring and transfers.

'That contract forbids discrimination on account of sex, etc.

'That during the period of Nov. 1950 to Nov. 1951 plaintiffs were laid off and not recalled in breach of their contractual rights of seniority and not to be discriminated against on account of sex; and, further, the Company hired new male employees on jobs to which plaintiffs were entitled, while they were laid off.

'That the layoffs were carried out pursuant to an agreement between Def. Company, Local Union 600 and Archie Acciacca as President of the Dearborn Stamping Unit to give men preference to jobs held by women and in derogation of their rights thereunder; and that it was part of the agreement that defendant Local Union and Acciacca would refuse to file grievances arising out of such layoffs.

'Refer to grievance procedure and allege plaintiffs filed grievance with district committeeman, other officers of the Unit, Acciacca and the Local Union, but that these Union representatives refused to file these grievances with the Company because of the existence of the agreement heretofore referred to; that an appeal was taken to the International Union which ruled plaintiffs' layoff illegal and in violation of the seniority provisions of the contract, but did not file a grievance for reinstatement or back pay.

'That plaintiffs were not recalled to work for many months, and some were never recalled and allege loss.

'Count II:

'That defendants Local Union and Acciacca entered into an agreement with defendant Company to permit the layoff of plaintiffs-appellants in breach of their rights under the collective agreement and to refrain from processing grievances arising from such breach, all contrary to their duty as collective bargaining representatives and under the provisions of the Union constitution; that the defendant Company induced defendants Local Union and Acciacca to breach and violate their duties.'

The setting for this litigation is given in the company's description of the nature of the work performed in the Dearborn stamping unit (which plaintiffs, in their reply, admit generally, through they allege that there are many jobs in said unit which females could legally fill, to which plaintiffs were entitled, et cetera):

'That the Dearborn stamping is primarily a heavy stamping plant, producing large body panels, floor pans, fenders, deck lids, roof tops, doors, side assemblies, hoods, etc., which weigh in excess of the 35 lbs. maximum permissible for female employees under the Michigan statute and regulations. Most of the jobs in this plant involve handling of these various heavy objects in and out of the presses, handling of gun welders, loading or lifting of stock, hanging stock on overhead conveyors, etc., and are entirely unsuitable for the restricted physical capacity and ability of female employees.'

To these facts should be added provisions of the contract which is in evidence by stipulation and upon which the parties rely. Twenty-seven pages of the agreement deal with seniority. The most pertinent sections appear to be:

Section 8(b) of article 8:

'The order of layoff and recall shall be governed by first, seniority of employment, and second, ability. The company shall consult with the union before deviating from strict seniority except where prior consultation is rendered impracticable because of a sudden interruption or resumption of work. Should there by any dispute involving the application of this clause, it shall be subject to determination through the grievance procedure.'

Section 26 of article 8:

'In the event of a reduction in force other than...