Cory v. White

Citation72 L.Ed.2d 694,457 U.S. 85,102 S.Ct. 2325
Decision Date14 June 1982
Docket NumberNo. 80-1556,80-1556
PartiesKenneth CORY, Controller of the State of California, et al., Petitioners, v. Mark WHITE, Attorney General of the State of Texas, et al
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus

Both Texas and California assert the right to levy state death taxes on the estate of Howard Hughes, the taxing officials of each State claiming that Hughes was domiciled in their State at the time of his death. The administrator of the estate filed an action in Federal District Court under the Federal Interpleader Act, alleging that the respective state officials were seeking to tax the estate on the basis of inconsistent claims. The District Court dismissed the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because of the failure to satisfy the Act's requirement that there be diversity of citizenship between at least two adverse parties. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the requisite diversity was present between the administrator and the County Treasurer of Los Angeles County. The court rejected the State's claim that although the suit was nominally against state officials, it was in effect a suit against two sovereign States barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

Held : The Eleventh Amendment bars the statutory interpleader action. Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 58 S.Ct. 185, 82 L.Ed. 268. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' view, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662, did not overrule Worcester County Trust Co. Pp. 89-91.

629 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1980), reversed.

Jerome B. Falk, Jr., San Francisco, Cal., for petitioners.

O. Clayton Lilienstern, Houston, Tex., for respondents Lummis, et al.

Rick Harrison, Austin, Tex for respondents White and Bullock.

Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, both Texas and California assert the right to levy state death taxes on the estate of Howard Hughes. The laws of each State impose an inheritance tax on the real and tangible personal property located within its borders, and upon the intangible personalty, wherever situated, of a person domiciled in the State at the time of death. Under the laws of Texas and California, an individual has but one domicile at any time. Taxing officials in each State assert that Howard Hughes was domiciled in their State at the time of his death. The issue before us is whether the Federal Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1335, provides a jurisdictional basis for resolution of inconsistent death tax claims by the officials of two States.

I

This case is the sequel to California v. Texas, 437 U.S. 601, 98 S.Ct. 3107, 57 L.Ed.2d 464 (1978). There, California petitioned for leave to file a complaint against Texas under this Court's original jurisdiction. At that time, we denied the motion. In concurring opinions, however, four Justices suggested that a determination of Hughes' domicile might be obtained in federal district court pursuant to the Federal Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1335.1 Three weeks after the decision in California v. Texas, the administrator of the estate filed a statutory interpleader action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. 491 F.Supp. 5. Asserting that the officials of the two States were seeking to tax the estate on the basis of inconsistent claims that each of their respective States was Howard Hughes' domicile at death, it requested the District Court to adjudicate the issue of domicile. The District Court entered a temporary restraining order prohibiting the California and Texas taxing officials from pursuing domicile-based inheritance tax claims in any other forum, including their own state courts.

The District Court then dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction for failure to satisfy the requirement of § 1335 that there be diversity of citizenship between at least two adverse claimants. It found that the administrator was not a claimant. Among the claimants, it held that the County Treasurer for Los Angeles County was a citizen of California for diversity purposes, citing Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 93 S.Ct. 1785, 36 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973). The court ruled, however, that the State of Texas, rather than its taxing officials, was the opposing claimant and that because a State is not a citizen of itself for diversity purposes, Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 15 S.Ct. 192, 39 L.Ed. 231 (1894), the action did not involve two or more adverse claimants of diverse citizenship as required by the statute.

The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the order of dismissal. Lummis v. White, 629 F.2d 397 (1980). In addition to the County Treasurer, it found the administrator of the estate, a citizen of Nevada, to be a claimant for the purposes of statutory interpleader. It recognized that Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 60 S.Ct. 44, 84 L.Ed. 85 (1939), held that a citizenship of a disinterested stakeholder could not be considered in determining interpleader jurisdiction. Reasoning, however, that here the administrator's legal duty of preserving the estate's assets from the double death tax liability and his assertion that Hughes was domiciled in Nevada, which has no state death tax, made the administrator an interested stakeholder, the court further held that the citizenship of an interested stakeholder may be considered for purposes of establishing diversity under § 1335. The requisite diversity—between the administrator and the County Treasurer of Los Angeles County—was therefore present.

The Court of Appeals went on to reject the States' claim that although the suit was nominally against state officials, it was in effect a suit against two sovereign States barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Recognizing that Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 58 S.Ct. 185, 82 L.Ed. 268 (1937), had squarely held that an interpleader action in all critical respects similar to this one was barred by the Eleventh Amendment, the Court of Appeals, relying on the concurring views of four Justices in California v. Texas, held that Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974), had silently, but effectively, overruled Worcester, and that the Eleventh Amendment as interpreted in Edelman did not bar the interpleader action.

The California officials petitioned for certiorari and, at the same time, filed a new motion seeking leave to file a com- plaint against Texas under this Court's original jurisdiction. Because of the troubling issues involving federal-court jurisdiction in such disputes, we granted certiorari. 452 U.S. 904, 101 S.Ct. 3028, 69 L.Ed.2d 404.

II

In Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, supra, the States of California and Massachusetts each claimed to be the domicile of a decedent and to have the right to assess death taxes on his entire intangible estate. A federal interpleader action followed, the estate naming as defendant the revenue officers of California and Massachusetts. This Court unanimously held that the case was in reality a suit against the States and that it was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court applied the accepted rules (1) that "a suit nominally against individuals, but restraining or otherwise affecting their action as state officers, may be in substance a suit against the state, which the Constitution forbids," 302 U.S., at 296, 58 S.Ct., at 186, and (2) that "generally, suits to restrain action of state officials can, consistently with the constitutional prohibition, be prosecuted only when the action sought to be restrained is without the authority of state law or contravenes the statutes or Constitution of the United States." Id., at 297, 58 S.Ct., at 187. The Court held that there could be no credible claim of a violation of federal law since it was clear from prior cases that inconsistent determinations by the courts of two States as to the domicile of a taxpayer did not raise a substantial federal constitutional question. The Court also concluded that the claim that the officials were acting without authority under state law was insufficient. Hence, "[s]ince the proposed action is the performance of a duty imposed by the statute of the state upon state officials through whom alone a state can act, restraint of their action, which the bill of complaint prays, is restraint of state action, and the suit is in substance one against the State which the Eleventh Amendment forbids." Id., at 299-300, 58 S.Ct., at 187-188.

The Court of Appeals' opinion that Edelman v. Jordan had overruled Worcester rested on a passage in the Edelman opinion that it interpreted as limiting the bar of the Eleventh Amendment to suits "by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury." 415 U.S., at 663, 94 S.Ct., at 1356. Because the interpleader plaintiff, the administrator of the estate, had sought only prospective relief, the appellate court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar his suit.

We are unpersuaded by this view of Edelman. That case involved a suit against state officials claiming that their administration of a particular federal-state program was contrary to federal regulations and the Constitution. Among other things, the plaintiffs sought a judgment for benefits that had not been paid them. The case was against individual officers who allegedly were violating federal law, and it therefore arguably fell outside the reach of the Eleventh Amendment under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). Edelman held, however, that the case was in effect a suit against the State itself because a judgment payable from state funds was demanded. It was correctly noted that Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 65 S.Ct. 347, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945), was authority for this result.

Edelman did not hold, however, that the ...

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