Cosby v. Alabama

Decision Date29 April 2016
Docket NumberCA 16-00070-KD-C
PartiesWILLIAM L. COSBY, Petitioner, v. STATE OF ALABAMA, et al., Respondents.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a self-styled petition for writ for order to show cause in this Court on February 22, 2016, putatively invoking this Court's jurisdiction in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651 and 1652. Plaintiff's motion to proceed without prepayment of fees has been referred to the undersigned for appropriate relief in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and General Local Rule 72(a)(2)(R) & (S). In reviewing the motion (Doc. 2), the Court is required to screen Crosby's action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. As a result of the undersigned's review of petitioner's complaint, it is recommended that this action be dismissed, prior to service of process, for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and, alternatively, as frivolous.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Crosby is no stranger to this Court, having previously filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, attacking his 2003 murder conviction and resulting 35-year sentence, see Crosby v. Cooke, CA 04-0023-KD-B, and several actions in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see, e.g., Crosby v. State of Alabama, CA 03-0042-CG-L. In the instant self-styled petition for writ for order to show cause, Crosby explicitly eschews § 1983 (see Doc. 1, at 4 ("This is not a § 1983 or 1985[.]")) and makes no mention of 28 U.S.C. § 22541 (see id. at 1-7). Instead, Crosby contends that this Court may exercise federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331; jurisdiction in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3); and, finally, jurisdiction in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651 and 1652. (Id. at 3.)

Crosby's "factual allegations" establish that, on or about December 21, 2015, he filed a petition in the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, putatively in accordance with Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking to enjoin the Circuit Court of Mobile County and the Attorney General of the State of Alabama in some respect with respect to his underlying murder conviction. (See id. at 3 & 4.) According to Crosby, instead of "keeping" his Rule 57 briefs and ruling on same, the Clerk of the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals improperly transferred his case to the Alabama Supreme Court—on the basis that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction (compare id. at 4 with Doc. 1, Appendix 1)—and the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Alabama then, two days later, exceeded its authority / jurisdiction in striking his petition for injunctive relief as prematurely filed (compare Doc. 1, at 5 with Doc. 1, Appendix B, December 23, 2015 ORDER).2 Crosby's extremely confused and confusing "factual allegations" otherwise read, in relevant part, as follows:

(4) Just to ask the "State" civil appellate court for "Show Cause Order" of exercise of authority-of subject matter of Clerk[]s of State of Alabama courts of their actions. And Attorney General of State of Alabama legal question of Crosby rights of the declaratory, in regards of magnitude and nature of the State of Alabama's exercise of authority and Crosby rights—to access the courts! This is not a § 1983 or 1985—yet claims not barred by Teague vs Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
(5) Because the State of Alabama place certain kinds of primary, private conduct beyond the power of the criminal law—making authority upon Crosby to proscribe as punishments, where federal laws were clearly established, where jurisdiction is power to declare the "law," and the Fed.R.Civ.P. 57 was for that to see! See: Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 506, 514 (1868). With respect to mere formalities does not relieve the State of Alabama of jurisdictional requirements!
(6) The declaratory judgment is not for an unspecified nature, it challenges Crosby rights as to the State of Alabama's subject matter—based on the allegations to decide the claims against the State of Alabama, founded upon the federal constitution, acts of Congress, within the Civil Rule 57.
(7) Crosby has a substantial liberty in this cause, which provides for the right to demand a change in government policies, and to petition thegovernment for a redress of grievances, in which is in Crosby Fed.Civ.R.P. 57 is to find out determination that involves apply the substantive federal law and federal constitution to the federal substantive facts. But without Rule 12(b)(1) by the State of Alabama Civil Judge[]s, the "Clerks" of both Appeal-Civil and Supreme Courts[-]exceeded their jurisdiction: even if aware of the existence of Crosby postconviction filed in Circuit Court of Mobile. A supervisor court must act civil or criminal. . . .
(8) The procedural Civil Rule 57 declaratory judgment was intended to reach the facts of the particular case, filed in Circuit Court, postconviction. Where Crosby clearly has an interest on basis of fundamental miscarriage of justice, even if there is another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief, in which would terminate the controversy of Crosby rights, privilege of status in which such legal interest depend.
(9) The record by the Clerks is devoid of any final judgment in which Crosby can appeal, or file a writ of certiorari. Clerks took matters into their own hands without facial subject matter jurisdiction. Violated Crosby of enumerated rights[,] see 9th Amend, U.S.C.[,] 1st Amend U.S.C.[,] Art IV § 2 U.S.C.[,] 14th Amend U.S.C.[,] due process of law of procedures, under color of law without authority.
(10) If "Nisi" was issued that would also have to be issued by a Judge of a Court which has jurisdiction, that subject matter jurisdiction, would have to be signed off by a judge! . . .

(Id. at 4-6.) Based on the foregoing "factual allegations," Crosby requests that this Court issue a "Show Cause Order" to Alabama's Attorney General and, more importantly, the Clerks of the Alabama Supreme Court and the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals, who "devised [a] policy that cause[d] Crosby a federal constitutional violation[] to access the state court—civil—for declaratory judgment under Fed.Civ.R.Pro.57." (Id. at 7; see also id. (citing to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) and requesting an award of attorney's fees and costs).)

DISCUSSION

A. Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, a federal court is required to conduct an initial screening of a prisoner complaint against a governmental entity, employee, or officer to determine whether the action: (1) is frivolous or malicious, (2) fails to state a claim uponwhich relief may be granted, or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) & (2). A claim is frivolous when it "'lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.'" Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008), quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831-1832, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989); see also Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding an action frivolous when the district court concludes that it has "little or no chance of success," because, based on the face of the complaint, the legal theories are "indisputably meritless," or the factual allegations are "clearly baseless,"—that is, the complaint "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact"), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 893, 114 S.Ct. 254, 126 L.Ed.2d 206 (1993) ; see Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir.) (a case is frivolous when it appears the plaintiff has little or no chance of success), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1044, 122 S.Ct. 624, 151 L.Ed.2d 545 (2001); Clark v. State of Georgia Pardons & Paroles Bd., 915 F.2d 636, 639 (11th Cir. 1990) ("A lawsuit is frivolous if the 'plaintiff's realistic chances of ultimate success are slight.'") (quotation omitted)). A complaint fails to state a claim when it does not include enough factual matter—taken as true—to "'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]'" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, the allegations must show plausibility. Id. at 557, 127 S.Ct. at 1966. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. . . . [This standard] asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). That is, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief abovethe speculative level" and must be a "'plain statement' possess[ing] enough heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557, 127 S.Ct. at 1965, 1966 (second brackets in original). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. In determining whether a claim is stated, the factual allegations are accepted as true, except for conclusory assertions or a recitation of a cause of action's elements. Id.; Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997).

When considering a pro se litigant's allegations, the court holds them to a more lenient standard than those of an attorney, Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), but it does not have "license . . . to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading [by a pro se litigant] in order to sustain an action." GJR Investments v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d...

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