Cortez v. Mun. Officers Electoral Bd. for Calumet City

• Decision Date: 25 February 2013
• Docket Number: Docket No. 1–13–0442.
• Citation: 369 Ill.Dec. 376,986 N.E.2d 689,2013 IL App (1st) 130442
• Parties: Rita H. CORTEZ, Patricia Twymon, Anthony Smith, Reginald Whitley, Wilbur Tilman, DeJuan Gardner, RaMonde Williams, Tyhani Hill, and Larry Caballero, Plaintiffs–Appellees, v. The MUNICIPAL OFFICERS ELECTORAL BOARD FOR the CITY OF CALUMET CITY, Adolf Aguilar, Randy Barron, Betty Boles, Joseph L. Castellanos, Guy Eveland, Robert Fredricksen, Stevon Grant, Deborah Haynes–Shegog, Cassandra Holbert, Bernice M. McClendon, Salimah Muhammad, Annie M. Smith, and Carrie Spaulding, Defendants–Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2013 IL App (1st) 130442

986 N.E.2d 689

369 Ill.Dec. 376

Rita H. CORTEZ, Patricia Twymon, Anthony Smith, Reginald Whitley, Wilbur Tilman, DeJuan Gardner, RaMonde Williams, Tyhani Hill, and Larry Caballero, Plaintiffs–Appellees,

v.The MUNICIPAL OFFICERS ELECTORAL BOARD FOR the CITY OF CALUMET CITY, Adolf Aguilar, Randy Barron, Betty Boles, Joseph L. Castellanos, Guy Eveland, Robert Fredricksen, Stevon Grant, Deborah Haynes–Shegog, Cassandra Holbert, Bernice M. McClendon, Salimah Muhammad, Annie M. Smith, and Carrie Spaulding, Defendants–Appellants.

Docket No. 1–13–0442.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Sixth Division.

Feb. 25, 2013.

James P. Nally, of Chicago, for appellants.

John J. Jawor, of Jawor Law Firm PC, of Bolingbrook, for appellees.

OPINION

Justice GORDON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

[369 Ill.Dec. 377]¶ 1 In the case at bar, the defendant, Municipal Officers Electoral Board for the City of Calumet City (the Board), was persuaded by certain objections made to the nominating papers of nine Democratic candidates for various offices in Calumet City; and, thus, the Board ruled that the candidates' names could not be placed on the ballot for the February 26, 2013, consolidated primary election. The circuit court of Cook County reversed the Board's order, and the Board now appeals to us. This appeal concerns the candidacy of the following nine candidates: Rita Cortez, Patricia Twymon, Anthony Smith, Reginald Whitley, Wilbur Tilman, DeJuan Gardner, RaMonde Williams, Tyhani Hill, and Larry Caballero. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the Board's decision with respect to the first eight candidates and, thus, find that their names may remain on the ballot. However, we affirm the Board's decision with respect to Larry Caballero and, thus, find that his name may not remain on the ballot.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 I. Facts Relating to All Nine Candidates

¶ 4 An objection common to the nominating papers of all nine candidates was that the words in the notarization, “who is to me personally known,” were omitted on the candidates' “Statement of Candidacy.”

¶ 5 Section 7–10 of the Election Code provides that the notarization on this statement “shall be in substantially the following form:”

“Subscribed and sworn to (or affirmed) before me by ... who is to me personally known, on (insert date).” (Ellipsis and parentheses in original.) 10 ILCS 5/7–10 (West 2010).

¶ 6 In contrast, the notarization on the statements of these nine candidates stated only: “Signed and sworn to (or affirmed) by * * * before me, on * * *.” The Board sustained this objection with respect to all nine candidates.

¶ 7 II. Facts Relating Only to Caballero

¶ 8 The objections which pertained only to candidate Larry Caballero concerned his “Statement of Economic Interests.” Caballero was required to file a “Statement of Economic Interests” that would have provided information on his dealings with Calumet City. Instead, he completed a “Statement of Economic Interests” that was designed to provide information on his dealings with a different government entity, namely, the State of Illinois.

¶ 9 Our state statute requires candidates for office to provide a “Statement of Economic Interest.” There is one form for candidates for statewide office which poses questions pertaining to the State of Illinois (5 ILCS 420/4A–103 (West 2010)); and there is a different form for candidates for local office which asks questions pertaining to the local unit of government at issue (5 ILCS 420/4A–104 (West 2010)) which, in the case at bar, was Calumet City. As will be discussed later, there are substantial differences between the two forms.

¶ 10 For whatever reason, whether inadvertence or deliberate intent, Caballero chose to file the form for statewide candidates which asked questions about his connections with the State of Illinois. Thus, he was never faced with the questions about his connections to Calumet City. On the form that he did file, he answered “N/A” or “not applicable” to every question.

¶ 11 As a result, there was an objection made that Caballero failed to file a “Statement of Economic Interests” as required by law. An additional objection was made that he failed to file a receipt for the filing of the “Statement of Economic Interests” with the Cook County clerk by the end of the filing period. The Board sustained these objections and found his nominating paper to be invalid in its entirety.

¶ 12 ANALYSIS

¶ 13 I. Standard of Review

¶ 14 Where an administrative board's decision has been reviewed by the circuit court, the appellate court reviews the decision of the electoral board rather than the decision of the circuit court. Pascente v. County Officers Electoral Board, 373 Ill.App.3d 871, 873, 311 Ill.Dec. 789, 869 N.E.2d 802 (2007); Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill.2d 200, 210, 319 Ill.Dec. 887, 886 N.E.2d 1011 (2008). When the dispute is over the interpretation of a statute, as it is in this case, then the question is purely one of law and our standard of review is de novo. Cinkus, 228 Ill.2d at 210, 319 Ill.Dec. 887, 886 N.E.2d 1011. See also Pascente, 373 Ill.App.3d at 873, 311 Ill.Dec. 789, 869 N.E.2d 802 (“The question of interpreting whether a candidate complied substantially with the Election Code is a question of law.”).

¶ 15 II. The Notarization

¶ 16 On this appeal, the appellants argue that the Election Code provides different notarization language for two different documents: (1) the petition document that candidates use to obtain signatures from voters; and (2) the “Statement of Candidacy.” 10 ILCS 5/7–10 (West 2010). The notarization for the petition states: “Subscribed to and sworn to before me on (insert date),” while the notarization for the “Statement of Candidacy” contains the following longer form: “Subscribed and sworn to (or affirmed) before me by ... who is to me personally known, on (insert date).” 10 ILCS 5/7–10 (West 2010). The appellants argue that the difference in language indicates a legislative intent to use the longer form on the “Statement of Candidacy.”

¶ 17 There is no dispute that these nine candidates used the short form, rather than the long form. There is also no dispute that the statute provides that the long form should be used on the “Statement of Candidacy.” The only dispute is whether the legislature intended the striking of the candidates' names from the ballot to be the appropriate sanction for a mistake in the use of the wrong notarization form.

¶ 18 “The primary objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the legislature.” Lacey v. Village of Palatine, 232 Ill.2d 349, 361, 328 Ill.Dec. 256, 904 N.E.2d 18 (2009). Each word, clause and sentence of the statute must be given reasonable meaning and not rendered superfluous. People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns, 203 Ill.2d 264, 280, 271 Ill.Dec. 881, 786 N.E.2d 139 (2003).

¶ 19 First, the statute does not affirmatively state that the sanction for a discrepancy in language is the striking of the entire candidacy. Second, and most importantly, the statute does state that the “Statement of Candidacy” has to be only “in substantially the following form.” 10 ILCS 5/7–10 (West 2010). See O'Connor v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board, 281 Ill.App.3d 1108, 1113, 217 Ill.Dec. 583, 667 N.E.2d 672 (1996) (“If the legislature had intended to require that the nominating petition be in the exact form as set out in section 7–10, it would not have used the word ‘substantially.’ ” (Emphasis in original.)).

¶ 20 The appellants argue that the doctrine of substantial compliance should not apply where the legislature has specifically provided for different language for one form, as opposed to another form. However, it will almost always be the case that one form says something different than another form; otherwise, it would provide only one form. Also, and more importantly, the statute simply does not state what appellants argue. The statute does not state, as appellants would have us read it, that the bulk of the form must “be in substantially the following form,” but when it comes to the notarization part, that must be exact and without any deviation, or the whole candidacy would be improper. Samuelson v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board, 2012 IL App (1st) 120581, ¶¶ 27, 29, 360 Ill.Dec. 658, 969 N.E.2d 468 (Justice Joseph Gordon rejected this same argument and held that the phrase “ ‘in substantially the following form’ ” “applies to all, not some, of that section's requirements”).

¶ 21 Appellants cite Bowe v. Chicago Electoral Board, 79 Ill.2d 469, 38 Ill.Dec. 756, 404 N.E.2d 180 (1980) ( per curiam), for the proposition that the doctrine of substantial compliance does not apply when the legislature sets forth a “different, significant” notarization form. First, as we have stated before, “we do not interpret Bowe as rejecting the doctrine of substantial compliance. Rather, in Bowe, there was no substantial compliance, as a matter of fact. Thus there was no compliance.” (Emphases in original and omitted.) Bergman v. Vachata, 347 Ill.App.3d 339, 346, 282 Ill.Dec. 934, 807 N.E.2d 558 (2004). Second, the notarization form at issue in Bowe was not a “different” form, but rather the “standard” form that the plaintiffs here actually used. In Bowe, the document at issue was the petition document that candidates use to obtain signatures from voters, and the notarization required for that petition uses the short form: Subscribed to and sworn to before me on (insert date). See Bowe, 79 Ill.2d at 470, 38 Ill.Dec. 756, 404 N.E.2d 180 (citing Ill.Rev.Stat.1977, ch. 46, ¶ 7–10). In Bowe, “the undisputed evidence” ( Bowe, 79 Ill.2d at 470, 38 Ill.Dec. 756, 404 N.E.2d 180) showed that a person who had circulated petitions had not personally appeared before the notary public. Thus, the issue in Bowe was not about a form, as it is in this case, but rather about an undisputed lack of...