Coruzzi v. State of N.J., 82-5364

• Decision Date: 07 March 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82-5364,82-5364
• Citation: 705 F.2d 688
• Parties: Peter J. CORUZZI, Appellant, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Administrative Office of the State of New Jersey, Appellees. . Submitted Under Third Circuit 12(6)
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 688

705 F.2d 688

Peter J. CORUZZI, Appellant, v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Administrative Office of the State of

New Jersey, Appellees.

No. 82-5364.

United States Court of Appeals,

Third Circuit.

Submitted Under Third Circuit 12(6)

March 7, 1983.

Decided April 22, 1983.

Peter J. Coruzzi, pro se.

Irwin I. Kimmelman, Atty. Gen. of N.J., Trenton, N.J., for appellees.

Before SEITZ, Chief Judge, HIGGINBOTHAM and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SEITZ, Chief Judge.

Peter Coruzzi appeals an order of the district court granting summary judgment to defendants in his civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983 and 1985 (1976). This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 (1976).

I.

On November 10, 1981 the Supreme Court of New Jersey initiated removal proceedings under N.J.Stat.Ann. Sec. 2A:1B-1 et seq. (West Supp.1981) against appellant Peter Coruzzi, a Judge of the Superior Court of New Jersey. The removal proceedings were based on his arrest by state law enforcement officials on criminal charges involving bribery and misconduct in office.

On the same date, the Supreme Court of New Jersey also ordered Coruzzi's suspension from office without pay pursuant to N.J.Stat.Ann. Sec. 2A:1B-5 (West Supp.1981). At the time of his suspension, this provision read as follows: "The Supreme Court may suspend a judge from office, with or without pay, pending the determination of the proceeding; provided, however, that a judge shall receive pay for the period of suspension exceeding 90 days." Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court's suspension order provided that "Peter J. Coruzzi may move before this Court for modification of any portion of this order upon five days notice to the Attorney General or his representative..."

In December, 1981 the New Jersey Legislature amended section 2A:1B-5 by deleting the proviso limiting suspension without pay to a ninety-day period. The legislative history of the amendment explains that the New Jersey Legislature intended the change "to allow [the period of suspension without pay] to be increased indefinitely at the discretion of the Supreme Court." S. No. 3517 at 88 (Dec. 10, 1981).

In accordance with the statutory revision, Coruzzi's salary was not resumed at the expiration of ninety days. Coruzzi thereafter filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. Secs. 1983 and 1985, seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that the December, 1981 statutory revision is unconstitutional either as a bill of attainder or as an ex post facto law, (2) an injunction reinstating his pay as of February 9, 1982 and (3) interest and counsel fees. He named as defendants the State of New Jersey and the Administrative Office of the Courts of New Jersey.

Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court entered a judgment for defendants. The court held that the December, 1981 statutory revision was not an ex post facto law because it was regulatory in nature rather than penal. The court also held that the statutory revision was not a bill of attainder because of its general applicability. Coruzzi appeals both of these rulings. The removal proceedings against Coruzzi have been stayed pending an appeal of his criminal conviction to the Supreme Court of New Jersey. ¹

II.

In addition to defending the constitutionality of N.J.Stat.Ann. Sec. 2A:1B-5, appellees also urged the district court to abstain from reaching the merits of Coruzzi's federal constitutional claims under the equitable restraint doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), and its progeny. The district court, without any explanation, stated that it did not consider Younger controlling.

The Younger abstention doctrine rests on a strong federal policy of noninterference with pending state judicial proceedings. Middlesex County Ethics Commission v. Garden State Bar Association, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). Traditional principles of equity as well as federal-state comity demand that, "except in carefully circumscribed situations, the federal courts should not disrupt an ongoing state judicial process, either by preempting the adjudication of claims that could be brought to the state forum, by directing the state court to stay its proceedings, or by directly interfering in other ways with the natural course of state adjudication." In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Wright II), 654 F.2d 268, 279 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098, 102 S.Ct. 671, 70 L.Ed.2d 639 (1981).

In Middlesex County, the Supreme Court recently set forth a three part analysis for determining whether a federal court should abstain from interfering in state judicial proceedings. First, there must be an ongoing state judicial proceeding. Second, the proceeding must implicate important state interests. Third, there must be an opportunity in the state proceeding to raise the federal constitutional challenge. 102 S.Ct. at 2522.

A.

As previously noted, the New Jersey removal proceeding against Coruzzi has been stayed pending the final resolution of the criminal charges against him. The suspension of Coruzzi from office without pay, an integral part of this proceeding, is "pending" for purposes of the Younger doctrine because the Supreme Court's order permits Coruzzi to move for modification of the terms of his suspension during the pendency of his removal proceeding. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 446 n. 9, 97 S.Ct. 1911, 1919 n. 9, 52 L.Ed.2d 486 (1976) (attachment proceeding "pending" in state courts within meaning of Younger doctrine because attachment contained return date on which parties would have had opportunity to contest validity of attachment in court).

Moreover, we believe the New Jersey removal proceeding against Coruzzi is "judicial" for Younger purposes, since it bears several of the traditional indicia of a judicial action. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court initiated the removal proceeding against Coruzzi by filing a complaint pursuant to N.J.Stat.Ann. Sec. 2A:1B-3. See Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Association, 102 S.Ct. at 2522 (state bar disciplinary action judicial because, among other reasons, initiated by filing complaint with ethics and grievance committee). In addition, judicial removal proceedings are governed in New Jersey by the rules of the Supreme Court of that state, N.J.Stat.Ann. Sec. 2A:1B-8, and the Supreme Court must find cause for removal "beyond a reasonable doubt". N.J.Stat.Ann. Sec. 2A:1B-9.

Also, the removal proceeding against Coruzzi is adjudicative in nature because it requires the New Jersey Supreme Court to "investigate, declare, and enforce 'liabilities as they [stood] on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist.' " District of Columbia Court of Appeals v Feldman, --- U.S. ----, ----, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1313, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (U.S.1983) (quotingPrentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210, 226, 29 S.Ct. 67, 69, 53 L.Ed. 150 (1908)); see Williams v. Red Bank Board of Education, 662 F.2d 1008, 1017-20 (3d Cir.1981) (Younger bars federal court intervention into state administrative proceedings if proceedings are adjudicative in nature and implicate important state interests).

B.

The judicial removal and suspension proceedings against Coruzzi implicate New Jersey's interests in regulating the conduct of the members of its judiciary, and in preserving the integrity of the state's judicial branch. The Supreme Court of New Jersey has actively pursued these interests by adopting the Code of Judicial Conduct of the American Bar Association. New Jersey Supreme Court Rule 1:14. The adoption of Canon 1 of the Code, which provides that "[a]n independent and honorable judiciary is indispensible to justice in our society," demonstrates the New Jersey Supreme Court's concern about the integrity of the judiciary. Likewise, the adoption of Canon 2, which requires a judge to avoid even the appearance of impropriety in...