Cosby v. Alabama
Decision Date | 29 April 2016 |
Docket Number | CA 16-00070-KD-C |
Parties | WILLIAM L. COSBY, Petitioner, v. STATE OF ALABAMA, et al., Respondents. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a self-styled petition for writ for order to show cause in this Court on February 22, 2016, putatively invoking this Court's jurisdiction in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651 and 1652. Plaintiff's motion to proceed without prepayment of fees has been referred to the undersigned for appropriate relief in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and General Local Rule 72(a)(2)(R) & (S). In reviewing the motion (Doc. 2), the Court is required to screen Crosby's action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. As a result of the undersigned's review of petitioner's complaint, it is recommended that this action be dismissed, prior to service of process, for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and, alternatively, as frivolous.
Crosby is no stranger to this Court, having previously filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, attacking his 2003 murder conviction and resulting 35-year sentence, see Crosby v. Cooke, CA 04-0023-KD-B, and several actions in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see, e.g., Crosby v. State of Alabama, CA 03-0042-CG-L. In the instant self-styled petition for writ for order to show cause, Crosby explicitly eschews § 1983 ( ) and makes no mention of 28 U.S.C. § 22541 (see id. at 1-7). Instead, Crosby contends that this Court may exercise federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331; jurisdiction in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3); and, finally, jurisdiction in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651 and 1652. (Id. at 3.)
Crosby's "factual allegations" establish that, on or about December 21, 2015, he filed a petition in the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, putatively in accordance with Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to enjoin the Circuit Court of Mobile County and the Attorney General of the State of Alabama in some respect with respect to his underlying murder conviction. (See id. at 3 & 4.) According to Crosby, instead of "keeping" his Rule 57 briefs and ruling on same, the Clerk of the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals improperly transferred his case to the Alabama Supreme Court—on the basis that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction (compare id. at 4 with Doc. 1, Appendix 1)—and the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Alabama then, two days later, exceeded its authority / jurisdiction in striking his petition for injunctive relief as prematurely filed (compare Doc. 1, at 5 with Doc. 1, Appendix B, December 23, 2015 ORDER).2 Crosby's extremely confused and confusing "factual allegations" otherwise read, in relevant part, as follows:
(Id. at 4-6.) Based on the foregoing "factual allegations," Crosby requests that this Court issue a "Show Cause Order" to Alabama's Attorney General and, more importantly, the Clerks of the Alabama Supreme Court and the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, who "devised [a] policy that cause[d] Crosby a federal constitutional violation[] to access the state court—civil—for declaratory judgment under Fed.Civ.R.Pro.57." (Id. at 7; see also id. ( ).)
A. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a federal court is required to conduct an initial screening of a prisoner complaint against a governmental entity, employee, or officer to determine whether the action: (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim uponwhich relief may be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). A claim is frivolous when it "'lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.'" Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008), quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831-1832, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); see also Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (, )cert. denied, 510 U.S. 893, 114 S.Ct. 254, 126 L.Ed.2d 206 (1993) ; see Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir.) (, )cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1044, 122 S.Ct. 624, 151 L.Ed.2d 545 (2001); Clark v. State of Georgia Pardons & Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 639 (11th Cir. 1990) () (quotation omitted)). A complaint fails to state a claim when it does not include enough factual matter—taken as true—to "'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]'" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, the allegations must show plausibility. Id. at 557, 127 S.Ct. at 1966. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). That is, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief abovethe speculative level" and must be a "'plain statement' possess[ing] enough heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. at 1965, 1966 ( ). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. In determining whether a claim is stated, the factual allegations are accepted as true, except for conclusory assertions or a recitation of a cause of action's elements. Id.; Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997).
When considering a pro se litigant's allegations, the court holds them to a more lenient standard than those of an attorney, Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), but it does not have "license . . . to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se litigant] in order to sustain an action." GJR Investments v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d...
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