Cortright v. Doyle

• Decision Date: 18 November 2008
• Docket Number: No. 1-07-1339.,1-07-1339.
• Parties: Margaret CORTRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jayne DOYLE, Carolyn Bailey, and Steven Minter, Defendants-Appellees (The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services and Rocco J. Claps, Director of the Department of Human Rights, an Agency of the State of Illinois, Defendants).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

898 N.E.2d 1153

Margaret CORTRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jayne DOYLE, Carolyn Bailey, and Steven Minter, Defendants-Appellees (The Illinois Department of Children and Family Services and Rocco J. Claps, Director of the Department of Human Rights, an Agency of the State of Illinois, Defendants).

No. 1-07-1339.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Second Division.

November 18, 2008.

Cantwell & Cantwell (Stephen F. Boulton and Michael J. Cronin, of counsel), Chicago, IL, for Appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney Gen., Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor Gen. (Paul Racette, of counsel), Chicago, IL, for Appellees.

Justice CUNNINGHAM delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Margaret Cortright appeals from the circuit court's November 21, 2006 order dismissing with prejudice her intentional tort claims (counts I, II, and III) and reaffirming the dismissal of her discrimination claims (counts IV, V and VI) under a previous ruling. Cortright v. Doyle, No. 01 L 02886 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co.). On appeal, the plaintiff alleged that: (1) the intentional tort claims were not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity; (2) the intentional tort claims were not preempted by the Illinois Human Rights Act (775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 1998)); (3) the defendants' actions were not subject to absolute immunity; and (4) she has adequately pleaded a claim for all of the intentional torts. For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Margaret Cortright suffers from a degenerative hearing condition called Meniere's disease and other related conditions of tinnitus and vertigo. Her symptoms include hearing loss, ringing in the ears and dizziness—all of which are exacerbated by stress but can be controlled with prescription medication and hearing aids. However, the prescription medication has a tendency to cause drowsiness.

The plaintiff was an employee of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) for over 20 years until her retirement in April 2001. From 1994 until her retirement, the plaintiff was a public service administrator at DCFS whose responsibilities included supervising 12 employees.

Defendants Jayne Doyle, Carolyn Bailey and Steven Minter (collectively the supervisors) worked at DCFS during the relevant periods of the plaintiff's tenure. In 1997, Doyle became the plaintiff's direct supervisor, and subsequently in 1998, Bailey and Minter also gained supervisory positions and authority over the plaintiff. The supervisors were aware of the plaintiff's medical conditions and the side effects of her medication.

The plaintiff had consistently received "Outstanding/Exceptional" ratings on her annual performance evaluations up until March 1998, when Doyle gave her a lesser rating of "Accomplished/Satisfactory" despite, allegedly, that the quality of the plaintiff's performance had remained the same. In April 1999, Minter rated the plaintiff's overall performance as "Unacceptable" and did not give any particular category a rating higher than "Acceptable"—ratings that were supposedly unprecedented in the plaintiff's evaluations during her approximately 20 years of service at DCFS. The overall rating of "Unacceptable" disqualified the plaintiff from receiving a raise at that time.

The plaintiff's most recently amended complaint alleged that beginning in 1998, the supervisors yelled at and demeaned the plaintiff both in private and in the presence of co-workers. They allegedly called her "stupid" or "stupidvisor" regularly and reprimanded the plaintiff for complaining of the perceived mistreatment. The plaintiff claimed that the supervisors falsely reprimanded her for incompetence, inability to understand management directives and inability to comprehend what was said at meetings. Allegedly, the supervisors set unreasonable task deadlines and chastised the plaintiff when she failed to meet them. Bailey also allegedly threatened the plaintiff with progressive discipline and accused her of having poor judgment. The supervisors issued formal reprimands and an eight-day suspension to her for sleeping at meetings, which the plaintiff denied doing. The complaint also stated that Doyle issued a memorandum to the plaintiff threatening further discipline and possible termination for her continued unacceptable job performance.

The stresses of these events allegedly caused emotional distress and further deterioration of the plaintiff's medical condition.

This case has a long and complicated procedural history. The plaintiff, acting pro se, attempted to file a charge of discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR) in 1998 which IDHR refused to accept. In 1999, the plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination and retaliation with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and subsequently received a notice of right to sue from the EEOC.

In January 2000, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Illinois court of claims against the supervisors and DCFS alleging age and disability discrimination. Cortright v. Department of Children & Family Services, No. 00 CC 2519. The court of claims dismissed the federal claims and claims against the supervisors in their individual capacities for want of jurisdiction in its February 2001 order. To the extent the claims were based on the Illinois Human Rights Act (Human Rights Act) (775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 1998)) and the public official immunity defense, the court of claims allowed the claims to stand pending further oral argument. The court of claims decided these remaining issues in a later order dated May 10, 2001, which denied DCFS' motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and, instead, placed the claims against DCFS under "general continuance" on the ground that the plaintiff had not exhausted her remedies before the IDHR.

In March 2001, the plaintiff commenced this action against the supervisors in the circuit court of Cook County alleging disability discrimination under the Human Rights Act and Americans with Disability Act of 1990(ADA) (42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (2000)) (count I), age discrimination under the Human Rights Act and Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) (29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (2000)) (count II), defamation (count III), retaliatory practices (count IV) and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) (count V).

The plaintiff's first amended complaint, filed on May 24, 2001, added DCFS as a defendant and a mandamus claim against the IDHR director seeking an order for the director to accept the plaintiff's charge of discrimination (count VI). On January 25, 2002, the circuit court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's first amended complaint without prejudice stating that jurisdiction is proper in the court of claims. The mandamus claim (count VI) was then transferred to the chancery division of the circuit court for further consideration. The plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal of counts III and V of the first amended complaint on April 9, 2003, the hearing for which was continued until January 5, 2004, when the circuit court found it had jurisdiction over the supervisors. During this interim, the plaintiff filed a second amended complaint on July 23, 2003, adding another mandamus claim (count VII) against the IDHR director to compel him to accept the plaintiff's charges of discrimination as pertaining to a worksharing agreement between the EEOC and the IDHR.

A third amended complaint was filed on January 6, 2004, by the plaintiff in which she added an eighth claim—interference with prospective economic advantage and contractual relationship (count VIII)— against the supervisors and tried to point to the worksharing agreement between IDHR and EEOC to support her mandamus claim (count VII) against the IDHR director. The circuit court's order on November 21, 2005, dismissed, with prejudice, claims against the supervisors based on a lack of jurisdiction to hear the intentional tort claims.

The plaintiff attempted to address the items the court found deficient in the third amended complaint by filing a fourth amended complaint (complaint) in March 2006. No new parties or causes of action were added to the complaint. Instead, the plaintiff simply attached the plaintiff's job evaluations to the complaint and renumbered the counts.

The complaint alleged defamation (count I), IIED (count II) and interference with prospective economic advantage and contractual relationship (count III) against Doyle, Bailey and Minter. Disability discrimination (count IV), age discrimination (count V) and retaliation (count VI) against DCFS were alleged. The two mandamus claims (counts VII, VIII) against the IDHR director also remained.

The circuit court's final judgment on November 21, 2006, granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the intentional tort claims against the supervisors (counts I, II, III of the complaint), holding that the claims were barred by sovereign immunity and preempted by the Human Rights Act. It reaffirmed the dismissal of the disability discrimination, age discrimination and retaliation claims (counts IV, V and VI) under a previous ruling.

On April 17, 2007, the circuit court dismissed with prejudice the claims against IDHR and DCFS (counts VII and VIII) pursuant to settlement and that is not at issue in this appeal.

The plaintiff now appeals dismissal of counts I, II and III of the complaint.

ANALYSIS

This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal. We review de novo the circuit court's November 21, 2006 decision granting the defendants' motion to dismiss under section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2006)). Wolfe v. Wolf, 375 Ill.App.3d 702, 705, 314 Ill.Dec. 486, 874 N.E.2d 582, 584 (2007). A section 2-619 motion for involuntary dismissal asserts affirmative matters-such as defenses of preemption, sovereign immunity and absolute immunity, in this case-that avoid or defeat the claim. Wolfe, 375...