Cortez v. Martinez

• Decision Date: 23 September 1968
• Docket Number: No. 8572,8572
• Citation: 79 N.M. 506,1968 NMSC 153,445 P.2d 383
• Parties: Bonifacia CORTEZ, Administratrix of the Estate of Eddie Raymond Cortez, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Francis MARTINEZ and Luis Martinez Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court

Page 383

445 P.2d 383

79 N.M. 506

Bonifacia CORTEZ, Administratrix of the Estate of Eddie Raymond Cortez, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Francis MARTINEZ and Luis Martinez Defendants-Appellees.

No. 8572.

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Sept. 23, 1968.

[79 NM 506] Stanley, Kegel & Campos, Frank P. Dickson, Jr., Santa Fe, Chacon & Melendez, Espanola, for appellant.

Civerolo, Cushing & Hansen, Albuquerque, for appellees.

OPINION

MOISE, Justice.

The action is one for wrongful death of plaintiff-appellant's decedent resulting from the alleged negligent operation of an automobile by defendant-appellee Francis Martinez. It is claimed by plaintiff that defendant-appellee Luis Martinez, father of Francis, was the owner of the car and that, at the time of the accident, it was being operated for family purposes. This is denied by defendants.

By deposition it was established that Francis Martinez was driving the automobile in question at approximately 45 miles per hour on wet pavement when it suddenly swerved, or 'fish-tailed,' went out of control, hit the embankment, and was wrecked. In addition to the driver, plaintiff's decedent, who died allegedly as a result of injuries sustained, and another boy were in the front seat of the car and three girls were in the back seat. They were out for a joy ride.

Defendants sought summary judgment on the grounds the driver of the automobile, Francis Martinez, was its owner and no allegations of gross negligence were asserted. By its order the court granted summary judgment and found that the automobile was owned by Francis Martinez, and that he was protected by the guest statute (§ 64--24--1, N.M.S.A. 1953).

Plaintiff appeals and advances two grounds for reversal. Her second point, which we will dispose of first, claims that § 64--24--1, supra, being the guest statute, is unconstitutional and void because it is violative of Art. II, § 18, of the New Mexico Constitution and of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The argument arises because in our decision in Gallegos v. Wallace, 74 N.M. 760, 398 P.2d 982 (1965), the statute was held to protect owner-operators but not to apply to non-owner operators. In Lewis v. Knott, 75 N.M. 422, 405 P.2d 662 (1965), we went a step further and held the owner was protected in a situation where he was not an operator. See also, Lopez v. Barreras, 77 N.M. 52, 419 P.2d 251 (1966). Appellant argues here that application of one standard of care to owners and another to non-owners is arbitrary and unreasonable and, although classification is constitutionally permissible, an unconstitutional classification results if not based on pertinent and real differences, as distinguished from artificial ones. See, Community Public Service Co. v. New Mexico Public Service Commission, 76 N.M. 314, 414 P.2d 675 (1966); Burch v. Foy, 62 N.M. 219, 308 P.2d 199 (1957); State v. Sunset Ditch Co., 48 N.M. 17, 145 P.2d 219 (1944); State v. Pate, 47 N.M. 182, 138 P.2d 1006 (1943).

The arguments advanced are identical with those considered in Romero v. Tilton, 78 N.M. 696, 437 P.2d 157 (Ct.App.1967), cert. denied, January 31, 1968, and there answered completely. No useful purpose would be served by our attempting to repeat or amplify what was there said. The point is ruled against appellant.

Appellant's first point asserts that the court erred in holding as a matter of law that the driver, Francis, was the owner of the car. An affidavit of the Assistant Title and Registration Co-Ordinator of the Department of Motor Vehicles, to which was attached a certificate of title on the car involved in the accident, was before the court when it considered defendants' motion. The certificate shows 'Luis C. Martinez,' the father, to be the registered owner. Appellees presented testimony by deposition to the effect that although Luis Martinez was the registered owner, Francis was in fact the owner of the car. Section 64--3--10, N.M.S.A. 1953, reads:

'A certificate of title issued by the division shall be received in evidence as prima facie evidence of the ownership of the vehicle named in the certificate and as prima facie evidence of all liens and encumbrances against said vehicle appearing on the certificate.'

It is appellant's position that since by statute the certificate is made prima facie evidence of the ownership of a vehicle, she had carried her burden when she presented it, and that the evidence of contrary facts merely had the effect of presenting a jury question as to who was in fact the owner, and that a jury question being present on this material issue it was error to grant summary judgment. That summary judgment may not be granted where there is an unresolved material issue of fact cannot be doubted. See Barela v. Lopez, 73 N.M. 121, 385 P.2d 975 (1963); Buffington v. Continental Casualty Co., 69 N.M. 365, 367 P.2d 539 (1961).

Appellees argue for a rule that would limit the prima facie character of certificates of title to disputes between opposing claims of ownership which they assert is the purpose and intent of ch. 138, N.M.S.L. 1953, of which § 64--3--10, supra, is a part (§ 49). We cannot agree that the section is intended to have this limited application. By its terms it is not so restricted. The legislation provides for certificates of title and states that they shall be prima facie evidence of ownership. When ownership is an issue, whether between opposing claimants of title or in a situation such as is here present, we see no reason for denying the certificate the effect clearly directed by the legislature. It was error for the court to disregard the certificate and grant summary judgment. An issue of fact on the question of...